Moon of Alabama Brecht quote
March 10, 2009
Renewed Iraq Violence

After a relative quiet January, February saw a sharp increase of violent death in Iraq with 258 people killed. In March the situation seems to become even worse.

Last Thursday Thursday, a truck bomb killed 10 people and wounded scores at a livestock market near Hilla, south of Baghdad. Sunday a suicide bomber killed 28 near a police academy in Baghdad. Today a suicide bomber killed 33 at a a tribal reconciliation meeting.

The Thursday attack was likely against predominant Shia, Sunday's attack against state security and today against Sunni leaders cooperating with the state. That makes it likely that this campaign is run by former Baathists and/or some salafist takfiris.

What is the idea behind this campaign? To restart a sectarian civil war? To unsettle the government? To keep the U.S. in Iraq?

I see little chance for them to achieve any of those goals.

Comments

The answer is: it’s either the US military trying to refuel sectarian conflict, though it’s pretty well dead these days. I would have said the US as a whole, but it seems that Obama is no longer one who wants to continue the war in Iraq, only the military.
Or it’s the Kurds, trying to re-establish their position, which has declined seriously in recent months, again by trying to repro

Posted by: Alex | Mar 10 2009 17:20 utc | 1

again by trying to reprovoke sectarian conflict.
That’s better.

Posted by: Alex | Mar 10 2009 17:21 utc | 2

When you ain’t got nothin you got nothin to lose

Posted by: par4 | Mar 10 2009 17:51 utc | 3

I see little chance for them to achieve any of those goals.

Of course, there is no chance.
Ethnic strife and regional conflict is name of the game. US in not in interest to people live in harmony. Harmony and cooperation among nations particularly in Eurasia, is the worst nightmare of father of Geopolitics Halford Mackinder who’s is philosophy behind foreign politics of US and UK snice 1945.
Peace doesn’t have chance in: Middle East, Balkan, Korea, Afghanistan, just to mention these chronic world promblems, and wherever US and UK boot stepped up. I know that from my personal experience.
It is very symptomatic killing of two soldiers and one police man in Norther Ireland in past two days. It ought to be said that most of the killings in N.I. is done by special force of British Army called Force Research Unit. They have been engaged in Baghdad (destroying golden mosque), as well.
Obviously, London and Washington need “release valve” and shift attention from domestic problems to somebody else land.

Posted by: Balkanac | Mar 10 2009 18:07 utc | 4

Alex: certainly the US doesnt want renewed strife of any kind in Iraq. We need to sell the “surge worked” policy.
US media have been uniformly reporting lately that al Maliki has successfully tightened his grip on power. I wonder if that’s just pr? I wouldn’t be surprised if all the old rivalries are still just waiting for the right time. How long will the US largesse to Sunni militants last? And what will they do when it stops?

Posted by: seneca | Mar 10 2009 18:35 utc | 5

I would bet anything that the US military is behind it. I’ve watched the Israelis play this game for year.
Time goes by without incident. The government sees no reason to do anything, because they’re military strategy worked. Then calls start to be raised about reducing the military involvement. Suddenly tensions “unexpectedly” rise again. So the military, says it can’t leave because it’s not secure. Heads they win…
The military spent the last year convincing Americans that the surge was successful. So Obama took the military at their word and committed to a withdrawal. Now, as if by magic, the place is no longer as secure as hyped, so obviously the military can’t leave.

Posted by: JohnH | Mar 10 2009 18:38 utc | 6

I wonder if that’s just pr? I wouldn’t be surprised if all the old rivalries are still just waiting for the right time.
No, that’s not right. It was the US that was pushing the sectarianism (deliberately). When the US departs, things will calm down. Even if not instantly. They’re more interested in being Iraqis than Sunni or Shi’a.
So if the US wants peace, there’s no problem.
The problem is how to justify the bases… Difficult one. That’s why the generals might have an interest to place a few bombs.

Posted by: Alex | Mar 10 2009 20:05 utc | 7

but Alex, listening to National Propaganda Radio on the way home from work I heard Gates declare that *all” US troops would be out of Iraq by end of 2011. not even a single Marine stays to guard the embassy as I understand it.
he wouldn’t lie through his teeth would he?

Posted by: ran | Mar 10 2009 22:56 utc | 8

the empire controls nothing, least of all, its own defeat
through sanctions & war the empire has made iraq hell & it will remain hell until the 4 square kilometre embassy & all other bases are ruins

Posted by: remembereringgiap | Mar 11 2009 1:06 utc | 9

Iraq is a historical hotspot, where three cultures meet and habitually fight with one another.
It’s not a “nation” in any European sense of the word.
Sectarianism is the rule, there, and the idea that the Iraqis “just want to be Iraqis” is false.
Iraq under the Baathists was held together by a military junta led by S. Hussein.
It was the same under the British, the Turks, and so on, ad infinitum, back into pre-Islamic history.
Iraq has been a region of cultural conflict going back as far as Persia, and before — back to Babylonia, Akkad, and even further.
That hasn’t changed, and it’s not going to.
I think that every sane person who knows anything about the place has always known that once the U.S. leaves there will be another war. But i do agree with Alex, when he says that such conflict will make an excellent excuse to extend the occupation.
Here’s hoping Obama has the fortitude to stand by his word.

