The piece below on 'Wilsoniansim' and U.S. foreign policy is an excerpt from a post at the Friday Lunch Club which probably stole it from Oxford Analytica.
While interesting and certainly worth a discussion, it misses the imperial-greed motive that is behind the liberal internationalists/neo-con mainstream in U.S. foreign policy. 'Wilsonianism' is, in my view, only the selling point. It is not the actual product. Am I right?
—
UNITED STATES: 'Wilsonianism' drives US policy abroad
SUBJECT: The resilience of 'Wilsonianism' in US foreign policy — what it means and why it matters.
SIGNIFICANCE:
As President Barack Obama begins his first days in office, many
academic and media commentators are urging him to close the supposedly
wide partisan fissures over foreign policy. However, these apparent
divisions are much less significant than they seem: US foreign policy
has long been dominated by a sclerotic 'Wilsonian' consensus, which may
have inhibited debate and contributed to recent strategic setbacks.
CONCLUSION:
Wilsonianism will continue to be the worldview that shapes US foreign
policy under Obama. While a Wilsonian approach is not inapposite, the
new administration could opt deliberately to seek out strong dissenting
voices that favour alternative policy frameworks, in order to avoid the
dangers of unchallenged assumptions.
ANALYSIS:
The intellectual framework for US foreign policy defined by former
President Woodrow Wilson in 1917-18 ('Wilsoniansim') continues to hold
a dominant position in official Washington. Therefore, while there is
sometimes fierce debate over particular policy choices (eg the decision
to invade Iraq without specific UN authorisation), US policymakers
share a worldview that broadly supports the same long-term strategic
objectives, values and sense of history. Although there is nothing
inherently fallacious about Wilsonianism — its basic assumptions may
be correct — the weakness or absence of alternative perspectives in
Washington may have been a contributing factor in recent foreign policy
setbacks.
SIGNIFICANCE:
As President Barack Obama begins his first days in office, many
academic and media commentators are urging him to close the supposedly
wide partisan fissures over foreign policy. However, these apparent
divisions are much less significant than they seem: US foreign policy
has long been dominated by a sclerotic 'Wilsonian' consensus, which may
have inhibited debate and contributed to recent strategic setbacks.
CONCLUSION:
Wilsonianism will continue to be the worldview that shapes US foreign
policy under Obama. While a Wilsonian approach is not inapposite, the
new administration could opt deliberately to seek out strong dissenting
voices that favour alternative policy frameworks, in order to avoid the
dangers of unchallenged assumptions.
ANALYSIS:
The intellectual framework for US foreign policy defined by former
President Woodrow Wilson in 1917-18 ('Wilsoniansim') continues to hold
a dominant position in official Washington. Therefore, while there is
sometimes fierce debate over particular policy choices (eg the decision
to invade Iraq without specific UN authorisation), US policymakers
share a worldview that broadly supports the same long-term strategic
objectives, values and sense of history. Although there is nothing
inherently fallacious about Wilsonianism — its basic assumptions may
be correct — the weakness or absence of alternative perspectives in
Washington may have been a contributing factor in recent foreign policy
setbacks.
-
A single theoretical framework dominates foreign policy thinking in official Washington — Wilsonianism.
-
While
liberal internationalists and neo-conservatives disagree over the
utility of multilateralism, they mostly share a common Wilsonian
perspective and assumptions. -
The only serious challenger to Wilsonianism as a US foreign policy-making framework is realism.
-
However, the realist challenge has faded, producing a powerful Wilsonian consensus.
-
This consensus may not be conducive to effective policy-making.
[…]
The Wilsonian consensus.
This
broad consensus is attributable to the fact that the two most
influential frameworks for post-Cold War US foreign policy, 'liberal
internationalism' and 'neo-conservatism' share a common intellectual
ancestor — Wilsonianism. Liberal internationalists and
neo-conservatives disagree fiercely about certain US policy approaches,
particularly the utility of multilateral diplomacy. However, the
rancour of their clashes on such issues has disguised how much they
have in common.
The
Wilsonian creed. Wilsonianism took shape in a particular time and place
(during and immediately after the First World War) in response to a
specific problem (Wilson's attempt to define the US role on the global
stage). Yet it was also couched in a much more profound belief in
long-term historical 'progress', which critics then and now incorrectly
label as naive: …
'realist' framework.
