The LA Times has a preview of the post-surge plans for the U.S. military in Iraq:

In a change of plans, American commanders in Iraq have decided to keep their forces concentrated in Baghdad when the buildup strategy ends next year, removing troops instead from outlying areas of the country.

The original plans were to ‘thin out’ the troops, but to keep some posture in every part of Iraq.

The Iraqi puppet government is protesting against the plans, especially because control of Anbar will now go to the U.S. paid ‘awakening’ tribes.

But the occupiers don’t care what the pesky Iraqi government thinks. Their plans include its likely removal:

[T]he day-to-day commander in Iraq, Army Lt. Gen. Raymond T. Odierno, and his staff believe that the increasing competence of provincial security and political leaders will put pressure on the government in Baghdad that "will breed a better central government," said his chief of staff, Brig. Gen. Joseph Anderson.
[…]
"The grass-roots level will force change at the top because if they do not act on it, they will get overrun," said another senior military officer responsible for Iraq war planning.

Meanwhile the British have finally bailed out of any responsibility in south Iraq. This with typical imperial prancing:

"I came to rid Basra of its enemies and I now formally hand Basra back to its friends," the commander of British forces in Basra, Maj. Gen. Graham Binns, said shortly before he added his signature to papers relinquishing responsibility for the region in Iraq’s far south. "We will continue to help train Basra security forces. But we are guests in your country, and we will act accordingly."

The Brits will stay at the Basra airport and reduce their troops bit by bit until none are left. Finally that has the U.S. concerned:

Lt. Gen. Ray Odierno, the No. 2 U.S. commander in Iraq, said the handover was "the right thing to do" for southern Iraq, but American officials worry that a power vacuum could heighten the influence of Iran and threaten land routes used to bring ammunition, food and other supplies from Kuwait to U.S. troops to the north.

Whatever there is in south Iraq, it is not a power vacuum. Iran certainly already has a firm grip there. Odierno is rightly worried that the Persians pratically have him by the balls. But what is it about that route to Aqaba?

To get a bit of control over south Iraq, Pat Lang urges Odierno to repeat the Anbar strategy.

Clearly, the US should look at the possibility of applying the "divide and rule" methods it has applied elsewhere in Iraq to this problem. There is no reason to treat the Shia population as a monolith. There are analogous fissure lines among the various Shia factions and between them and the Shia tribes.

He, after all, has co-written the study the U.S. used to get control over the Anbar tribes.

But the Shia tribes in South Iraq and the economy are already under Iranian control. The Persians know very well how to pay off this or that faction to get things done in the way they like. I doubt that the U.S. can beat them in that trade.

The new "retreat to Baghdad" strategy the U.S. has unveiled is essentially the long expected retreat to the big bases. The task there is to wait for a change in government.

No, not to wait for a change in Baghdad – that government doesn’t matter much anyway – but to wait for a regime change in Washington DC.