Posted by: china_hand2 | Mar 11 2009 4:16 utc | 10

It’s not a “nation” in any European sense of the word. Sectarianism is the rule, there, and the idea that the Iraqis “just want to be Iraqis” is false.
That is a neo-con style propaganda meme, invented to justify the US breaking up the country, divide and conquer. A theme with which the US has often been accused on these pages, and rightly. Iraq is an ancient country with an identity going back thousands of years. Its history is very parallel to that of Germany, and nobody accuses Germany of not being a country. Unfortunately it doesn’t have as easily defendable frontiers as China.

Posted by: Alex | Mar 11 2009 6:26 utc | 11

It’s interesting, that there are some 2-3 million refugees that have escaped from Iraq, and have filled into enclaves in Syria, Jordan, and other countries. If sectarian animosity were endemic to the Iraqi psyche you’d think these places where they have taken refuge would see a corresponding increased violence, as these people have little left to lose. But, this is not the case at all. It would almost seem that after leaving Iraq, the refugees also left their sectarian rancor behind as well. How could that be? Unless that is, they never actually held those attitudes in the first place, or up until one group was empowered to take up arms against the other – as in divide and conquer.

Posted by: anna missed | Mar 11 2009 7:29 utc | 12

By the way, I found Odierno’s recent statement shows the way the wind is blowing:

He added that he believes all U.S. troops will be out of Iraq by 2011, as laid out in the security agreement announced by President Obama.

This means that Odierno has understood. He has been told to toe the line. And he’s doing it. But he still yearns to stay:

“If they ask us to stay we will probably stay and help them out. If they ask us to just provide them the advising and training support, then we’ll do that,”

I have some difficulty in believing the cynics these days, those who maintain that O. is just Bush Imperialism continued. The position over Iraq no longer fits in with the “Imperialist” model.

Posted by: alex | Mar 11 2009 11:56 utc | 13

That is a neo-con style propaganda meme, invented to justify the US breaking up the country, divide and conquer. A theme with which the US has often been accused on these pages, and rightly.
Uhhh….. so what you’re saying is that the Sunnis didn’t expel all the Shia from their enclaves?
Or was it the Shia who didn’t expel all the Sunni from their enclaves?
Or perhaps you have some insider information that proves the Kurds aren’t actually serious about building their Kurdistan? It’s not as if they haven’t been fighting a civil war these last fifty years — right?
I have no problem with anyone who despises the neocons, but even so, it’s important to keep yourself in the “reality based” world.
Iraq is the meeting place of three different cultures that, traditionally, have been very firm about their unwillingness to mix. The attempt to build a nation out of them is relatively recent, and once the U.S. decides to depart those tensions will reassert themselves.
As i said above: i agree with you that fatuous elements in the U.S. leadership may try to use these tensions as an excuse to reassert a military presence in the region. But without strong evidence, it would be very wrong to blame the increases in violence solely on those same stupid people.
Also, i’m sure many Iraqis would probably find it simply laughable.
@anna:
Syria is a largely Sunni country run by Shia. The leadership there works very hard to ameliorate ethnic tensions, and i’m sure that’s an important element in their success at keeping the violence out of the refugee camps. And of course, it helps to have a well-supplied and well-trained military to police them (as the Syrians do).
But let’s not get too rosy, here; those camps are pretty hellish places.
The Jordanians have been managing Palestinian enclaves for decades, now, as well. They too have a strong military.
Lebanon had a bunch of Palestinian refugee camps, but they didn’t have a strong military. We all know what happened (and is continuing to happen) there.
So i don’t see peaceful co-existence inside a refugee camp as evidence supporting an “Iraqi National Identity.”

Posted by: china_hand2 | Mar 12 2009 8:14 utc | 14

Uhhh….. so what you’re saying is that the Sunnis didn’t expel all the Shia from their enclaves?
Sorry, ch2, I don’t have time to rewrite all this just for you. But there was v. little sectarianism before 2003. It just suddenly ‘blew up’, all of a sudden. And I see you like Kurds; that’s why you take the point of view you do.

Posted by: Alex | Mar 12 2009 9:13 utc | 15

The kind of ethnic strife we’re talking about here is more a function of group(think) behavior, and patterns of violence created by politics. It’s simply wrong to assume that “these people have been killing each other for thousands of years” as if it’s an inherent or innate part of their (individual) personality. The lack of sectarian violence in the refugee areas is evidence that the animosity is not an inherent characteristic, but is rather a group function or response to political pressure upon a group identity. This of course is no different than any group identity may have as a response to a particular political pressure. Remove the pressure and the response goes away, apply the pressure the response returns. I’m pretty sure that in America, with the proper political pressure the Native people could be re-demonized into an expected (violent) response pattern that could once again characterize them as endemic “savages”.

