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The China Taiwan Flirt
by china hand2
lifted from comments
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Below are a list of links to news articles dealing with some major changes taking place in Taiwan today.
For those of you who aren't familiar with the place, Taiwan recently
elected a KMT president, ending the eight year DPP hold on the
country's executive.
For those even less aware of the place: The KMT is the party which
was "led" by Chiang Kai Shek. Today's group are the mainlanders who
fled to Taiwan following Chairman Mao's victory in the CCP revolution.
Chen Shuibian was the DPP president preceding the current one, Ma
Yingjeou (pinyin: Ma Yingjiu). Originally getting his start as a lawyer
defending a group of opposition party members in a sedition case
brought against them in the late '70's, Chen gradually rose to
prominence in the party, eventually becoming Mayor of Taipei. His
public image was based on a firm anti-corruption platform, and he used
it to great advantage when running against the "old guard" KMT pols.
Leaving aside the many questions surrounding his run-up to the
presidency, once there he continued to use his anti-graft and
anti-organized crime message to attack the KMT, gradually expanding
this into a very open pro-independence position.
In 2006, however, much evidence came to light implicating him in a
massive embezzlement case that involved the theft of public funds in an
"emergency relief fund", bribes taken for major development projects,
and insider trading on the stock market. Because he was president, he
could not be prosecuted. But with the new president now sworn in, the
case is underway — and as it continues, more and more evidence is
emerging that he is guilty as charged.
All of this has also resurrected the many questions regarding the
alleged "assassination attempt" of 2004 (which was openly acknowledged
by all to have won him his 2d term).
The import of this could not be greater; Chen was a U.S. toady, and
solidly backed by the Bush junta, with which his party was in constant
and close cooperation. Many of the techniques used in U.S. elections —
astroturfing, the media echo-chamber, "opposition research", etc —
were adapted and implemented by the DPP in its effort to consolidate
its hold on the government (sometimes so baldly that it was difficult
to believe the media here in Taiwan hadn't picked up on the
similarities). Some of this I can attest to from personal experiences,
in exchanges I have had with high-ranking officials.
With Chen's decline and fall, the DPP has essentially been left
without any sort of substantial leadership. Originally born from
left-wing human rights activists, lawyers, and ethnic nationalists
(though I'd say "chauvinists" would be more accurate), the DPP today is
being led by essentially a group of housewives, its leadership all
either in jail or hounded from politics by forced admission of graft or
other corruption.
On the other hand Ma Yingjeou, the current KMT leader, is widely perceived as spotless.
This was a very difficult thing for the DPP. Their original intent
(again, from personal interactions) was to campaign against him on the
basis of his mainland Chinese ancestry. However, Ma is a Harvard
graduate, an extremely erudite analyst with a solid grounding in
practical economics (as opposed to that calculus-based bullshit that
created the current global crisis) and an avowedly traditionalist
Chinese politician who often goes back to review ancient texts for
advice on how to handle modern problems. By the time the election came
around, people were far more interested in what the government was
going to do to bring back the economy than in ethnic origins. As that
fact came to the fore, the imported "slime machine" went into action,
trying to find some way to tar the man — but, surprisingly, it found
so little traction in Ma's history that the insinuations, court cases,
and attacks simply provoked more people to support him.
With all this as background, I would like to emphasize the really
monumental changes that are currently taking place here on this little
island: already having secured direct links with China (the first in
over fifty years), Ma is now poised to secure a Free Trade Agreement
between Taiwan and China. Taiwanese businesses represent the greatest
bloc of capital investment in China, but because of historical
rivalries and, later, Chen's obstructionism, until now it has been
impossible for Taiwan and China to do business directly. That's about
to change.
Many Taiwanese are terrified by this; they have been led to believe
many things, ranging from a huge influx of cheap mainland laborers to a
vast wave of emigration that will take over the entire island and,
eventually, subvert its government.
