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Ominous Signs of War
The Vineyard Saker has a very thoughtful analysis of political/military options in a USrael attack on Iran: Iran’s asymmetrical response options. He concludes:
In any scenario, time would always be on the Iranian side while the Empire would very rapidly run out of options to try force an acceptable outcome.
This lack of a viable “exit strategy” would rapidly force the time-pressed Imperial High Command to consider the use of nuclear weapons to avoid getting bogged down in a rapidly worsening situation. Any actual use of nuclear weapons would result into a general collapse of the entire Neocon empire of a magnitude similar to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. In other words, there are no possible winning strategies for an Imperial aggression against Iran.
Dispite the last sentence, the author believes that the attack on Iran is coming and probably soon. The neocon crazies who run the show in USrael are just that – crazy.
There are ominous signs that something immediate is up.
On Sunday Secretary of Defense Gates canceled his long planed visit to four South American countries. The official reason was to help script the presidential report to Congress on the Iraq situation due on Sunday.
I do not believe for a minute that such a report is reason enough for Gates to stay in Washington. Gates was put into the Defense job by pressure of the powers behind the Baker/Hamilton report. His job is to prevent any further stupidities by Cheney and the crazy gang of neocons.
Israel is running huge training maneuvers on the Golan Heights. Pat Lang thinks:
They
are preparing for a drive into Syria across the Golan heights, a
"decisive" battle with the Syrians between there and Damascus and then
a left "hook" into Lebanon to execute a "turning movement" against
Hizbullah.
This would certainly coincident with an attack on Iran.
Syria has asked all Syrians in Lebanon to come home immediately.
The Arab League chief was in Syria yesterday. Officially the League is trying to mediate on Lebanon. More likely it wants to stop another war. In a historic breakthrough a high level Arab League delegation was supposed to meet Prime Minister Olmert in Israel today. But just an hour ago Israel moved the session to July 25 due to some "special considerations".
The air-craft carrier Enterprise left Norfolk and is heading to the Middle East.
In a major sideshow Turkey has 140,000 troops ready to invade North Iraq.
On the propaganda side the neocon Jerusalem Post today headlines: ”Time running out for Iran strike’. Expect the Israeli Congress members Lieberman and Lantos to repeat that line over and over.
Yesterday the Washington Post ran a very speculative piece, including a picture, on page A01 enforcing the "nuclear Iran" meme: Tunneling Near Iranian Nuclear Site Stirs Worry. A fact driven piece, without a picture, that counters that meme was today buried on page A12: Slowdown Seen in Iran’s Nuclear Program.
Just about any event, Gleiwitz or Tonkin Gulf like, or a real one, can start a multi-front, multi-party war in the Middle East.
That event could happen tomorrow, or in a few weeks. But it certainly feels like it will be soon.
Nobody will win anything in this war. But that argument will not prevent it from happening.
DoS
The majority of the 250 airframes at Balad are helicopters – which are not much use as strategic bombers. The airbase is simply not big enough to accommodate 250 fixed-wing airframes. Note that the US requires support from naval aviation assets from their carriers to do combat air support over both Iraq and Afghanistan – this should tell you that they don’t actually have enough airframes based in either country to cover ongoing operations there. The B1’s are flying from Oman these days.
The airstrips ( Kandahar and Bagram )in Afghanistan are somewhat “austere” – which means that they’re not much use in a strategic bombing campaign as they cannot support the high-end aviation assets that are required for such operations; they’re also about 1500km from the bits of Iran that one might actually consider bombing. Afghanistan and Iran have pretty good relations – so you’re putting the US into a political conflict with its hosts.
Diego Garcia is a UK base – at best, the US will be allowed to use it for search and rescue missions for downed pilots. I’d also note that the B1’s that were based there have been moved as it’s too bloody far to Iraq/Afghanistan for operations to be sustained.
The other large airbases in the region are in Kuwait, Qatar, Oman and the UAE: all of these countries, which have normalised relations with Iran, have explicitly told the US that they cannot be used for airstrikes on Iran. This is one of the insurmountable diplomatic obstacles that the US faces. The only country that actually wants the US to go to war with Iran is Israel – and they’re not going to be much help.