Posted by: anna missed | Mar 12 2009 18:58 utc | 16

It’s simply wrong to assume that “these people have been killing each other for thousands of years” as if it’s an inherent or innate part of their (individual) personality.
Well, no. Actually, it isn’t.
The Sunni and Shia have been fighting for control of the Sunna ever since the Shia split from the Sunni line.
The Kurds have been fighting against the Arabs for as long as the two have co-existed; and if you include pre-Islamic history, then it’s in no way wrong to say that “these people have been fighting for thousands of years.”
Here in Taiwan, there is a small but vibrant Muslim community. Once you start to get involved with them, the most immediate thing that sticks out is that — unlike, say, the Indonesians, Malaysians, or Central Asian Muslims — the Middle Easterners are extremely clannish. Egyptians, Jordanians, Palestinians, Maghrebians — they all stick together, and they all share very similar opinions of one another (many of which aren’t very flattering).
Even within a relatively peaceful place like Jordan, the tribal lines are drawn with prejudicial distinction. Palestinians band together, and they are at the mercy of the Urban Jordanian security establishment; the Bedouin from the deserts do not enjoy the same authority as the urban Jordanians, but they are given freer rein to move around and do as they please than the Palestinians. Jordanian Christians have a culture distinct from Jordanian Muslims — and so on.
Lebanon is another good example. It’s a nation, right? Well, no; not really. “National identity” connotes a shared ethnicity and cultural background, but beyond doing business with one another, the Lebanese don’t have that. There’s Hamas; there’s the PLO; there’s Hizb’allah; there’s the Phalangists; Christians vs. Muslims; darkies vs. whities; and so on.
Iraq is no different in this respect. Yes, Hussein succeeded in enforcing a measure of peace and cooperation upon the people — but he did so at the point of a gun, utilizing torture, imprisonment, and cursory executions with no underlying legal process. Once he was removed, it was a certainty that violence would erupt along ethnic and cultural fault-lines — just as it did during the Second Persian Gulf War, when the U.S. encouraged the southern Shia to revolt and then hung them out to dry.
As i said before: i support any criticisms of the neocons, and how they handled the war. I always opposed it, and despise the people who created it. But we should not fall into the very ugly habit of blaming the U.S. for everything. I say this even as i am fully prepared to acknowledge that the U.S. invasion was the catalyst for the violence. I can agree with you when you say, anna, that:
Remove the pressure and the response goes away, apply the pressure the response returns.
But it is a terrible mistake — hubristic, in fact — to suggest that the pressures on this region ONLY come from the U.S. and its partner in crime, Israel. Setting aside Russia’s role over the last thirty or forty years, it is disingenuous to pretend like the Saudi-backed Salafis haven’t had a part to play in stoking these fires, just as it is to forget that Iran has a vested interest in seeing its Shia supporters come out victorious.
Then, of course, there are the Baathists. My suggestion to you, regarding the Syrian camps, would be that the Baathist elements are doubtlessly strengthened and re-inforced within Syria. But the suggestion that this indicates a shared, peacefully accepted national identity of some sort doesn’t follow.
The Baathists under Hussein were bloody, torturous, and lacked no compunction about such acts as gassing their own civilian population. Stuff like that doesn’t happen amongst a people who truly share a “national identity”, as was the case with France, Germany, or Britain, these last few hundred years.
Would you also say that the Irish share a national identity? Northern Ireland? What about Scotland — would you say they share a national identity as British? What about the Basques?
These questions are not simple things to answer, and if one’s intent is to persuade people to re-think the causes and consequences of this war, it’s best to acknowledge the complexity, rather than trying to sweep it under the rug and blame everything that happens on the U.S.
The U.S. military is, obviously, NOT in control of everything that happens, there. Obviously because, if they were, the U.S. government wouldn’t be trying so hard to pull it out.

Posted by: china_hand2 | Mar 13 2009 6:34 utc | 17

China_hand2, maybe I’m not being clear but, I think you’re drawing inferences and jumping to conclusions. Nowhere did I mention nationalism or national identity as it pertains to ethno-sectarian violence. I did mention it only elliptically in “The kind of ethnic strife we’re talking about here is more a function of group(think) behavior, and patterns of violence created by politics.” My main point being, that such ethno-sectarian violence (in Iraq) is not harbored so much on the individual level as a particular (Iraqi) innate characteristic – anymore than any other such group identities in any other social contexts. But are instead more of a function of external influences and pressures exerted upon one group (against another) for political advantage.
You cite several examples of apparent sectarian discord within nation states, but in all those examples (as in Iraq) there are/were significant external political pressures acting in proxy to inflame various group identities for their own (externally driven) political colonial/neo-colonial advantage. As an aside, you’re odd (contradictory) assertion that the Middle Easterners in Taiwan are “clannish and stick together”, regardless of country of origin, would seem to reinforce my main point, that Iraqi’s aren’t anymore prone to exclusive sectarian identity than any other sectarian identity group, minus the outside manipulation.
As far as Saddam goes, in many ways his regime was a precursor to the same problems as the U.S. occupation, in that his regime attempted to impose an a-la Shah of Iran lite secular government structure through the same as usual western enabled tyrannical corruption and ethno-sectarian divisionism. The U.S. has now killed about the same number of people as Saddam did in a similar attempt to deny the true reflection of the larger (multi-sectarian, but Islamic) national identity of the people of Iraq. As the U.S. leaves Iraq, there will of course be violence – as the political realities equate and find new balance with the cultural, social, religious, and historical realities. Bu all in all, I think most Iraqi’s will in retrospect see the U.S. occupation itself as the high water mark of violence, as opposed as to what ever happens in it’s wake.

Posted by: anna missed | Mar 13 2009 9:50 utc | 18

alex #11, spot on.
Iraq is the meeting place of three different cultures that, traditionally, have been very firm about their unwillingness to mix.
that is crazy. baghdad was mixed neighborhoods, lots of cross marriages. you should hang out on iraqi blogs more, they don’t say this. iraqis self identify as iraqis before their sect, in every poll.
badger has a number of recent posts dealing with the latest political shinanigans in iraq. for a brief driveby check out De-Bremerizing Iraq: Can it be done?