The current process, however, is working hard to assuage these
concerns (as I mentioned before: Ma is a smart and capable guy),
particularly with regard to emigration, the relative independence of
the two political and economic systems, and the number and status of
foreign laborers.
Yet once this process begins, its inevitable end-point will be the
effective "re-unification" of Taiwan and China — and there could be
nothing worse for the long-term prospects of U.S. political presence in
the Asia-pac region.
Below, I include a set of links from various sources. Most are simply
bland commentary to back up my assertions, above, but the two Heritage
Foundation links provide some compelling insight into how the PNAC crew
view the Taiwan-China relationship, and suggest that the U.S. may be
prepared to provoke war to protect their stake in the island.
Currently, Taiwan is the center for the U.S.'s regional intelligence
gathering operations; Yangming Mountain (Yangmingshan) was, in WWII,
the main base for the Japanese Kemputai, and upon the start of the
Korean War was inherited by the U.S. military. Today it is run jointly
by the Taiwanese, Japanese and U.S. militaries.
I think people here will find this extremely interesting.
U.S.-Taiwan Defense Relations in the Bush Administration
Peter Brookes, Heritage Foundation, November 14, 2003
America's Stake in Taiwan
John J. Tkacik, Jr., Heritage Foundation, January 11, 2007
A political union of Taiwan with China would be contrary to U.S.
interests. Taiwan is a crucial element in the geostrategic structure
of the Asia- Pacific region as the magnitude of China's military might
catches up with its economic and trade power. Taiwan is democratic
Asia's third largest trading power. Its population is slightly larger
than Australia's. If Taiwan were a member of the 10-nation Association
of Southeast Asian Nations, it would be ASEAN's biggest economy and
largest military spender.
In other words, Taiwan is a significant Asia- Pacific power in its
own right. This means that America's stake in Taiwan has far-reaching
economic, political, military, and strategic dimensions.
Backups:
Former Taiwan leader Chen's treasurer pleads guilty in graft case
XINHUA, February 19, 2009
Taiwan ex-leader denies taking bribes
AFP, March 4, 2009
Taiwan economics minister Yiin rejects opposition fears over CECA with China
Taiwan News, February 24, 2009
China Seeks ‘Comprehensive’ Economic Pact With Taiwan (Update2)
Bloomberg, March 5, 2009
China says ready to talk to Taiwan, end hostility
AP, March 5 2009
Level of cross-strait tension at record low: President Ma
Taiwan News, March 5 2009
Yes, b — i’ve much appreciated your observations on the China – U.S. dance, and i sent your post about the Wen call out to a few deserving people. But as a 17 year resident of the island, i wouldn’t characterize the proposed re-unification as “selling out”, and i’m not so sure that the pledge that Wen elicited was anything more than a promise that the U.S. wouldn’t provoke a war, here (which, in the context of recent years, wouldn’t really be such a reassuring thing anyway).
Essentially, i see Taiwan faced with a clear choice: either “re-unify” with the mainland, thereby gaining wealth, security, and a free hand in international affairs, or continue its current relationship with the U.S. — and wind up the 21st century’s Cuba, isolated and poor.
Taiwan is, in every way imaginable, an independent nation. Yes, it has some serious restrictions on its ability to operate in international organizations and such, but essentially it’s already it’s own nation. Continuing a combative relationship with China, with whom it is so close in so many ways, would be a huge problem.
I believe we are seeing a massive, global shift from a Euro-American economic axis to a Eurasian one. I believe China will, over the long-term (20-30 years?), subsume the U.S.’s place in the world economy. While i do have hope — like Jim Kunstler — that the world will be forced “to rebuild our systems at smaller scales”, the fact is that China has already been managing its current size and scale for around a millenium or so. Though the world may be shrinking, come what may, China is going to remain pretty much what it is now.
Also, around 2004 i was informed by my highly placed source that the planned re-unification would take place around eight years later — or 2012, as was indicated in the Heritage link. Though i was told this confidentially, by a member of Chen’s cabinet, my informant did not seem to be troubled with the idea.
