A bit of war nerdism from my side.
Map courtesy of BBC
On the evening of August 7 the Georgian President Saakashvili went on TV and announced a cease-fire. This came after some small tit for tat fire exchanges on the border between Georgia and South Ossetia. A few hours later Georgia launched a massive artillery barrage against the South Ossetian city of Tskhinvali. It used Grad multiple-launch rocket systems. Such weapons are effective against area targets, like large infantry clusters, not against pinpoint aims. To use such weapons against civilian areas leads to mass casualties and is in itself a war crime.
The attack hit people at sleep in their homes. It was followed by bombings from SU-25 ground attack airplanes in and around Tskhinvali.
The Russian peacekeepers in South Osssetia had less than a battalion of mechanized infantry between the border and Tskhinvali. This batallion was attacked by a multi battalion Georgian tank and armored infantry forces. The Russians retreated through and around Tskhinvali but held the line within the city limits.
According to Russian sources the Georgian assault killed some 1,500 to 2,000 civilians.
South Ossetia is connected with North Ossetia in Russia by only one
road which leads up to the Caucasus mountain range and through the Roki
tunnel. It was obvious that any Russian reinforcements would have to
come through that tunnel. Georgia seems to have made no attempt to
close the road and the tunnel.
Why was this attack done this way and why was the tunnel not closed down?
The only explanation I can come up with is planed ethnic cleansing.
The Georgian attack was planed and prepared for some time and
followed a bigger strategic plan. Hitting the civilians in their sleep
guaranteed panic and would obviously push them to look for refuge. The
only place these Ossetians had to go was north to their compatriots. If
the tunnel would have been closed, Georgia would have been stuck with
these people after taking their land. That would have led to a messy
guerrilla war. It was better, so the plan, to let them flee and
therefore leave the outlet open. Indeed some 30,000 of 70,000 Ossetians
fled through the tunnel.
Maybe the Georgian plan was to close the tunnel later, like after
some 24 or 48 hours after the initial assault. That then was a gamble
that Russia would not intervene or would need too long to reinforce.
The gamble was lost.
Russia reacted quite fast and only six hours after the initial attack a
combined arms force of tanks, artillery and armored personal carriers
in the size of one battalion (some 600 soldiers) was on its way through
the Roki tunnel. By late noon these forces had reached Tskhinvali and
immediately began to push the Georgian forces back.
At the same time the Russian air force started to bomb Georgian air
fields. At least four Georgian planes were destroyed on the ground. Two
Russian planes were shot down by SA-5 anti air missiles which Georgia
was not known to have. These weapons were possibly manned by Ukrainian
mercenaries.
While the Russian troops were still on their march, Russia asked the
UN security council to condemn the Georgian attack and to call for a
cease-fire. The ‘western’ powers at the security council declined to do
so.
Only after that did Russia start to get really serious. It activated
paratrooper and special forces to reinforce in South Ossetia. A marine
battalion was send from the Crimea and on the 11th landed in Abkhasia.
Further reinforcements there came by rail. The Russian Air force
launched a classic ‘effect based operation’ and took out military
airports, radars, barracks and communication points.
A few of these attacks hit, as is inevitable, civilian places but
Georgian civilian casualties seem to have been light. Russia did not
attack economic or civilian installations like electricity plants,
pipelines, or major traffic points. A Russian reconnaissance force only
briefly moved to Senaki and the only place outside of South Ossetia and
Abkhasia Russian forces now hold is a central highway crossing north of
Gori.
The last Georgian attack attempt yesterday (after Saak signed
Kouchner’s cease-fire paper) was by six helicopters that again hit
Tskhinvali. They were later destroyed by Russian air power. Yesterday
night Georgian troops in Gori panicked and headed for the capital
Tiblisi.
The Russian president Medvedev has stopped ground operations but the
Russian forces will continue air operations against any Georgian troop
concentrations until a cease-fire is signed that fits Russian demands.
The Georgian forces have lost quite a bunch of their tanks and other
equipment. The Georgian air force does not exist any more. The Georgian
navy lost the only two missile boats it had. Military infrastructure
was hit badly. The military budget that Saak had increased from $30
million to $1 billion over a few years was wasted. The training
Georgian forces received by U.S. troops and Israeli mercenaries seems
to have been completely useless. Well, they learned how to bike quads.
There are now in total still only some 10,000+ Russian troops in South
Ossetia and Abkhazi. Georgia has 27,000 men under arms. These did not
even achieve their first objective and folded against a smaller force.
From a military standpoint the Georgian forces deserve an F. The
Russian ground force deserves an A for the early holding of the ground,
a B for the quick first reaction unit and a C for the reinforcement
thereafter which seems to have not been very effective. The Russian air
force for losing two planes only gets a D.
From a strategic political point Saak gambled badly and lost. It was
obvious that he would lose this one from the beginning. Four days ago
when Saak started his splendid little war I headlined Saakashvili Wants War – He Will Get It and wrote:
Saakashvili may hope for physical help from ‘the west’, but neither NATO nor the EU has any appetite to support his escapades. What has led him to this miscalculation?
That question is still unanswered. Saakashvili should answer it when he gets his deserved process at The Hague.