The whole U.S. military counter-insurgency (COIN) fad is based on a false premise. It assumes that it itself is a legitimate force fighting an illegitimate insurgency.
Insurgencies are, by and large, social movements challenging their own government because of some grievance. If the movement is small, it can be fought down through sheer brutality. If it is larger and backed by a significant part of the population, it can only be accommodated by social-political compromise. To achieve the compromise both parties usually fight until everyone is sick of it. The compromise does not necessarily need to be a change of government, but can be participation of the insurgency in the political process or simply a change in social-economic issues.
A resistance is also a social movement, but it is fighting primarily against an invading and occupying force. Its grievance is the fact of occupation, not some local social problem. If the resistance fights against the local government, then only because the government is seen as illegitimate tool of the occupation.
The difference of a resistance towards an insurgency is motivation and possible accommodation. While an insurgency can be accommodated by letting it participate in the general political process and alleviating its grievance, a resistance can only be satisfied by retraction of the occupation.
The COIN strategy assumes that ‘hearts and minds’ stuff, better government services and an inclusive political process will, over the long term, reduce the insurgents motivation until the movement frays out and blends away.
But in Iraq the U.S. is an occupying force against a national, though not yet united, resistance. There is no way a COIN strategy can satisfy their demand. The only way to make the fight stop, is for the U.S. to leave.
The above occurred to me independently a few days ago. Researching on it now, I find that others have made the same point much earlier. In a review of a book by the retired Air Force Colonel Chet Richards, William Lind writes:
Perhaps Richards’ sharpest point is that DOD’s latest fad, counter-insurgency, is something of a fraud. He notes that whereas states have often been successful in defeating insurgencies on their own soil, invaders and occupiers have almost never won against a guerilla-style war of national liberation. Not even the best counter-insurgency techniques make much difference, because neither a foreign occupier nor any puppet government he installs can gain legitimacy.