In my experience, the vast majority of people on the island would prefer to be re-united with the mainland. Hardline independence activists tend to be either rabidly pro-American “Chinese culture is so coarse and shallow!” types, or extremely naive right-wing ethnic chauvinists from the majority Min ethnic group.
Mainland China has already said it will allow Taiwan to maintain independent military and political systems and to keep its own currency and tax system; one can’t get much more independent than that. Once “re-unified”, Taiwan could set a powerful example for political and economic reforms on the Mainland, and may become an intermediary between China and the rest of the world.
But the loss for the U.S. will be huge. Most computer chips are made here (chip prices spiked for six months following the massive 1999 earthquake, here, even though only a few factories were down for something like six hours), and access to the Taiwan Strait and the Pescadores (oil!) will be lost.
And as i mentioned above, the losses in intelligence-gathering capabilities, maritime access, geo-strategic positioning, and in stature amongst U.S. allies like Japan, the Philippines, and Korea, will be massive.
Finally, i’ll also mention that Pres. Ma is widely acknowledged to be pursuing a relationship with China modeled on the current China-Singapore relationship.
So for my part, i see this process as boding much opportunity for Taiwan, with little risk; but it will be a huge blow to the U.S.’s Pacific presence, and that will mean a big hit in its global presence overall.
Posted by: china_hand2 | Mar 5 2009 18:06 utc | 5
@b’s #6 –
While most Taiwanese would prefer re-unification, all remember well the last time a large mainland contingent assimilated Taiwan into greater China: the “White Terror”, 40 years of martial law, and brutal repression of the native cultures by Chiang Kai Shek. The CCP hasn’t had any better of a human rights record, and of course all Chinese know their 5000 year history of authoritarian disregard.
So the Taiwanese may be ready to consider re-unification, but realpolitik demands that they maintain military capabilities long enough to guarantee that they get the deal they’ve been promised. I support re-unification, but i also have been vociferous among my Chinese friends about the wisdom of buying those weapons.
@Slothrop:
I’d suggest that you’re making a mistake i attribute to many “economists” and “business commentators”, these days. The question is not whether China can maintain its current standard of living (as defined by the West); the question is rather: can China turn the massive industrial base that it’s created to adapt its export-oriented economy towards domestic service.
China’s growth in recent years has been primarily domestic; while exports are certainly fuelling this growth, 43% of the population remains in the agricultural sector.
That means that, as this economic crisis deepens, the factories may stop running — but nearly a full half of the population won’t care, and will continue on with their work pretty much as they always have.
Also, remember: the entire reason the Opium Wars were fought is because China was perfectly happy trading only among its own. It had everything it needed, and found nothing elsewhere it wanted to buy. With the rise of industrial colonialism and the weapons industry, that all changed. But for the first time in a century, global conditions have re-aligned to allow the possibility to once again emerge.
The fall-off in exports will give China two opportunities: first, they will be able to develop new links between export-oriented enterprise and domestic demand. Communist ideology is ideally suited for making such adjustments, and socialist policies will be easy for them to adapt and adopt, as needed. Doing so will help shore up support for the central government, which in turn will give them the opportunity to make badly needed reforms.
Second, a fall off in exports is going to allow the Chinese to experiment more with developing new foreign relations that don’t involve the U.S. or Europe. China has already made great inroads in South America, Africa, and Central Asia. They have a rosy relationship with Russia and Iran, and are making overt, friendly gestures to both India and Pakistan.
This is significant and probable because, as the economic fall off continues, European and American foreign aid will take a huge hit. The populations of these countries are not used to giving things away while they themselves suffer, and their governments have established a system of patronage that depends on large infusions of their own currencies (and not much else) in return for privileged access to natural resources. When those currencies take a hit, neither of these cultures is going to be much inclined to have the government step in and start up private-public sector cooperatives to push foreign investment. It was such public-private sector cooperation that initially got things like the East Indian Company set up and under way, and which allowed it to dominate India in the way it did — but those populations have forgotten this, and — at least in the U.S. — will violently resist any attempt to initiate such programs.