(As for the American version of the Iraq storytelling, it is painfully clear that any discussion of de-Bremerizing is taboo. This is partly reflected in the media boycott of the recent NUPI/Iraqi report, and more immediately it is reflected in the initial reporting of the latest violence, which is uniformly being attributed to resurgent sectarian and ethnic struggles, in effect reprising the stories of the 2003-7 period, in which only the sectarian factors were reported, in effect denying that there was any such thing as principled resistance to the occupation, something supposedly proved by the story of the Awakenings. It stands to reason that a Bremerized, sectarian, Iran-vulnerable system will be resisted just as the actual occupation was, and the American story will be the same: There isn’t any principled resistance: it all goes back to sectarian in-fighting).

i recommend reading the last 4 or 5 posts to grasps the multi pronged theories. to keep pulse on iraq , ladybird @ roads to iraq is crucial.

Cat and mouse game between Maliki and Hakim explains the statement issued by Abbas Al-Biyati (close to Maliki) saying:
Maliki never said in his statement that he invited the Ba’ath Party for reconciliation.
But leave the official reports, the unofficial scenario is totally different, as reported by Akhbar-Al-Khaleej saying that Maliki’s delegations are in secret negotiations with both factions of Ba’ath Party (Al-Duri-faction and Mohammad Younis-faction), as for why these negotiations kept secret:
Maliki wants to contain all the opposition abroad, but the Government did not want to announce the first moves waiting for a major successes by the national reconciliation.
Arab media reported yesterday’s Al-Shorouk report, Al-Arab said:
Some think that this plan is science-fiction, others think that this is a very logical to balance the political power (Shiites vs Sunnis and Islamists vs Seculars) before the withdrawal of the US forces.
Also notice the left sidebar, the newspaper ran a poll asks the following:
What do you think of the timing of the talk about the US wants to restore the Ba’ath Party and Iraqi government’s reconciliation initiative?
– US coup (against the current Iraqi government) 36.7%
– Victory for the (Iraqi) resistance 43.9
– A real reconciliation 19.4
This morning the US coup option was ahead, later in the evening the victory option scored higher.

head over to badgers and read the last few posts, i’m not qualified to give a nutshell rundown.

Posted by: annie | Mar 13 2009 14:09 utc | 19

chinahand, as i mentioned earlier, your assertions do not match the voices of most iraqi bloggers. for example, i have been reading some of the teens blogs for quite awhile, the war has gone on so long you can literally listen to them growing up and evolving thru their teens. they have mixed friends. in mosel when the purging of christians was occurring their was horror in their (muslim) voices when their neighbors were forced to move. the policy of walls is meant to force and then reinforce the separation all leading eventually to the neocon/zionist plan of division thru sect. in politie company in iraq you never ask what sect a person is and many of the people didn’t even know what their friends were prior to the war. according to them anyway.
an example from circa 06 a year in review by Konfused Kid, who now calls himself Catharsis.

This year contains the best day of my life: The Graduation Day, I have never felt such an exaltness and looseness in my entire life, I danced like crazy until i got too tired to stand up – maybe it’s also because i felt very cool that day – Our costume was a Mexican Mariaachi, I was the only one with the long hair wig and the fake big moustaches, I was the talk of the town! I also wrote a song for the march and had the guys sing it, I felt very happy that day.
That day was June 5, 2006, six days later was the worst day of my entire life, my four friends were killed – for most people, graduation is a big thing, for me it didn’t register much, because its joy was swiftly encompassed by the great sorrow that swallowed it – this event has changed my incredibly – I became very pessimistic towards Iraq’s future and have now entirely different thoughts about my identity, before this year I used to think of myself as an:
1. Iraqi first, and most importantly
2. Arab second.
3. Muslim thirdly, not as important as the first two.
But today, I am:
1. Muslim first.
2. Arab second.
and I don’t want to be an Iraqi, I didn’t ask for being one in the first place.
The longhand explanation requires much discussions for which this year-in-review has no.
For me, “Iraqi” now is just a tag I am identified with, cuz of my dialect, the place I was born, etc- as for the emotions it conveys, it don’t register here anymore. and I wonder if it ever did..actually. I am not even sad as I write this, I just want to say this out and loud for all to hear.

these friends of his, his very best lifelong friends. it was just brutal reading about their deaths. and sect had never been important to them.
9/22

They were the best of people. Two of them, my best friends, were Shiites; another was Sunni and the other was Christian — an example of unity that can never be portrayed in a million years by the hypocritical fake advertisements they numb us with on TV. Three of them lived in the internal hostel because their families were abroad, and each one’s story is sadder than the other.
Ninos, the Christian, was perhaps the kindest person I ever met, the type that fills you with a warm glow when you speak with him … you connected to a forgotten fountain of happiness that was spurred by his natural do-goodness. He had just two weeks until he would have finished his final exams and returned forever to the safety of Kurdistan, where his Assyrian family resides.
Yahya was a Sunni from Mosul, also a nice guy: He could not even hurt the ground he stepped on. (He and Ninos were roommates, and were called “the saints” by their neighbors.) His family had moved to Egypt after being threatened. He had one week until he was to leave for home, and on top of that, get married. The girl in question is in our academic department. She is now in a state of paralysis.
The third, Hobi, was a Shiite of Turkish descent from Karbala. He was my best friend. The day before, I asked him if we could take a picture together since this was the last year of college and I would probably never see him again after he set off for Spain, where his mother lives. Little did I know I would get that picture, and that it would be a picture of his grave.
I remember precisely the moment when I got the phone call at 10:30 p.m. telling me that three of them were dead.* The time went very slowly. The room, just a minute earlier moist and extremely hot, became sullen and cold. In the living room Nancy Ajram was loudly assuring us of her undying joy and devotion, strangely out of context.
I went upstairs and wept alone. I wept all day, frequently looking at the mirror and gesturing incoherently … Robert DeNiro would’ve been ashamed …
The next day, while I was walking in the protest in which the three coffins were held up high and marched around the college courtyards, everyone was crying, everyone was shouting — it was a terrible sight. But when I heard the shouts “No! No to Terrorism!” up ahead, I didn’t feel a thing. They were exploiting us, we the people, we the good people of Iraq who never looked at our good friends as Sunni, Shia and Christian — these divisions did not exist. We cried for them together. We prayed the Islamic funeral prayer over all three of them, even though it is supposed to be unacceptable in Islam to pray for the Christian dead. I didn’t feel that I wanted vengeance towards Zarqawi in particular. I didn’t know why then, but I think I do now: because it is not only Zarqawi who is to blame.