Iran has so much more than just a couple of diesel subs – they have hundreds of anti-ship missiles, some of which have ranges of 300km, that can be launched from fixed-wing, rotary wing, sea and mobile ground platforms – just hunting these assets down would take the combined aviation assets of 2 carriers. They also have an airforce, their own recon satellite, shed loads of mobile medium-range missiles, a very large “force-in-being”, regional intelligence networks, tactical footholds in both the UAE and Bahrain, and strategic footholds in both Iraq and Afghanistan. There are more Iranians travelling to Iraq and Afghanistan per day than Americans travelling to Iran in a decade – where do you think that the intelligence advantage actually lies? The UAE is an offshore Iranian colony – 25% of the population is from Iran. Bahrain is 60% Shia, Kuwait is 30% Shia, and a fellow member of the Saddamised club, Qatar and Iran have excellent relations.
The one thing that you’re forgetting is that all of the US airbases in the region are within easy range for Iranian retaliation, and that Iran actually has the means to retaliate. The ones in Iraq are technically surrounded already. I’m sure that Bernhard could give you an estimate of how many Hizbullah-style artillery teams it would require the Iranians to deploy in the Balad region to do runway denial; it’s really not that many.
There is no group in Iran that the US can task to take over Khuzestan, which is the most heavily-militarised region in Iran. It would require a force numbering in the 100’s of thousands to take this region ( go ask Saddam, he tried, and failed ) – and the US doesn’t even have 5% of the force necessary available for this. I can’t believe that after the Lebanon fiasco of last year, where Israel used everything in the US airpower playbook over a tiny battlespace and failed miserably, that you think the US can achieve a different result against an orders of magnitude bigger opponent, that is much better armed, has strategic depth, and real tactical advantages over the US that can be leveraged to its benefit; it’s insanity to think otherwise, and US military planners already know all of this.
The only reason that the Pentagon civilians under Rumsfeld started talking about nuclear options is because the planners gave them a list of requirements that they needed to do Iran – and these requirements cannot be fulfilled.
The nuclear option is a short-circuit; the downside of it is that the Bush administration goes down in history as being on a par with Hitler or Stalin – the US military knows this and is, understandably, not keen, as they’re quite content to be on a par with Pol Pot.
There are a number of reasons for the escalating costs of Iraq: entropy, reset for damaged, destroyed and worn-out equipment, rampant inflation, combat pay burdens and ultra-high re-enlistment bonuses, fuel costs, corruption and profiteering, bribing people to not attack you or your convoys etc. It all adds up.
Posted by: dan | Jul 11 2007 11:00 utc | 28
Rick
One of the banker results of toppling Saddam was that Iran and Iraq would move towards an entente cordiale. The momentum for this began years before the invasion happened ( one of the key Baathists, Izzat Ibrahim el Douri, who is an important figure in the insurgency, was the architect on the Iraqi side of improving relations with Iran in the late 1990’s ) and was set in stone by the summer of 2003 – it took the US the best part of a year to realise what had actually happened. The US was politically defeated in Iraq by the end of the summer of 2003.
The first elected Iraqi PM, Jafaari, made very significant moves towards “defence and security cooperation with Iran”, which freaked the US out so much, that, amongst other things, the US had to create a parallel Iraqi intelligence apparatus that wasn’t controlled by, in their estimation, Iranian proxies; when Jafaari won the December 2005 elections the US spent the best part of 5 months fucking around in a desperate bid to prevent him from retaining his post. This was a “spoiler” strategy and somewhat ineffective to boot, as Maliki is in broad agreement with the EC posture. There will be considerable integration of parts of Iraq into the Iranian economy – this is already happening in the South with connections to the Iranian grid, oil-swap deals, rampant smuggling, the development of export markets for Iranian goods/produce, massive pilgrim tourism to Karbala and Najaf (with the Iranians building a new airport specifically for this ).