China, however, remembers the colonialist era and its policies very, very well, and the Chinese — including the Taiwanese — all have a very strong strain of nationalistic fervor. This may be easily turned to such state-supported projects. Whether it is or not remains to be seen, but the potential is certainly there.
China, of course, has a lot of internal divisions and tensions. But China and Russia have also succeeded in keeping the U.S. out of Central Asia, and soon enough it will have a peaceful relationship with Taiwan, as well. So those divisions will be very difficult for the CIA and like-minded institutions to manipulate, and barring that i think the CCP will be able to continue to maintain order.
I know this flies in the face of the conventional “wisdom”, but one must keep in mind that the “conventional wisdom” is still being written by the same sorts of people who told us that the Iraq War would be over in six months, that the Iraqis would welcome their occupiers with flowers and wine, and that its oil proceeds would pay for everything and make the U.S. rich, rich, rich.
So pardon me if i look askance at their predictions for China, as well.
Posted by: china_hand2 | Mar 6 2009 2:58 utc | 8
First, i’d ask: why do the Chinese need the U.S. dollar to prop up their domestic growth? The only thing they need the dollar for is to buy resources, so that the factories have something to work with. More on that, later.
But i will admit that the worker-capitalist class divisions are deep, and very problematic. I expect there to be a lot of strife and trouble along those lines, yes. Yet as i pointed out: the agricultural sector makes up something like 43% of the country, and most of the growth areas in China are located along the urban peripheries — towns, smaller cities, and so forth.
So the strife should remain concentrated in the urban centers. But because those areas are so dense, government policy will be most effective there, as well, so that threat isn’t really the danger.
Meanwhile, as RsOR begin to decline, the political power of the lower classes is going to rise; that’s when the nationalism, military, and the “Communist” part of the CCP are going to really begin to be felt.
Mao won the revolution by getting the farmers involved. Now, if you were a high-ranking CCP guy, and you had a bunch of factories that were no longer producing and no longer bringing in any money, a bunch of angry workers with nothing to do, and a bunch of farmers complaining that they can’t sell their food, what would you do? You want to please the farmers, and give the factories enough to do so that everyone gets fed and nobody riots.
I’d guess you’d do something like what’s happening in South America, now, with workers’ collectives and direct state involvement in managing production. What many people forget is that it’s precisely such management that led to the “Taiwan Miracle” under Jiang Jingguo — and he also had great success with it in Shanghai, when he was the chief administrator for that city (just after WWII).
The “Taiwan Miracle” involved bringing private capital under state advisory and the levying of high taxes on profit and investments; then these were re-directed back into the economy, to fund newer ventures and research. Taiwan’s taken much of that apart, in recent years, but Jiang Jingguo’s plan worked just as famously in Shanghai, in 1946, when the Chinese economy was in much worse shape than it is, now. The current Chinese system isn’t all that much different from Jiang’s — mainly, it’s differences of scale and historical anomalies — so I believe that they will be resurrected and put to use again.
The KMT certainly remembers it, here, and have been pushing to expose a lot of the hanky-panky that goes on behind the scenes of “deregulation” (see the Chen corruption case for more on that).
Farmers don’t need BMW’s, and they don’t need gold-plated iPods. Turning these factories to produce stuff that the agricultural sector wants and can use won’t be that difficult — it just won’t be bringing in American dollars.
So that means that the Chinese will need to find the resources to power those factories — which is where the foreign investment initiatives come in. The Chinese will still hold all of those U.S. bonds; so, if things get better, they’ll get better. If things stay worse, though, then that also works in their favor: the playing field will be level, which is a relatively great step up from the current situation.
Have you been following what China’s been doing in South America and Africa? In just the last few months, they’ve gotten major stakes in mining companies around the world; these investments show no signs of slowing down.
