Dexter Filkins has a traveled the Pakistani western boarder region for some years. He went back this summer and now wrote a long piece on the current situation.
The Pakistani army and government have no incentive to hinder Taliban attacks within Afghanistan. Indeed they have several reasons to support such and they do so. As emphasized in prior pieces here, their top motivation is the strategic position towards India. Pakistan fears Indian influence in Afghanistan that could end with fighting India in the east and in the west:
After the U.S.-led invasion in the fall of 2001, .. , India lost no time in setting up consulates throughout Afghanistan and beginning an extensive aid program. According to Pakistani and Western officials, Pakistan’s officer corps remains obsessed by the prospect of Indian domination of Afghanistan should the Americans leave. The Taliban are seen as a counterweight to Indian influence. “We are saving the Taliban for a rainy day,” one former Pakistani official put it to me.
The second reason offered is general anti-American and pro-Islamic disposition in the Pakistani security forces.
The third one is a new aspect to me and interesting:
The reason the Pakistani security services support the Taliban, [the retired Pakistani official] said, is for money: after the 9/11 attacks, the Pakistani military concluded that keeping the Taliban alive was the surest way to win billions of dollars in aid that Pakistan needed to survive.
On the situation in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and North-West Frontier province (map) Filkins finds the traditional tribal structures with tribal heads (malik) through which the government rules broken. The Taliban have overwhelmed those structures by force, but also by social means:
Hamidullah, for instance, was an illiterate wheat farmer living in Khyber agency when, in 2002, a wealthy landowner seized his home and six acres of fields. Hamidullah and his family were forced to eke out a living from a nearby shanty. Neither the local malik nor the government agent, Hamidullah told me, would intervene on his behalf. Then came Namdar, the Taliban commander. He hauled the rich man before a Vice and Virtue council and ordered him to give back Hamidullah’s home and farm. Now Hamidullah is one of Namdar’s loyal militiamen.
The Pakistani army only fights the Taliban, when they turn against Pakistan outside of the FATA. Then it hits back hard to make a point and after that offers peace.
The [peace agreement struck between the army and Mehsud], which has not been officially released, provides a look into the Pakistani government’s new strategy toward the militants. According to the agreement, members of the Mehsud tribe agreed to refrain from attacking the Pakistani state and from setting up a parallel government. They agreed to accept the rule of law.
But sending fighters into Afghanistan? About that, the agreement says nothing at all.
The Pakistani strategy is to redirect the Taliban threat from inner Pakistan areas towards Afghanistan. It has several good reasons to do so and I can not think of a scenario that would take away these incentives except a retreat of ‘western’ forces from Afghanistan. But that is still some years away. Meanwhile a lot of people will be killed in the conflict.