|
On Hamas’ Performance In Gaza
There is some discussion in the thread below about the performance of Hamas as a military force.
Hamas never was a military organization. It is and was a social movement with an attached small military wing. Think Sinn Féin and IRA maybe.
I tried to answer the question about the possible military Hamas performance on January 5 discussing actual Hamas' fighter numbers:
In 2006 Hizbullah in Lebanon was said to have 600 to 1,000 active fighters and some 5,000 reservist. Given the size of Gaza I estimate that there are probably 200 to 400 active Hamas fighters in Gaza with less than 1,000 reservists and people in training.
Hamas has lots of people in its social/political functions. But it only has very few fighters in a tightly closed guerrilla force. While Israel has spies within the social Hamas movement, note how it brags about attacks enabled by these on the higher political functionaries, it seems to have little intelligence access to the military wing.
But such a small force, with obviously no access to modern weaponry, can only do so much.
The point for Hamas military wing is not to kill IDF troops, but to demonstrate that they can continue to lob rockets on Israel. That is their only available method to press on Israel to lift the devastating inhuman total blockade of Gaza. As long as Hamas and other organizations launch rockets, and miraculously they still can, they have won as Israel has thereby not achieved the main stated goal of its operation.
Meanwhile the Israelis shoot at anything that moves and, when perceiving anything as "threat", bomb the hell out of it before moving forward.
McClatchy had a good story one the "rules of engagement" the Israeli forces are under (somehow that one quickly vanished from their homepage): Israeli soldiers say they have OK to use tough tactics in Gaza
When Israeli soldiers saw a suspected suicide bomber riding a bike towards them, they moved quickly. As the man ducked into a building for safety, Israeli soldiers said they used a bulldozer to bring the walls down on top of him.
So a suspected "suicide bomber" "ducks to safety". Why? Afraid of death?
"We came in very strong," said Yehuda, a battalion commander with Israel's Givati infantry regiment. "Our doctrine is to take over our assigned positions, purging any resistance and then fanning out as required, repeating the process."
…
"With all the regret over the harm to innocent people, I'm not prepared for a soldier of mine to get killed because of a terrorist who is hiding in a house with civilians," an unnamed Israeli officer told Israel's Yedioth Ahronoth newspaper. "Hamas brought this on its own civilians."
Sure, and the Nazis just had to have gas chambers because Jews resisted their lunatic policies?
If there's been any major surprise for Israeli soldiers in Gaza, it has been the relatively weak resistance they've faced from Hamas.
…
Gaza militants have fired more advanced rockets at southern Israeli cities. Soldiers said, however, that they haven't faced Hamas fighters armed with significant new weapons.
A lot of the prewar propaganda was Israeli hyping about the tens of thousands of Hamas fighters and all the sophisticated weapons it was supposed to have. That was just that – hype and propaganda to justify the obliteration of the people in Gaza and to kill off the social movement, once nurtured by Israel as counterweight to the "terrorists" PLO, that became inconvenient to its plans.
Sitting on his hospital bed with a broken wrist and burns across half his face, [Israeli army sergeant] S. said Hamas had failed in its efforts to emulate Hezbollah fighters in Lebanon who'd put up a surprisingly effective fight against Israeli forces in 2006.
"You can't compare it," he said. "Hezbollah is a much more organized army. Hamas, they usually run away."
The sergeant does not understand the Hamas operation.
They will harass the Israeli force if needed and where possible without losing capacity. But the main aim of Hamas is to keep the pressure on Israel by launching rockets.
The Israelis are working with a theory that they need to kill 25% of Hamas fighters to end its "system". The theory itself is a largely false and lousy application of system dynamics in social fields (I tried such an SD application on economic systems in my never finished doctoral thesis and found that it does not apply in the social realm at all.)
So far the Israelis have killed so far maybe 1,500-5,000 people in Gaza. Given the indiscriminate killing they use those are "only" 0.1%-0.35% of the population there. Half of those kids. The percentage on the small population of Hamas fighters might be a bit higher, but not near anything of the 25% they plan to achieve.
To kill 25% of Hamas' military wing, absent of a decisive intelligence break, 25% of all people in Gaza would have to be killed. Maybe even more as Israel does not know who is in that military wing and obviously does not know enough on where they hideto prevent them from operating.
Hamas of course has for years analyzed the Israeli military thinking and adopted to counter it.
Do not trust the Israeli media. They are censored by law on any military issue. Do not trust the Hamas media. They need to keep up their people's will by any means.
BBC and Al Jazeera try and partly succeed to lift the current fog of war a bit. But they can only do so much. What really happens now will only be publicly known later on.
For now the quite lousy Hamas rockets and mortars landing on Israeli ground are the real numerical measure of the fight. There are still 20-30 of those incoming each day.
Given the size and ruthlessness of the Israeli campaign, Hamas, on that count, has already won.
The fight is about the blockade which resulted in at least half of the 750,000 children in Gaza being under nourished and the rockets are the only way to break that state. The bodycount, while emotionally devastating for everyone, is not the issue at all.
To correspond with us about your e-mail address on the listserv, write . Thank you.