This recession is, hands down, the absolute best thing that could happen for the Chinese economy as a whole — both domestically and in terms of foreign trade — right now. Who needs American dollars when you *own* the mining companies?
Why bother fighting America for oil when you can drill all you want in Venezuela, Central Asia, and Iran?
And as any player in China knows, the number one problem there isn’t a lack of opportunity — it’s a glut of players, most of whom have no idea what they’re doing, but most of whom are making a great deal of money to produce what is essentially a bunch of crap.
This recession will weed out the incapable, and consolidate the production base under more responsive management.
Of course, none of this takes global warming into account. I haven’t studied it deeply, but that certainly has the potential to tear all of this apart — if the farmers start starving, then all bets are off; but, to China’s credit, the Chinese as a whole — from the lowest people to the highest bureaucrats — are all taking it very seriously indeed. But beyond that, i can’t really say any more.
Posted by: china_hand2 | Mar 6 2009 4:42 utc | 10
Well, i do admit that massive climate change could cause severe problems for China. But the way i see it, if China starts experiencing drought, then soon enough the U.S. is going to, too.
So i have set aside questions of the effect of climate change, and am looking at the political and economic situation strictly from the perspective of the current situation — and, as i said, i believe that situation is extremely favorable for China, and extremely unfavorable for the U.S.’s long-term situation.
Now, the interesting thing about climate change is that it’s going to affect different areas of the continent in different ways. Desertification and drought will be serious problems up in the northern and western provinces, like Gansu, Xinjiang, and inner Mongolia.
Probably places like Qinghai, Shaanxi, and Shanxi will also feel really strong effects, particularly if Tibet suffers a great deal.
But the southern provinces — which is anything south of a line drawn from Sichuan eastward, to Zhejiang — will probably remain quite wet. All of that is either plains that have historically gotten too much rain (Sichuan), or rain-forest — bamboo, jungle, and so on. Drought isn’t likely to affect those places, and rainfall may in fact increase, there, as its predicted to do in the U.S. south (while drought would hit the U.S. midwest really hard).
In such a situation, the government would probably use rice production in the southern provinces to supplement the northern areas — and that kind of situation would result in a strengthening of the government, rather than a weakening.
But you’re absolutely right: historically, drought and famine have been large components in the downfall of Chinese imperial dynasties. This is in no small measure because the government’s raison d’etre has always been to maintain grain reserves for just such eventualities.
The modern situation, though, is quite different from even what it was fifty years ago. Now, Chinese infrastructure and transportation are all industrialized and modern, whereas even only 30 or 40 years ago that just wasn’t true.
So i haven’t really looked at these issues with an eye for the climate change question, because any effects that hit China are going to be felt at least as badly — and in fact probably much worse — by the U.S. and Europe as they will by China, but also because the modern CCP government is in a much better position to deal with such catastrophes than at any other time in China’s long history, even going back to ancient times.
Basically, i think that should China ever fall as a result of pressures brought on by climate change, then the U.S. will have already been blown apart by the same pressures.
So i suppose my greater point is that the U.S. is actually in a much more precarious position economically and politically than China is, and so long as the U.S. continues to insist on maintaining its huge military then that disparity will continue to widen.
If the only thing one has is a military, then the only thing one can sell are weapons. It has always been true that it’s a lot easier for a defender to develop defensive systems than it is for an aggressor to develop an invincible atttack. That’s what’s been so special about the 20th century: technology reached such a height that things like the blitzkreig, carpet bombing, and so on were being developed while other nations — Ethiopia, Laos, Persia or China, for instance — were had not yet advanced much (if at all) beyond medieval-era weaponry.
Also, i’ll remind folks of one other thing: when the Mongols swept across the Eurasian continent, every defender they encountered succumbed in months, if not days. Europe would have been no different, except it was saved by the death of the khan at the very cusp of their planned invasion.
China, however, held out for 20 years.