you can literally hear him change over the course of the year. scroll to 4/19/06. scroll to the finali in Friday, March 24, 2006
The Day I Tried To Go Home…

———–
FINAL SCORE
2 HOMEBOYS KILLED, 16 POLICE OFFICERS DEAD.
—————————————————————
And so here I am, back home after one of the most troublesome days I’ve yet met – made more intense by JIDIDA’s incessant fears and nagging.Today I was utterly and truly convinced of the helplessness of the political game, I lost faith again in keeping interest, true, I love my coutnry and I wish the best for it, and I may have been more optimistic in the past – much to the admiration of those stupid clueless Americans who just want someone to assert their legality of the war – FUCK THE EXCUSE, the country is falling apart, people, it takes strong strong wills to have more faith in this country, look everywhere on the blogosphere, hope is quickly dying…I just wanna swear my ass off at this horrible mess we’ve deteroriated into, it is now impossible, I tell you, impossible not to think of sectarian terms, as people are being divided into Sunni and Shiite territories, things do not look very promising. Six months earlier, I didn’t even know what the word ‘sectarian’ meant in English, after a death of a close family friend by Badr, I became aware of the danger, but I shrugged it off as something that cannot ferment a long-standing unity, but today, it is amazing how little evil work can change a belief so quickly – these days, every person I meet, there’s a little voice inside me that wants to know if he’s Sunni or Shiite, I’ve become hatefully familiar with all the discrmiminations between Sunni and Shiite and how to tell who’s who (names, areas, clothings, rings, vocal intonations)…All out Brother-against-brother Civil War? why the hell not….
The only place I feel free of these constraints is in college, most of my friends there are Shiite from southern governorates, and some of them are actually UIA-affiliated, they are also the nicest people – we spend our days talking girls and laughing head-over-heels, but when you get back to your repsective Sunni/Shiite territory, things are a lot different.
Well well, what to do, I guess I’ll turn up Metallica’s ‘Mercyful Fate’ and revel in swearing it all away as a last resort of an insecure teenage dude who’s weak with words..
[hip-hop backup beat]
F**k You
F**k Me
F**k Sunni
F**k Shiite
F**k Iraq
F**k USA
F**k Allys
F**k
F**k
Piss
C()t
D((k
Stupid Mothafa’in’ Politicans

at 10/18 he lists a whole bunch of iraqi bloggers and their reaction to the traitor bloggers (ITM) denouncing the lancet study. this is just ONE young voice, who has really changed during the war. i suggest you listen more to iraqi voices, especially of the youth before you make such sweeping statements.

Posted by: annie | Mar 13 2009 14:53 utc | 20

China_hand2, maybe I’m not being clear but, I think you’re drawing inferences and jumping to conclusions. Nowhere did I mention nationalism or national identity as it pertains to ethno-sectarian violence.
No. Actually, i think it’s just that i was making inferences and jumps between yours and Alex’s posts. I made the mistake that you were offering support directly for his perspective, when it’s clear now that you were simply offering up your own, much subtler points about what was going on.
I agree with you completely that this violence is not an innate “Iraqi” quality. Which i think you can easily believe, because i don’t really think there’s such a thing as an “Iraqi”, in the “Western” sense of the word.
But — just in case there’s any question about this – i also wouldn’t ever say there’s any greater or lesser tendency towards violence in any group of humans over another. Barring genetically incontrovertible evidence (which i totally do not believe we will ever have), then such a statement seems to me simply uncouth.
And the rest of your post i am in complete agreement with.
To respond to your implied question about the Muslim community, here: there is nothing contradictory in saying someone is clannish as a Muslim, and also clannish within Islam. In fact, one implies the other. I’d suggest that someone who sees the world from the perspective of a clan, would tend to conform to a sociology not too far away from:
first the immediate family, next the extended family, third the tribe, fourth the people/land, fifth the religion, sixth the business group, seventh the….
You see what i’m getting at; there’s nothing contradictory in saying that the Muslims are clannish as Muslims, and yet also clannish internally, as well.
However, insofar as you talk about the Iraqi society: well, i don’t need to hang out on Iraqi blogs. There are a few Iraqi, Jordanian, and Egyptian expats around here, and i can simply ask them.
Really: everyone in the Middle East knows that, historically, the lands surrounding Baghdad have been a hotspot for Persian-Arab conflict. Read the Wikipedia entry on it; it was founded in the Abbasid period, and within only a couple of generations the wars began — and continued, on, right through the Turkish possessions, into the present day.
Elsewhere in Wikipedia, we find an attributed comment:
Throughout most of the period of Ottoman rule (1533-1918) the territory of present-day Iraq was a battle ground between the rival Ottoman Empire and Safavid Iranians. Economically, Iraq was one of the least developed areas of the Ottoman Empire. The region suffered from frequent inter-clan struggles and major outbreaks of plague and cholera.
So really, you and Alex haven’t a historial leg to stand on, here.
Baghdad and the region surrounding it have been a historical battleground for centuries; first, between Arabs and Persians; next, between Turks, Arabs, and Persians; and, since the British carved up their empire, between the Kurds, Arabs, and Persians.
That part of the world is, socially, extremely volatile and prone to clan wars.
What i absolutely don’t understand is why you and Alex insist on denying these facts. Are you both so beholden to the idea of “nationhood” that you cannot conceive of legitimate, human society and culture existing outside of it?

