A late 2007 BBC/ABC/ARD poll in Afghanistan shows a quite big support for Karzai and temporary foreign troop stationing. But, as ABC notes, the general support is trending lower and:
Among Afghans who report shelling, bombing or civilian deaths in their area caused by U.S. or NATO forces, approval of U.S. efforts overall drops sharply, to 29 percent. Specifically in the Southwest, among people who report no civilian deaths or injuries caused by coalition forces, 64 percent say people in their area support these forces. Among those who report such casualties, that support is 30 points lower.
…
In Kandahar, the Taliban’s hometown, just 18 percent see a better life for their children; it’s a still-low 37 percent in next-door Helmand. That soars, by contrast, to three-quarters in Balkh and two-thirds in Kunduz, two Northern provinces.
The other big point:
Lack of jobs, electricity and medical care and poor roads, bridges and
other infrastructure are other broad and persistent concerns. Nearly
half the population is illiterate; six in 10 Afghans have household
incomes under $100 a month.
There is the hen and egg problem of violence. Does Taliban presense necessiates more ‘kinetic’ foreign troop presence, or does foreign troop ‘kinetic’ activity increase the support for and number of Taliban.
Karzai says more foreign troops are not the answer and forced eradication of opium, another U.S. ‘recommendation’, would be a major problem.
At some point last year Associated Press tallied more civilians killed by foreign troops than by Taliban. In total, the Taliban seem not to be the big problem unless ‘the west’ makes them the big problem.
The general support for the Taliban is low (14%) but growing. The major problems the poll found, electricity, jobs and clean water, can be solved if enough resources are invested there.
But while the foreign countries engaged in Afghanistan spend billions on their military there (Germany 500+ million Euros), international development programs count in millions (Germany 100 million Euros). That relation is a shame. Additionally many aid-dollars are skimmed off by international contractors and via conditional aid. (BTW: I couldn’t find U.S. numbers for military costs vs. civil aid – any ideas?)
Here are my recommendations on what to do in Afghanistan:
- Stop fighting ghosts and creating new ones. The locals can fight or integrate the Taliban much better than anyone else.
- Launch a $25 billion, 10 year program ‘Green Afghanistan‘. This money is to be a gift: Not ‘debt relief’, not ‘development credit’, not conditioned on ‘buy only from originator’, not for technical ‘license fees’. This money has to be a gift.
Mayor program points of ‘Green Afghanistan‘:
Electricity: Variants of modern energy mills in the 1, 10
and 100 kilowatt class optimized for low-tech production and little
maintainance need. With modern stateless (no maintainance) technology
hundreds of those community mills can be interconnected locally to form
a self sustaining net. Sometimes there will be no wind, but better
intermitted electricity than none at all. Add solar when local
production of solar panels is feasible.
Build 100 factories to produce such energy mills locally.
Use as little import parts/materials as possible. Needed imports, the
machinery and transport costs will be payed by the aid program for
maybe 5-10 years. Attach basic engineering schools to each factory.
After growing experience and the supporting industries, these products
can be major Afghan exports ten years from now.
Water: Use windmills/watertowers/solar for pumping. Build
small(!) dam projects. Build standardized low tech, biological sewer
treatment systems.
Wood: Afghanistan is seriously deforested.
Build a countrywide reforestation program with hundreds of tree
nurseries and schools for locals to learn to create and tend to the
reforestated areas. Concentrate on fighting timber rather than opium
smuggling.
Ahh, opium: Best solution, buy it for cheap at the local
markets (80% of the export price is margin for the dealers). Use for
regular medicine whatever is feasible and discard the rest. Do not
enforce eradication. Don’t fight smuggling. Offer alternatives. For the
last point – do NOT import food but in serious emergencies. When food
prices go up, farmers will turn away from growing poppies.
Other important points:
Only local labor and companies to be allowed below the level of
engineering. Why are Chinese day laborers and U.S. companies building
Afghan roads when unemployment is the Afghan number one problem?
Stop building those big roads between the major foreign troop
garrisons. Local roads to local markets are much more important for the
economy than super highways.
Let the local sheiks and tribal elder councils run the projects. They
will skim off some of the money – so what. Recruit only locals for
police/security forces – pay them well.
A note to imperialists:
There are much more profits to be made by skimming off a well grown
economy, than a dirt poor one. Give some money to Afghanistan, let it
grow for a while and you will reap in good profits. In between – shun
your hedge fund managers and google long term profitability.