That’s intended merely as a suggestion that our post-colonial view of history has badly skewed Western visions of other civilizations and peoples. The Chinese have been, for most of history, the most technologically advanced people on the planet. The 20th century was, in that respect, a very large aberrance from the norm of these last two thousand years.
Only in the last ten or twenty years have they at last established the research parks, the scientists, the political and economic organization to begin competing with European and American innovation as equals — and, in fact, they are the first colonized people to ever independently manage such a feat. One could perhaps argue that Japan did, but it wouldn’t be a convenient argument. Otherwise, there are really no others: Africa? South America? Central Asia? South-East Asia?
That’s a monumental sea-change in geo-politics. As just a gesture towards what it might mean, i’d recall the missile test last year, the one where China shot a satellite out of orbit.
I really believe the Chinese are only going to get stronger — and right now, the U.S. looks as if it can only go in the opposite direction.
Posted by: china_hand2 | Mar 7 2009 11:39 utc | 20
Overall, i’d give it something between a B and C+.
The geographic lesson is good, and makes some very important points that most westerners haven’t yet assimilated. The broad historical strokes are more or less accurate, but flat-out wrong on some important details (Colonialist Europeans essentially inherited trading networks that had already been long-established by the coastal Chinese, some of them 1000 years or more old), and misleading on others (the Tang dynasty was actually the first non-Han dynasty; they were Turks, thus you see all the Tang-era statues of horses which weren’t reproduced in such quantities during other eras; also, Cantonese isn’t “the language of the South”, but rather just the language of the South-eastern coastal areas; etc).
Geopolitically, though, i did learn something; the statistic about the farmland-per-capita gave me an “A-ha!” moment. It’s something i’d intuited, but hadn’t ever articulated, nor seen (AFAICR) any stats on. Yet it’s wrong to say that this is a “historical” fact, or that it has been something China has long grappled with; it’s a product of overpopulation, and as such is really only a 20th c. problem (and when seen that way, puts the starvation that occurred during the Great Leap Forward into a new light — as well as the one-child policy). Certainly, it drives home the need the Chinese have for food imports.
The description of the economic disparities between the West and the East are spot-on, but again i’d question whether it’s accurate to say that China is “dependent” upon exports. For food, i’d say (esp. in light of that new statistic) probably; but for everything else, i can’t agree.
When the author talks about “regionalism”, he’s missing an important quality of Chinese history: “China” is really four or five independent socio-economic zones. Xinjiang/Gansu/Sichuan, Tibet, North China (Manchuria, Mongolia), Central China (from Beijing down to Henan, on over to the edge or partway into Sichuan), South China (from Henan down to Guangdong, on over to Guangxi), and then maybe far-southern China (Yunnan down to Burma, and over to the Tibetan plains).
Yunnan is something of an anomaly. The cultures there are more closely related to South-east Asia (Laos, Burma, etc) than they are to the Han Chinese; but then, all of Guangdong originally was, too, so it may be that we’re just witnessing the tail end of a historical shift that began 1300 years ago.
These four or five zones interact with each other to create wealth when unified, but when they break apart they each become independent states. So “regionalism” seems a rather lukewarm phrase to use. Rather, i’d say that China as we see it is more like the European Union than it is like, say, Russia, or the U.S. That is, “regionalism” is a constant feature of the union, and it is the union — not regionalism — that is the exception.
Now, with that point in mind i’d just say that the Chinese people are, by and large, not currently interested in seeing that union dissolve. So long as the union can deliver concrete returns, that won’t change. But — and this is an important point — now that China has entered the modern era, with all its technology, there is no reason to suppose that once the current union dissolves that China will fall apart so completely as it has in the past. Just as with Europe — where France, Germany, Britain, and Italy spent centuries fighting with one another for control of the continent — China, too, may be on the cusp of discovering a new form of political unity and cooperation.
