[D]eep concern has arisen at the Pentagon about supply lines, reflected in the following private comment to us from an official at the policymaking level in the Defense Department: “The idea that we can wage an effective military campaign in this landlocked country without safe and dependable logistical support is crazy."
Swoop
WaPo's Ann Scott Tyson has some new information and numbers about logistics in Afghanistan:
[General] McNabb said 130 contract drivers have been killed trucking American supplies through Pakistan, for example. Once inside Afghanistan, he said, some roads are so dangerous that the U.S. military will have to fly over them to carry in supplies and personnel.
…
The U.S. military is seeking to expand its flow of ground cargo into Afghanistan by at least 50 percent, to more than 100 containers a day, to meet the needs of the initial increase of 17,000 troops this year ordered by President Obama last month, McNabb said. About 38,000 American troops are currently in Afghanistan, and U.S. commanders have asked to increase that number to as many as 60,000 to combat an intensifying Taliban insurgency.
Up to 90 percent of American military ground cargo, which consists of nonlethal supplies such as food, fuel, water and construction materials, currently flows through Pakistan, defense officials said.
…
The goal is for the northern route via the Russian rail system to handle about 20 percent of the ground cargo destined for the U.S. military in Afghanistan, or about 100 20-foot containers a week, compared with about 500 a week through Pakistan, officials said.
According to the second graph, "more than 100 containers a day" are needed. The numbers in the last quoted graph only add up to 600 per week. The military continues to obfuscate these numbers.
Also note that fuel does not come in containers but is trucked in with tankers. Using official U.S. solicitations for fuel I calculated that 33 tankers need to deliver in Afghanistan each day to keep the U.S. troops supplied. The number of trucks that have to arrive per day is thereby over 133. Nice, big targets – all of them.
With the total needs increasing adding the Russia route at such a low rate as 20% means that the total traffic through Pakistan will increase due to the reinforcement, not decrease.
Sure, the truck losses in Pakistan have gone down last month. The last news I find of attacks on the route through north Pakistan is from February 7 and the last bad logistic news from the route through Quetta is from February 8 when a truck driver was shot. My assumption is that early in February someone spent real money to buy off the locals in Pakistan who facilitate the earlier attacks – Anbar tactics. But that will not hold for long. You can rent the Pashtuns, but you can not buy them. As soon as someone is willing to pay better, they will again be your enemies.
A
25-year-old man we will call Shakir has told IRIN he rues rejecting an
offer of “work” from a Taliban agent whereby he would get 500 Afghanis
(about US$10) a day for carrying out attacks on government offices in
Farah Province, southwestern Afghanistan.
…
“The Taliban pay 500-1,000 Afghanis [$10-20] for a day of action against government and American forces,” said Lutfullah, 23, from Helmand Province.By contrast, government employees get less than $2 a day.
When the Russian route was announced the U.S. said that it could eventually carry up to 20-30 trains per week with about 100 containers each. That would be much more than the total needs are. So why not use more of the Russian route? Yes that route is currently only for non-military goods. But Russia has offered to open it for military goods too and even offered Russian military air-transport.
Was the political price it demanded for that too high? I suspect the real reason to not use that new route in its capacity is institutionalized Russophobia.
Gareth Porter has this nugget for us:
[T]he Pentagon has made contingency plans for the use of the Iranian route, according to one well-informed former U.S. official. That suggests that the Russian-Central Asian route was regarded as far from certain.
Can someone send me those contingency plans please? I am really interested to flip through these.
But back to the WaPo piece:
Apart from the ground cargo, all lethal and sensitive U.S. military supplies, as well as all personnel, travel into Afghanistan by air. Such supplies include ammunition, weapons and vehicles with sensitive communications and other gear. Air cargo demands will increase significantly as fresh troops move into Afghanistan, according to McNabb. For example, when the Army's Stryker combat brigade heads to Afghanistan this summer, all of its vehicles will be flown into the country, he said. The military's mine-resistant armored vehicles are also flown in to avoid attacks, he said.
A Stryker brigade has (pdf, page 66) 309 Stryker vehicle that each weighing about 20 tons. Additionally it has some 1,200+ other vehicles from HMMVEE's over artillery pieces to large transport trucks. Let's assume that these vehicles have an average weight of 7.5 tons.
Then the total tonnage that will have to come in by air for the hardware of one Stryker brigade is 15,000 tons (indeed such a number is corroborated here). To bring one ton to Afghanistan by air costs $14,000. To move the Stryker brigade in by air will thereby cost $210,000,000. (Transport by rail through Russia would be $500 per ton or $7,500,000 in total for the Stryker brigade.)
A Stryker brigade is only 3.900 soldiers strong. The total reinforcement now is 17,000 and may grow to 30,000. Barracks will have to be build for them too and mess halls. They will need fuel, food and ammunition. The financial costs are staggering.
The Taliban are reinforcing too and it is now estimated that 15,000 are active in Afghanistan with the same number available in Pakistan and ready to cross the border. At $10 per day for each of them they are less than an tenth as expensive than U.S forces. Donations from the Gulf countries and taxing the drug business sustains them.
Isn't one of the alleged al-Qaida aims to hurt the U.S. finances and eventually bankrupt it? If so, they are indeed succeeding in that battle.
Then again we noted that other folks are even more successful in achieving that goal.
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earlier coverage of Afghanistan logistics at MoA:
Iran Should Offer Fuel To DESC, Feb 21, 2009
The New Route Plus Iranian Jet Fuel Supply To Afghanistan, Feb 20, 2009
The Pink Route To Afghanistan, Feb 3, 2009
The Costly New Supply Route To Afghanistan, Jan 26, 2009
New Supply Routes To Afghanistan, Nov 19, 2008
Fuel for War in Afghanistan Aug 20, 2008
The Road War in Afghanistan Aug 16, 2008
Fuel Tanker Attacks in Afghanistan Mar 24, 2008