Commentary No. 249, Jan. 15, 2009
“Chronicle of a Suicide Foretold: The Case of Israel”
The state of Israel proclaimed its independence at midnight on May 15, 1948. The United Nations had voted to establish two states in what had been Palestine under British rule. The city of Jerusalem was supposed to be an international zone under U.N. jurisdiction. The U.N. resolution had wide support, and specifically that of the United States and the Soviet Union. The Arab states all voted against it.
In the sixty years of its existence, the state of Israel has depended for its survival and expansion on an overall strategy that combined three elements: macho militarism, geopolitical alliances, and public relations. The macho militarism (what current Prime Minister Ehud Olmert calls the “iron fist”) was made possible by the nationalist fervor of Jewish Israelis, and eventually (although not initially) by the very strong support of Jewish communities elsewhere in the world.
Geopolitically, Israel first forged an alliance with the Soviet Union (which was brief but crucial), then with France (which lasted a longer time and allowed Israel to become a nuclear power), and finally (and most importantly) with the United States. These allies, who were also patrons, offered most importantly military support through the provision of weapons. But they also offered diplomatic/political support, and in the case of the United States considerable economic support.
The public relations was aimed at obtaining sympathetic support from a wide swath of world public opinion, based in the early years on a portrait of Israel as a pioneering David against a retrograde Goliath, and in the last forty years on guilt and compassion over the massive Nazi extermination of European Jewry during the Second World War.
All these elements of Israeli strategy worked well from 1948 to the 1980s. Indeed, they were increasingly more effective. But somewhere in the 1980s, the use of each of the three tactics began to be counterproductive. Israel has now entered into a phase of the precipitate decline of its strategy. It may be too late for Israel to pursue any alternative strategy, in which case it will have committed geopolitical suicide. Let us trace how the three elements in the strategy interacted, first during the successful upward swing, then during the slow decline of Israel’s power.
For the first twenty-five years of its existence, Israel engaged in four wars with Arab states. The first was the 1948-1949 war to establish the Jewish state. The Israeli declaration of an independent state was not matched by a Palestinian declaration to establish a state. Rather, a number of Arab governments declared war on Israel. Israel was initially in military difficulty. However, the Israeli military were far better trained than those of the Arab countries, with the exception of Transjordan. And, crucially, they obtained arms from Czechoslovakia, acting as the agent of the Soviet Union.
By the time of the truce in 1949, the discipline of the Israeli forces combined with the Czech arms enabled the Israelis to win considerable territory not included in the partition proposals of the United Nations, including west Jerusalem. The other areas were incorporated by the surrounding Arab states. A large number of Palestinian Arabs left or were forced to leave areas under the control of the Israelis and became refugees in neighboring Arab countries, where their descendants still largely live today. The land they had owned was taken by Jewish Israelis.
The Soviet Union soon dropped Israel. This was probably primarily because its leaders quickly became afraid of the impact of the creation of the state on the attitudes of Soviet Jewry, who seemed overly enthusiastic and hence potentially subversive from Stalin’s point of view. Israel in turn dropped any sympathy for the socialist camp in the Cold War, and made clear its fervent desire to be considered a full-fledged member of the Western world, politically and culturally.
France at this time was faced with national liberation movements in its three North African colonies, and saw in Israel a useful ally. This was especially true after the Algerians launched their war of independence in 1954. France began to help Israel arm itself. In particular, France, which was developing its own nuclear weapons (against U.S. wishes), helped Israel do the same. In 1956, Israel joined France and Great Britain in a war against Egypt. Unfortunately for Israel, this war was launched against U.S. opposition, and the United States forced all three powers to end it.
After Algeria became independent in 1962, France lost interest in the Israeli connection, which now interfered with its attempts to renew closer relations with the three now independent North African states. It was at this point that the United States and Israel turned to each other to forge close links. In 1967, war broke out again between Egypt and Israel, and other Arab states joined Egypt. In this so-called Six Day War, the United States for the first time gave military weapons to Israel.
The 1967 Israeli victory changed the basic situation in many respects. Israel had won the war handily, occupying all those parts of the British mandate of Palestine that it had occupied before, plus Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula and Syria’s Golan Heights. Juridically, there was now a state of Israel plus Israel’s occupied territories. Israel began a policy of establishing
Jewish settlements in the occupied territories.
The Israeli victory transformed the attitude of world Jewry, which now overcame whatever reservations it had had about the creation of the state of Israel. They took great pride in its accomplishments and began to undertake major political campaigns in the United States and western Europe to secure political support for Israel. The image of a pioneering Israel with emphasis on the virtues of the kibbutz was abandoned in favor of an emphasis on the Holocaust as the basic justification for world support of Israel.
In 1973, the Arab states sought to redress the military situation in the so-called Yom Kippur war. This time again, Israel won the war, with U.S. arms support. The 1973 war marked the end of the central role of the Arab states. Israel could continue to try to get recognition from Arab states, and it did succeed eventually with both Egypt and Jordan, but it was now too late for this to be a way to secure Israel’s existence.
