The Senate Intelligence Committee Report on pre-war intelligence on Iraq, is finally out.
The first part is a (big pdfs)
At first glance there is nothing new in there. Bush lied, people died.
The second part is a
and it has some interesting and funny stuff. For your amusement I excerpt some bits below.
In 2004 Josh Marshall, Laura Rozen and Paul Glastris wrote on Iran-Contra II? –
Fresh scrutiny on a rogue Pentagon operation.
Their story was about secret meetings in 2002 in Rome and 2003 in Paris with Michael Ledeen, Department of Defense officials, the Iranian expat Ghorbanifar of Iran-Contra fame, some Iranian ‘officials’ and Italian intelligence officials. Ledeen was pushing schemes for regime change in Iran.
The new report describes whole affair in some detail. First the meeting in Rome and the attempts of Ledeen to get the U.S. government behind his plans.
Consider a bar, a napkin and $5 million for regime change as described on page 16 of the PDF. (Franklin and Rhode are DoD persons):
Mr. Franklin informed the Committee that during the trip in Rome Mr. Ghorbanifar pressed his own agenda for regime change in Iran. Mr. Franklin stated that late night during a discussion in a bar Mr. Ghorbanifar laid out his plan on a napkin. The plan involved simultaneous disruption of traffic at key intersections leading to Teheran that would create anxiety, work stoppages and other disruptive measures. Mr. Franklin recalled that Mr. Ghorbanifar asked for $5 million in seed money to facilitate the activity. He added that Mr. Ghorbanifar indicated that if the first action was successful additional money may be needed later but Mr. Franklin could not recall specific amounts being discussed beyond the $5 million. Mr. Rhode recalled Mr. Ghorbanifar discussing a plan to set up a network that would lead to the overthrow of the regime, but could not recall a specific dollar amount. Mr. Ledeen provided the Committee similar recollections, noting that Mr. Ghorbanifar offered a variety of different schemes for regime change in Iran dating to the time the two had first met. Mr. Ledeen added that he believed the U.S. Government should be supporting Iranians who want to overthrow the regime.
Other possible sources for money come up (page 16/17):
A synopsis of the discussion in Rome on Mr. Ghorbanifar’s plan, prepared by Mr. Rodman in mid-February 2002 with input from Mr. Franklin, stated that Mr. Ledeen and Mr. Ghorbanifar advised Mr. Franklin and Mr. Rhode of “the XXXXXXXXXXXX [foreign government] support for this information collection opportunity and financing by XXXXX [foreign] corporate enterprises midway through the interviews…..”
Who could that be? The Saudi government in person of Price Bandar offering black money pilfered from the Saudi-BAE weapons deal?
There follows some discussion between the State Department and the CIA, who both had been kept in the dark about the meeting, and the DoD. The CIA had marked Gharbanifar as not trustworthy for a long time.
Still Ledeen pushes on and, after intervention by Newt Gingrich, Rumsfeld’s office gives orders to the Defense Human Intelligence Service to meet with Ledeen (p22):
Information provided by the DoD in March 2008 indicates that after the interview of Mr. Ledeen the Defense HUMINT Service held discussions with several components of the CIA, XXXXXXXXXXXXX. During the meeting, the Defense HUMINT Service learned that Mr. “Ledeen had a history of approaching the USG [U.S. Government] contacts with various ‘schemes’ to gain USG interest and/or support for various issues normally related to Hizbollah, Iran, and/or Terrorism.” The Service also became aware that some of Mr. Ledeen’s contacts were considered “nefarious and unreliable.” The Defense HUMINT Service determined that no further contact with Mr. Ledeen was warranted or advisable.
Smart folks. Next Ledeen goes to the Vice President (p23):
Mr. Franklin advised the Committee that he became aware of Mr. Ledeens’ efforts to push for other elements of the U.S. Government to hear Mr. Ghorbanifar’s plan. He recalls being approached by an official from the Office of the Vice President in early 2002 requesting his opinion of Mr. Ghorbanifar’s plan and his judgments of its prospect for success. Mr. Franklin stated that he recommended it not be pursued.
After the ambassador in Italy protest against Ledeen’s plan for another meeting in Rome, Sec State Powell intervenes. Hadley finally gets upset that Ledeen continues to press for the scheme and the whole issue dies down.
Ledeen managed to get the top U.S. government, Hadley, Cheney, Rumsfeld, Powell and Tenet involved to further a regime change plan for Iran scribbled one late night on a napkin in a bar in Rome.
Still he finds no takers for this attempt. But in 2003 he is back with a new plan. That will be stuff for a second post.