Although US politicians often raise the spectre of
a return to isolationism — as former President George Bush did last
year a speech to the Israeli Knesset — the policies of the 1930s
remain thoroughly discredited. Wilsonianism and its offshoots have only
one rival as a framework for US policy in official Washington —
'realism': …
broad consensus is attributable to the fact that the two most
influential frameworks for post-Cold War US foreign policy, 'liberal
internationalism' and 'neo-conservatism' share a common intellectual
ancestor — Wilsonianism. Liberal internationalists and
neo-conservatives disagree fiercely about certain US policy approaches,
particularly the utility of multilateral diplomacy. However, the
rancour of their clashes on such issues has disguised how much they
have in common.
The
Wilsonian creed. Wilsonianism took shape in a particular time and place
(during and immediately after the First World War) in response to a
specific problem (Wilson's attempt to define the US role on the global
stage). Yet it was also couched in a much more profound belief in
long-term historical 'progress', which critics then and now incorrectly
label as naive: …
[…]
Competing'realist' framework.
Although US politicians often raise the spectre of
a return to isolationism — as former President George Bush did last
year a speech to the Israeli Knesset — the policies of the 1930s
remain thoroughly discredited. Wilsonianism and its offshoots have only
one rival as a framework for US policy in official Washington —
'realism': …
[…]
Contemporary
Wilsonian thinking (as practiced by liberal internationalists or
neo-cons) has several distinct political advantages, in a US context,
over realism:
Wilsonian thinking (as practiced by liberal internationalists or
neo-cons) has several distinct political advantages, in a US context,
over realism:
-
It
embodies the notion that US political and economic principles have
universal appeal and relevance, which helps secure public support for
an active US role in global affairs. -
It proved to be a much more adaptable framework than realism, in the face of changes wrought by globalisation.
However, it has problematic policy implications:
-
Wilsonianism
is not easily exportable or explicable to other powers; it has often
caused other states (including US allies) to assume that Washington's
policies are either naive or duplicitous, when in fact Wilson's
approach combines both altruism and self-interest. -
Its moralist tone can inhibit constructive engagement with non-democratic states (eg China prior to Kissinger).
-
In the post-Cold War context, it may have contributed to an unhealthy degree of US triumphalism.
Dangers of Wilsonian consensus.
His
appointments and rhetoric (eg frequent references to the 'arc of
history') suggest that President Barack Obama is a liberal
internationalist. This is not an inapposite approach, but it there are
several potential policy pitfalls:
appointments and rhetoric (eg frequent references to the 'arc of
history') suggest that President Barack Obama is a liberal
internationalist. This is not an inapposite approach, but it there are
several potential policy pitfalls:
-
Unchallenged
assumptions. Wilsonian dominance in Washington can lead to
'groupthink', where consensus allows weak analytical assumptions to go
unchallenged. This risk might be reduced were the Obama administration
deliberately to include people who favour different frameworks (such as
realism) in policy discussions. -
Unpleasant
democratic 'surprises'. The assumption that democratisation will
invariably produce outcomes congenial to the United States leaves
policymakers unprepared when this is not the case. For example, the
2006 Palestinian Legislative Council elections resulted in a clear
mandate for Hamas, which Washington regards as a terrorist
organisation. -
Susceptibility
to manipulation. Foreign governments, political parties and exile
movements are aware of the dominance of Wilsonian thinking in
Washington, and policymakers' preference for historicist language.
Therefore, they often couch their appeals to US policymakers in similar
terms, even when their intentions, or the political or social systems
in their countries, are far from conducive to the growth of liberal
democracy. Policymakers tend to place too much store in such
individuals' views, a tendency that was particularly egregious in
2002-03, prior to the Iraq War. -
Knowledge
shortfalls obscured. Wilsonianism is a general policy framework and
worldview, not a specific guide to short-term political and economic
developments in particular societies. It is striking that in both the
Vietnam and Iraq Wars, policy decisions sometimes appeared to rely on
Wilsonian assumptions, when empirical knowledge of the particular
society, culture and political environment was lacking.