Posted by: china_hand2 | Mar 13 2009 15:03 utc | 21

China_hand2, maybe I’m not being clear but, I think you’re drawing inferences and jumping to conclusions. Nowhere did I mention nationalism or national identity as it pertains to ethno-sectarian violence.
No. Actually, i think it’s just that i was making inferences and jumps between yours and Alex’s posts. I made the mistake that you were offering support directly for his perspective, when it’s clear now that you were simply offering up your own, much subtler points about what was going on.
I agree with you completely that this violence is not an innate “Iraqi” quality. Which i think you can easily believe, because i don’t really think there’s such a thing as an “Iraqi”, in the “Western” sense of the word.
But — just in case there’s any question about this – i also wouldn’t ever say there’s any greater or lesser tendency towards violence in any group of humans over another. Barring genetically incontrovertible evidence (which i totally do not believe we will ever have), then such a statement seems to me simply uncouth.
And the rest of your post i am in complete agreement with.
To respond to your implied question about the Muslim community, here: there is nothing contradictory in saying someone is clannish as a Muslim, and also clannish within Islam. In fact, one implies the other. I’d suggest that someone who sees the world from the perspective of a clan, would tend to conform to a sociology not too far away from:
first the immediate family, next the extended family, third the tribe, fourth the people/land, fifth the religion, sixth the business group, seventh the….
You see what i’m getting at; there’s nothing contradictory in saying that the Muslims are clannish as Muslims, and yet also clannish internally, as well.
However, insofar as you talk about the Iraqi society: well, i don’t need to hang out on Iraqi blogs. There are a few Iraqi, Jordanian, and Egyptian expats around here, and i can simply ask them.
Really: everyone in the Middle East knows that, historically, the lands surrounding Baghdad have been a hotspot for Persian-Arab conflict. Read the Wikipedia entry on it; it was founded in the Abbasid period, and within only a couple of generations the wars began — and continued, on, right through the Turkish possessions, into the present day.
Elsewhere in Wikipedia, we find an attributed comment:
Throughout most of the period of Ottoman rule (1533-1918) the territory of present-day Iraq was a battle ground between the rival Ottoman Empire and Safavid Iranians. Economically, Iraq was one of the least developed areas of the Ottoman Empire. The region suffered from frequent inter-clan struggles and major outbreaks of plague and cholera.
So really, you and Alex haven’t a historial leg to stand on, here.
Baghdad and the region surrounding it have been a historical battleground for centuries; first, between Arabs and Persians; next, between Turks, Arabs, and Persians; and, since the British carved up their empire, between the Kurds, Arabs, and Persians.
That part of the world is, socially, extremely volatile and prone to clan wars.
What i absolutely don’t understand is why you and Alex insist on denying these facts. Are you both so beholden to the idea of “nationhood” that you cannot conceive of legitimate, human society and culture existing outside of it?

Posted by: china_hand2 | Mar 13 2009 15:03 utc | 22

Whups.
Don’t know how that double post happened.
Alex:
i’d suggest that reading english-language blogs isn’t really the best way to get to know what’s happening among the Iraqi people, nor in getting to the root of what characterizes the Iraqi experience.

Posted by: china_hand2 | Mar 13 2009 15:21 utc | 23

Well, i shouldn’t leave things on such a haughty note.
English language blogs are, after all, what i mainly read, and my only access to anything outside my local community.
That said: there’s a lot to be learned in plain ol’ history, and blogs rarely teach that. Sociology and anthropology can also teach you a lot about how wars erupt and why conflict continues.
Beyond that i have supplemented my knowledge with an on-again, off-again, 20 year flirtation with Islamic history and culture.
So really, i’d suggest that reading the english-language blogs written by Iraqis may not be the best means of learning what’s going on over there. A person who writes English well enough to create a blog suggests a certain array of socio-economic factors that would suggest the type of person that lies well outside the sort of sectarian or clannish mindset that many in the region adhere to.
I mean, think about it: if you were convinced that your clan was so righteous that you must go out and kill your neighbors —
would you then go out and learn English?

Posted by: china_hand2 | Mar 13 2009 15:48 utc | 24

So really, i’d suggest that reading the english-language blogs written by Iraqis may not be the best means of learning what’s going on over there.
so in other words, don’t listen to educated people to understand the society?

Posted by: annie | Mar 13 2009 15:59 utc | 25

i don’t really think there’s such a thing as an “Iraqi”, in the “Western” sense of the word.
could you elaborate on your meaning behind this statement.

