bin Laden was on Dialysis for kidney failure before 911. He is dead and has been for YEARS.

Posted by: david | Nov 19 2008 22:31 utc | 3

Maybe the U.S. govt, should invest in some of these to make sure and get the job done. Makes about as much sense and would be quite cost prohibitive.
Prof. Juan Cole :Afghan article says US Bin-Ladin hunt phoney
CIA are expert’s in reality manipulation… what’s that saying, “if there wasn’t a Osama bin Goldstein, then they would have to create one”.

Posted by: Uncle $cam | Nov 19 2008 23:10 utc | 5

@5: It really was mind-blowing for those who had read Nineteen Eighty-Four, was it not, to watch Emmanuel Goldstein created in the real world, in our lifetimes.

Posted by: Cloud | Nov 20 2008 4:51 utc | 7

“Osama is the shiny object for Obama to do Iran.”
b, can you elaborate on how you think that would play out?
i recommend reading the whole link for background. U.S. Animosity Towards Iran Thwarts Policy in Afghanistan by Barnett R. Rubin and Sara Batmanglich (source: MIT Center for International Studies)

Afghan in the Middle
President Bush signaled decisively that cooperation in Afghanistan would not lead to a broader rapprochement with Iran when he included Iran in the “Axis of Evil” in his January 2002 State of the Union speech. Subsequently he also named Pakistan as the U.S.’s closest non-NATO ally. In this, the Bush administration showed that the events of 9/11 had not at all dissuaded it from perpetuating the historic mistake of considering Afghanistan a sideshow and subordinating policy toward that country to broader strategic interests in the Persian Gulf and Middle East, above all, the conflict with Iran.
…….
In the summer of 2007, as calls for “regime change” and a pre-emptive attack on Iran’s nuclear program escalated in Washington, Tehran formally changed its policy toward the U.S. in Afghanistan. Previously, according to Iranian diplomats, Tehran’s position was that even if the U.S. attacked Iran, Iran would not respond in Afghanistan. Iran’s bilateral interest in stability in Afghanistan and in supporting the Karzai government as a bulwark against the Taliban and al-Qaida outweighed any advantage that would result from attacking the U.S. presence. If, however, Iran were attacked by the U.S. from Afghanistan, it might indeed respond there. Iran had opposed the mention of NATO in the January 2006 Afghanistan Compact and had called for a timetable for the withdrawal of foreign troops, but it had agreed to the Compact despite these objections. At an ambassadors’ conference in Tehran in August 2007, however, Iranian diplomats were told that if Iran were attacked by the United States, it would respond fully against U.S. forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, regardless of its bilateral interests in those two countries. “Afghanistan is our friend,” one participant was quoted as saying, “But when your life is at stake you may have to sacrifice even your friends.”
The U.S. continued to charge Iran with providing support to the Taliban, while remaining publicly silent over Pakistan’s far larger support to the Taliban. Iran continued to deny such support, but even Afghan officials with no particular grudge against Iran claim that intelligence data support the contention that the Quds Force of the IRGC was supplying some IEDs and other supplies to groups fighting in Western Afghanistan. The amount supplied was sufficient to act as a warning or signal, not to change the military balance significantly. Iran clearly did not want the Taliban to win, but it did not want the U.S. to feel secure in Afghanistan either.
Iran (along with Russia and India) has also looked with skepticism on proposals to include the Taliban in any kind of a political settlement. According to Iranian diplomats, Tehran sees such ideas not as a broadening of the peace process but rather the U.S. returning to its policy of subcontracting Afghan policy to Pakistan. Such a move would be consistent with the U.S. realignment in Iraq, where the U.S. forces have armed and paid former groups of the Sunni resistance, while publicly charging Iran with destabilizing a government over which Tehran has enormous influence.
The Iranian suspicions have a basis in fact: Pakistani interlocutors often invoke the Iranian threat with Americans to convince them to eliminate the Northern Alliance from the Afghan government and strike a deal with the insurgents. There are also charges that the U.S. is using Afghanistan and Pakistan as bases for covert support to Baluch or Sunni Islamist insurgents in Iran, such as Jundullah. U.S. political leaders often issue statements naming Iran as the main state sponsor of terrorism, at the same time that U.S. intelligence agencies have unambiguously identified Pakistan, especially al-Qaida controlled parts of the FATA, as the major source of international terrorist threats.
……….
…..
There is, however, a major strategic judgment to be revisited. The military and intelligence agencies of both Pakistan and Iran have systematically used asymmetrical warfare, including terrorism, as a tool of their security policy. Which of them poses a greater threat to U.S. national interest and international peace and security? How should responses to these two threats be balanced? Since the Iranian revolution, the U.S. has overreacted to the Iranian threat and engaged in systematic appeasement of Pakistan, which is now home to the leadership of both al-Qaida and the Taliban (both Afghan and Pakistani). These countries are rivals for influence in Afghanistan and are sponsoring competing infrastructure projects for road transport and energy trade. Iran and India are building a combined rail and road link from the Iranian port of Chah Bahar to Afghanistan’s major highway. Pakistan, with Chinese aid, is building the port of Gwadar in Baluchistan, aiming at a north-south route to Central Asia. “Taliban” regularly attack Indian road building crews in southwest Afghanistan, and Pakistan charges that India is supporting Baluch insurgents from its consulates in Afghanistan.
A reevaluation of the threats originating in Iran and Pakistan should lead to a recalibration of U.S. policy in Afghanistan to tilt away from Pakistan and more toward Iran. Yet it would be wrong and destructive to treat Pakistan with the type of enmity now reserved for Iran. Like Iran, Pakistan’s policy is motivated by a combination of genuine security threats, ideological aspirations, and institutional interest. In Pakistan’s more open political system, it is far easier for the U.S. to engage with allies inside the country against the security services whose covert policies the U.S. finds threatening.

He has more important enemies to deal with, from Iran to Russia.
or pakistan…

Posted by: annie | Nov 20 2008 16:31 utc | 9

al, have you read b’s posts on baluchistan?
you may want to start there, check the search function on the homepage. i can’t remeber when you arrived here, but those posts are vital, along w/the accompanying threads.

Posted by: annie | Nov 20 2008 21:13 utc | 11