A few days ago Willem Buiter asked How likely is a sterling crisis or: is London really Reykjavik-on-Thames?. He found it possible as Great Britain, though bigger than Iceland, has the same problems:
The risk of a triple crisis – a banking crisis, a currency crisis and a sovereign debt default crisis – is always there for countries that are afflicted with the inconsistent quartet identified by Anne Sibert and myself in our work on Iceland: (1) a small country with (2) a large internationally exposed banking sector, (3) a currency that is not a global reserve currency and (4) limited fiscal capacity.
Over the last year the pound sterling already went down from €1.50 per pound to €1.15 and from $2.00 per pound to $1.50. Could that slump be only the beginning of a currency rout?
Following a funny rant on why he blogs in such long and winded posts, Buiter today adds a long and winded post to analyzes the possibility of a Sterling crisis.
Great Britain’s taxpayers will soon be owners of 60% of the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS). With that ownership comes a lot of debt, about £2 trillion, and assets of unknown value. The additional net debt on Britain’s asset sheet could be huge.
At the same time Gordon Brown plans tax cuts, which, as the recent tax rebate in the U.S. has shown, are an ineffective, costly way of providing stimulus. As they will also increase Britain’s debt the markets might start to doubt Britain’s solvency and the value of the pound sterling.
Writes Buiter:
If there is doubt in the markets about whether the solvency gap of the banking system is smaller than the fiscal spare capacity of the government, we could have a UK public debt crisis. Fear of default would cause an across-the-board rush of out sterling assets.
[..] much of the debt of the banking system is foreign-currency-denominated rather than sterling-denominated (total foreign currency liabilities and assets of the banking system are each over 200 percent of annual GDP). With the foreign currency liabilities of the banking system likely to have shorter remaining maturity and more liquid than its foreign currency assets (these are banks, after all), the UK would be likely to face a (partial) sovereign debt crisis as well as a foreign exchange liquidity crisis, even if the government tried to inflate its way out of trouble.
Because the Bank of England cannot issue foreign currency reserves, and because sterling is no longer a serious global reserve currency, the lender of last resort has to fall back on the deep pockets of last resort: the creditworthiness of the British state. That creditworthiness, I would argue, is now in worse shape than it has been since the days of the Stewarts. The reason is the fact that the UK authorities have effectively underwritten the balance sheet of the over-sized UK banking sector.
The tax cuts Brown is planing add to the above problematic situation.
To avoid a currency crisis there are two things, Buiter says, Britain needs to do immediately:
Introduce a Special Resolution Regime to avoid the nationalization of banks. This would probably be comparable to a Chapter 11 reorganization bankruptcy in the U.S., where a company keeps operating but shareholders and creditors have to take haircuts. Currently the UK only knows a Chapter 7 comparable liquidation bankruptcy where a company stops operating. As RBS is of systemic importance the lack of a Chapter 11 solution requires nationalization where the taxpayers take on all the risks, debt and assets.
The second point is to prepare the way to join the euro, though it is not clear if the criteria for that can be met. A pound sterling, officially bound to the euro in preparation for a currency change would make the sterling’s value defensible.
Wolfgang Münchau in his FT column sees additional reasons for Britain to join the Euro. Keeping the sterling has costs as it would likely result in higher interest rates and the loss of financial center status for London.
While there is tremendous public resistance to adopting the euro, as was in Iceland until a few weeks ago, the now imminent costs of monetary independence may push the British public into that direction.
But rather then join the euro and thos pesky French and Germans, could the Brits vote to join the U.S. dollar? Aren’t they already the 51St State?
Anyway – a sterling crisis may well be in the making. MoA readers in Britain should prepare for that while they still can.