For that to happen, though, will require a re-organization of the government. Much easier said than done, but my point is that it’s still a possibility, and also that it won’t happen overnight. So with the population now much better educated about the various cultures encompassed by the “Middle Country”; with transportation and communication links now saturating the entire land; with the ongoing experiments in autonomous zones, cultural reserves, etc; with the astounding economic resurgence of the last thirty years; and with the military now increasingly distinct from all other aspects of internal affairs, i see it as much more likely that we will see a loosening of government control and an increase in regional autonomy.
As Taiwan is brought into the fold, this process should accelerate.
Now, today i was just up in a mountain bamboo-grove with an old master bamboo-weaver. In his whole life, he’s never worn shoes. I mention that because he, and the people who live with him up there in those mountains, could not care less about watching t.v, having a nice car, getting an i-pod, or any of those things (he was just telling me today that the only t.v. programs he watches are either about bamboo, magic, or maybe dancing — nothing else). This is Taiwan, one of the most technologically advanced places in the world, right now. Yet even today, this little island is still filled with communities like that. These folk live their lives pretty much like their grandparents and great-grandparents did, except they also have computers, Karaoke, and motorized vehicles, as well. They value savings, they are very thrifty with their money, they like to travel, and they don’t buy many things that don’t directly help them get the farming done (and when they travel, the always eat Chinese food).
I mention that because the areas of China this guy is talking about — the western areas, the “poor” areas — are all just like that, except a full generation or three behind. I translate daily articles for a local charity news channel (Da Ai TV), and we do stories on these rural areas of Sichuan, Gansu, and Xinjiang. The folk there are quite simple, and living their lives pretty much the way they always have — except they have motorized vehicles, maybe a t.v., rarely a computer.
There’s a LOT that eastern China could sell them, provided they had the money to buy it. But of course, to get the money to buy those things, they need jobs. Jobs require factories — but the factories haven’t been built.
The reason those factories haven’t been built has less to do with foreign trade than it does the internal political divisions of the Chinese state. Up to now (or just a few years ago) the western provinces have been managed by military men. This was a holdover from the economic institutions developed under Lin Biao and Mao, and one of Deng’s main legacies (and the one most vigorously pursued by Jiang Zemin) was the divestiture of the PLA from the mainstream civilian management of the country (i.e. — businesses, technology, etc). This was the main thrust of an anti-corruption campaign, and probably the single-most effective measure in the effort to free up the Chinese economy.
The West is still dominated by these ex-military men, by men who are allied with the military, and by military influence.
So i’d argue that the analysis is over-simplified. “China” is really four or five distinct economies. Those economies support distinct cultures, and each has a different function and relationship relative to the central Han areas. These central areas are the most built up and developed of the country (Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong, and everything in between). The outlying economies, however, have yet to develop — not because they can’t, and not because they won’t, but because up until now they’ve largely been managed by the military, and the military out there is pretty nastily corrupt and the last thing the government wants to do is throw money at them.
The question, of course, is whether or not the CCP is going to be able to help shift this development into the Western areas. This article misses all of that. Back seven years ago, when Hu was just ascending, plans were being put into place to start this transition. Currently, they are focusing on extremely progressive educational initiatives, so it’s still a bit early to tell — but the plans are under way, and it’s so far, so good.
So while i’d say that the Chinese economic situation may be something of a balancing act, it’s only so in the sense that the European Union is a balancing act — and, just as nobody’s expecting a massive world war to break out in Europe any time soon, so also we should look askance at anyone who predicts the dissolution of China. The Chinese have been practicing this particular balancing trick a lot longer than the Europeans have and are arguably much better at it. So with the current manufacturing base along the coastal areas, plans to expand this economy into the west, and their slow and peaceful overtures towards Taiwan, i think the CCP has laid down a foundation stronger than the one upon which the EU is built, and is working a more effective geopolitical strategy than the U.S. is.
Still, the food issue is very important; but even so, i think it’s the only real deal-breaker CCP need worry over.
Posted by: china_hand2 | Mar 9 2009 18:32 utc | 25
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