As of this point, there emerged a serious Palestinian Arab political movement, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which was now the key opponent of Israel, the one with whom Israel needed to come to terms. For a long time, Israel refused to deal with the PLO and its leader Yasser Arafat, preferring the iron fist. And at first, it was militarily successful.
The limits of the iron fist policy were made evident by the first intifada, a spontaneous uprising of Palestinian Arabs inside the occupied territories, which began in 1987 and lasted six years. The basic achievement of the intifada was twofold. It forced the Israelis and the United States to talk to the PLO, a long process that led to the so-called Oslo Accords of 1993, which provided for the creation of the Palestinian Authority in part of the occupied territories.
The Oslo Accords in the long run were geopolitically less important than the impact of the intifada on world public opinion. For the first time, the David-Goliath image began to be inverted. For the first time, there began to be serious support in the Western world for the so-called two-state solution. For the first time, there began to be serious criticism of Israel’s iron fist and its practices vis-à-vis the Arab Palestinians. Had Israel been serious about a two-state solution based on the so-called Green Line – the line of division at the end of the 1948-1949 war – it probably would have achieved a settlement.
Israel however was always one step behind. When it could have negotiated with Nasser, it wouldn’t. When it could have negotiated with Arafat, it wouldn’t. When Arafat died and was succeeded by the ineffectual Mahmoud Abbas, the more militant Hamas won the Palestinian parliamentary elections in 2006. Israel refused to talk to Hamas.
Now, Israel has invaded Gaza, seeking to destroy Hamas. If it succeeds, what organization will come next? If, as is more probable, it fails to destroy Hamas, is a two-state solution now possible? Both Palestinian and world public opinion is moving towards the one-state solution. And this is of course the end of the Zionist project.
The three-element strategy of Israel is decomposing. The iron fist no longer succeeds, much as it didn’t for George Bush in Iraq. Will the United States link remain firm? I doubt it. And will world public opinion continue to look sympathetically on Israel? It seems not. Can Israel now switch to an alternative strategy, of negotiating with the militant representatives of the Arab Palestinians, as an integral constituent of the Middle East, and not as an outpost of Europe? It seems quite late for that, quite possibly too late. Hence, the chronicle of a suicide foretold.
by Immanuel Wallerstein
[Copyright by Immanuel Wallerstein, distributed by Agence Global. For rights and permissions, including translations and posting to non-commercial sites, and contact: rights@agenceglobal.com, 1.336.686.9002 or 1.336.286.6606. Permission is granted to download, forward electronically, or e-mail to others, provided the essay remains intact and the copyright note is displayed. To contact author, write: immanuel.wallerstein@yale.edu.
These commentaries, published twice monthly, are intended to be reflections on the contemporary world scene, as seen from the perspective not of the immediate headlines but of the long term.]
Posted by: Malooga | Jan 16 2009 2:07 utc | 22
The Israeli hysteria over a purported nuclear Iran, IMO, has a kernel of truth in it. For 60 years and counting, Arab states have been feckless and ineffectual, despite (or perhaps because of) Soviet and American superpower support. The correlation of forces was never more in Israel’s favor after the 1991 Gulf War, and it would have been the ideal time to come to a final settlement. Their rejection in 2001 marked the passing of that opportunity.
Right after the failure of Taba came a dazzling new possibility: a chance to destroy their Islamic enemies by hitching on to the War on Terror caused by 9/11. The neocons and their Israeli backers decided they could impose a final military victory over their enemies, but they failed (first Iraq, then Lebanon, now Gaza). Their overreach will be their downfall. Global politics will shift decisively against Israel, and because they advocated that force is the only way to settle the issue, they can see that in the future a terrible reckoning coming, due to a confluence of various factors:
* The coming of peak oil. Today’s $35/barrel to the contrary, the Persian Gulf states have the lion share of a steadily declining, completely invaluable resource. With America’s failure to secure Iraq’s oil, countries like Saudi Arabia and Iran will become exponentially more powerful, perhaps as soon as 5 years, maybe 10, 15, 20 years from now.
The Gulf’s rising oil power will buy all the technological and military capability necessary to counter Israel, up to and including nukes. Or maybe just nukes – that would be enough. There is zero probability that Israel can prevent Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt from developing their own nuclear capabilities in the future.
* The decline of America, and the rise of China. For various reasons Israel is popular with America’s people and leadership, but that’s sui generis. Anyone think Israel will have a ‘special relationship’ with China? Not likely. With their actions in Gaza, Israel has taken a giant step towards alienating the entire EU. Their only Muslim ‘ally’, Turkey, will soon abandon them. India and China won’t help. Japan? LOL. And with America reeling economically and likely forced to retrench internationally, Israel becomes dangerously exposed. Frankly, the Israelis should be begging to implement the 2002 Saudi initiative, but now it’s probably too late. Demands for a ‘single state’ where Palestinians and Israeli Arabs will eventually be a majority, or continued occupation, will eventually create an international explosion.
It won’t happen tomorrow, or 5 years from now, or even 20 years. But before oil runs out (let’s say 50-100 years from now), unyielding Palestinian, Arab, and Islamic resistance, combined with increasing international support, will eventually bring down the Zionist state.
Posted by: JoeJoe | Jan 16 2009 4:38 utc | 29
|