Posted by: annie | Mar 13 2009 16:02 utc | 26

i’d suggest that reading english-language blogs isn’t really the best way to get to know what’s happening among the Iraqi people, nor in getting to the root of what characterizes the Iraqi experience.
Would you like to read my “Iraq al-Arabi: Iraq’s greatest region in the pre-modern period”, 151-166 in R. Visser and G. Stansfield, (eds.), An Iraq of Its Regions: The Cornerstones of a Federal Democracy? (London and New York: Hurst & Co. and Columbia University Press), before you accuse me of not knowing what I’m talking about? By the way I read Arabic well, though not Kurdish.

Posted by: Alex | Mar 13 2009 16:07 utc | 27

china_hand2, are you graduated from this school?
Harvard’s masters of the apocalypse

Posted by: Balkanac | Mar 13 2009 16:14 utc | 28

I think everyone views the world thru their own particular (peculiar) set of filters. What we read and how we interpret these words are always from seeing them from our singular spot.
Reading internet posting from other countries is no different than reading them here in america. If all I read were KKK sites, I’d have a pretty odd take on america…
Reading post from other countries may help inform us of what people similar to us are feeling and thinking about their culture/country, but it is a pretty limited viewpoint. Think about the sort of people who don’t use computers in the West; yeah, those types, and it isn’t any different in other places.
The world’s problems are from too many people reveling in their ignorance; erecting churches and temples to their “true” god while a few smart, greedy people use other’s stupidity to achieve their goals.
I want to finish by saying it is always great reading well argued, as well as written post.
Annie, Alex, china_hands, let me buy ya’ a round of thinkin’ drinkin’. Thanks for the good read.

Posted by: David | Mar 13 2009 16:37 utc | 29

alex, speaking of R. Visser alex, what did you think of NUPI/Iraqi Report (titled More than shiites and Sunnis)?
badgers take.

The report is a consensus compilation of the views of a number of Iraqi contributors (who are named in the intro), and although relatively short, it covers the problem in an encyclopedic way: from origins of the problem, development of the problem, why it can be fixed, how to fix it.
But amazingly, following the presentation Tuesday at the United States Institute of Peace in Washington by Visser and the other Norwegian organizers of this (Iraqi contributors planning to come reportedly couldn’t get visas), the coverage was as follows:
Corporate media–zero
Major general-politics blogs–zero
Major Mideast-policy blogs–zero
(1) The problem is with the 2005 Iraqi Constitution–which doesn’t even set out clearly the powers of the central government in the matter of taxation, not to mention the jurisdictional problems with oil, federalism, etcetera–and the various steps taken by Bremer that set in motion the principle that the perks of power are allocated by sect and race. That is not a problem at all if the aim is a splintered Iraq; it is less of a problem if the aim is a weak but territorially united Iraq; and it is only a pressing problem if the aim is a strong and united Iraq (for instance, capable of withstanding undesirable pressure from neighbors including Iran).
So the apparent lack of interest could reflect weak problem-consciousness.
….
Either the policy people really don’t “get” why the Bremer system is such a bad idea from the point of view of stability; or else they think that to the extent it is a problem for Iraq, it is a plus for America as a manipulative power.

i don’t know how to link to the pdf but you can find it following badger’s link.
chinahands: note page 18 and 19. i wish i knew how to copy paste from the pdf to here but it doesn’t work for me.
what do you think of reading translated versions of the arab press? or do you also consider this non representative of present day because it denotes a level of education?

Posted by: annie | Mar 13 2009 16:43 utc | 30

I think everyone views the world thru their own particular (peculiar) set of filters. What we read and how we interpret these words are always from seeing them from our singular spot.

Partially true, but there is something what we humans call: ethics and moral. There are supposed to have universal values, that’s why we have certain conventions.
Unfortunately, capitalism (and so called democracy) and moral/ethics do not goes together.
US regime have killed over million Iraqis and foment sectarian violence which caused that four millions Iraqis escape, and you can see people that blame them for it!?

Posted by: Balkanac | Mar 13 2009 17:14 utc | 31

Annie, I hadn’t got round to reading the NUPI report, but looking at it, a lot of it reflects Visser’s ideas. It is clear who wrote it. My position is pretty close to his. The analysis – from skimming the text – looks basically right.
I don’t think I am as bothered as Badger by the lack of public interest in the US. Who, after all, in the US is going to pay attention to crazy Europeans? More importantly, it is not the US which is deciding the future of Iraq – what people in Washington think really has little importance any more. (It is not Iran either; It is the Iraqis themselves). The US is on the way out of Iraq, and it is very hard to turn back the flow. US can slow down developments, but not impose a new road.
How politics in Iraq will actually develop is hard to say, depends whether Maliki gets knocked off. But Maliki is not isolated, other politicians would do the same.

Posted by: Alex | Mar 13 2009 17:41 utc | 32

I suppose it goes without saying, but should be said anyway – that because the U.S. upset the table in Iraq, it now has the responsibility to somehow re-set the table as a condition to leaving, is the essence of the argument at hand. Just the other day I heard liberal talker Michael Reagan say exactly this same sort of thing. Which isn’t surprising as it is the yin side of American yin-yang Exceptionalism as it plays out in foreign policy. This is clearly evident in the Iraqi escapade as how the Bush regime always characterized the mission there in both in terms of proactive unilateralism and in the language of instituting a liberal (secular) reform agenda. This was, as indicated in the NUPI document, instituted by CPA Bremmer and his numerous edicts imposed on the constitutional level and the practical functioning of government. Because these edicts are still in effect Iraq has been held in a kind of sectarian abeyance, where the resolution of these issues becomes all the more difficult, if not impossible to achieve. The problem is, now that we have a liberal administration the inclination is to simply assume the previous administrations liberal rational and continue with the same policies, and expect a different result. The reason that china_hand2’s (& R.Reagan’s for that matter) argument is suspect – that the U.S. must be instrumental in establishing security in Iraq as a precondition to leaving – is that it flies in the face of the fact that the U.S. established the structural conditions that have created the present circumstances, in the first place. The U.S. has imposed a political structure on Iraq that has, and continues to, inflame and manipulate the sectarian dynamic according to its own “interests” and desires. Until the U.S. is willing to allow the Iraqi’s to reformulate their own political structure, according to their own needs, the U.S. has no credible role to play in that countries future. And should simply fold the tent and leave.

Posted by: anna missed | Mar 13 2009 19:40 utc | 33

yes, of course anna missed.
Because these edicts are still in effect Iraq has been held in a kind of sectarian abeyance, where the resolution of these issues becomes all the more difficult, if not impossible to achieve.
this is the zionist (sects identification) quota model as can be seen in lebanon also. it legitimizes/urges political distinctions by ethnicity.

Posted by: annie | Mar 13 2009 20:39 utc | 34

“Do you remember the right-wing execution squads in El Salvador?” a former high-level intelligence official said to Hersh. “We founded them and we financed them. The objective now is to recruit locals in any area we want. And we aren’t going to tell Congress about it.” A Pentagon insider added: “We’re going to be riding with the bad boys.” Another role model for the expanded dirty war cited by Pentagon sources, said Hersh, was Britain’s brutal repression of the Mau Mau in Kenya during the 1950s, when British forces set up concentration camps, created their own terrorist groups to confuse and discredit the insurgency, and killed thousands of innocent civilians in quashing the uprising.

Seymour M. Hersh
“The Coming Wars,” New Yorker, Jan. 24, 2005
Sounds familiar: Yugoslavia 1992, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan

Posted by: Balkanac | Mar 13 2009 21:15 utc | 35

David —
Cheers, man.
It seems we’ve lost the thread in this thread.
I thought we were discussing Iraqis and national identity. Now, though, it appears we’re chatting about the finer points of modern epistemology.
I really enjoy chatting with you folks. It’s good fun, in the same way a good sparring with the old Kung Fu Master is.
I don’t mind the bruises.
Ciao!
@Balkanac:
I don’t like Milosevic, but i like the KLA far, far, far less. Cheers to you, too, man.

Posted by: china_hand2 | Mar 14 2009 19:00 utc | 36

@annie:
i don’t really think there’s such a thing as an “Iraqi”, in the “Western” sense of the word.
…could you elaborate on your meaning behind this statement?

Sure.
“Nation” in the European sense connotes a shared cultural and ethnic identity. A hundred or three years ago, it was even believed to be genetic. It was, essentially, an extension of “tribe” or “clan” that included enough extended social units to span a really large geographic region.
That’s not to say the concept is static and unchanging; it seems to me that, as of the present day, the French and Germans have gone on to elaborate this into “a linguistic collective”, with the French believing, basically, that if you speak French then you are French, while the Germans seem to believe something like only those born speaking German, in traditionally German lands, can be considered German (but i’m not necessarily beholden to those ideas; i’m just presenting them here as something for consideration — and of course, there are right-wing, reactionary challenges to these ideas, as well). The U.S. is another kettle of fish entirely, but essentially (and again, i’m just making a cursory gesture; it’s certainly a discussion that could go on for a very long time) involves nothing more than accepting the U.S. constitution and government as the pinnacle of human development (whether naturalized or native) — that is, one is either an avide proponent of “American Exceptionalism”, or one simply isn’t really “An American”.
But there are many, many places in the world where these sorts of qualifications don’t hold. Taiwan is one; Indonesia is another; most African nations, as well as post-Soviet republics (i’d guess). Yugoslavia tried to create a national identity, but always had to fight cultural resistance. As with Yugoslavia, so with Iraq: yes, the U.S. and Europe mercilessly exploited the divisions within those lands for their own gain, but the divisions were always there. The only Western European analogy that can be drawn to those situations are the Basques in France and Spain, i think.
If we were to envision a European equivalent to Iraq, it would be something along the lines of Thailand conquering Europe, and then combining Alsace-Lorraine, a large chunk of Western Germany, a large chunk of Eastern France, and Switzerland into an autonomous government unit.
Now, obviously arming each of those cultural groups against one another would be adding fuel to the fire (and, IMO, horrifically inhumane). But my point is that the fire would burn, regardless of whether or not the weapons were delivered. Certainly, Europe’s past up to the modern era is a clear record of that.
The conflicts between Sunni and Shia, and Arab and Kurd, have never been settled. This is a casual, commonly understood fact, and however wishfully youthful Iraqi bourgeoisie might want to pretend it had already been peacefully solved, the unfortunate truth is that it never was.

Posted by: china_hand2 | Mar 15 2009 4:55 utc | 37

… china_hand2’s … argument … that the U.S. must be instrumental in establishing security in Iraq as a precondition to leaving….
I have never made this argument, nor in any way implied it. I simply challenged Alex’s suggestions that the sectarian divisions in Iraq is a fiction of U.S. propaganda and his assertion that Iraqis share a common sense of national identity — nothing else.

Posted by: china_hand2 | Mar 15 2009 13:01 utc | 38