The Iranians are currently involved in a diplomatic demarche with some of the Sunni political groups/tribes as a means of maintaining a sort of unity front that can function politically – this is post-occupation, endgame diplomatic manouevring. They’re going to be much more successful at this than the US, as Iran has no intention of becoming militarily involved in Iraq unless they’re attacked. What’s been noticeable is the utter lack of any coherent Jordanian, Egyptian, Saudi or Kuwaiti diplomacy since the occupation began – they really don’t have a clue as to how to deal with the mess, have their heads stuck in the sand and have no confidence in the Bush administration – or the wider US polity – to deal with the situation; they’re panicking – the Iranians are quite noticeably not.
The US cannot sustain itself in Iraq for much longer and is caught in the entropy trap ( and no amount of extra airpower can save it from this ) – its ground force component is tapped out, and there is talk of having to put some 30k National Guard troops into Iraq during the next rotation to keep force levels adequate ( ie 130k upwards ); 2008 will be a nightmare, with units having to extend tours to up to 18-24 months to prevent collapses at the margins. Forget about talk of withdrawing to bases and drawing down to a 50k post-occupation occupation; all the US bases are co-located with the Iraqi population in the Tigris-Euphrates vallies ( water, roads ) and they can’t be insulated from events outside the wire.
Once the decision is made in early 2009, it will take at least 18 months for the US to withdraw, and the process will be a hideous, and probably bloody, nightmare, as the US military will be forced to abandon tens, if not hundreds, of billions of dollars of kit/stores/sunk costs, hostages/dead bodies; there is going to be a significant payoff for Iraqi groups that can get hold of US military equipment, stores, hostages as a means of positioning themselves for the next phase of the civil war – the “bribery” costs to forestall this will be enormous, and will involve the handover of a lot of firepower.
The burnout costs once the endgame begins are going to be unbelievable, and will likely coincide with a severe US fiscal crisis, which will impede the US’s ability to reconstruct its ground forces for at least 5 years, if not longer; this was anticipated by the JCS in 2005 – and was at the source of Murtha’s opening salvos against the occupation “strategy”.
The Iraqi civil war will continue until the Iranians and Saudis get together and impose a Taifa-type solution. The US will have to under-write the costs of this – and it will be very, very expensive.
Posted by: dan | Jul 11 2007 14:59 utc | 38
Dan, I personally don’t believe either that team Bush/Cheney (if it actually still is a team) has the power left to instigate an actual attack on Iran. The troops are just not available, the blow back too unpredictable, and most of all, as you pointed out, apart from Israel they’d be on their own. The admin’s credibility batteries are empty.
Although, it’s not that the usual suspects in the press wouldn’t be ready for it, some outlets are almost gaging for it.
I guess what keeps me worrying that the unthinkable will still be thought of is that
a, if mighty powerful people are in “take over the world” mode, they quite often don’t think straight. For Hitler to open the russian front with Operation Barbarossa was suicide, and many of his generals told him so. I am not saying GWB is like him, but he is also not known for being the sharpest knife in the drawer. All it takes is one of George’s prophetic dreams.
b, I am not actually that well-informed about what is really happening, assuming that the bits we get to see are the tips of the icebergs. I start to worry when people who do have access to more and better info, like lets say the Syrian government and its secret service sources, ask their citizens to leave Lebanon. There are much smarter people than me out there who do not discount the possibility that the 18 mths left will be plenty of time left for George and Dick to have an “ahhh fuck it, let’s do it!” moment. The Friends of Israel corner will certainly be sending “all shall be good” encouragements.
c, The team Bush/Cheney is not up for re-election, those two are not really loosing any sleep over what the electorate will think of such plan. The fact that their whole party and with them the republican 08 candidates will be wiped out at the next election should they start this Iran thing, doesn’t play much of a factor in their deliberations. The approval ratings are below laughable, the mid terms lost, the Iraq surge as noticeable as a fart in a cow shed, it already looks pretty grim for the GOP, senators jumping ship over the war issue. But does GWB change his politics to give his party a fighting chance? No. Carry on soldier. In short, domestic opinion and politics don’t seem to have much of an influence on those two, see the Libby case. Some things just have to be done.
d, You mention Gates having been put at the helm of the defense department in order to be the moderate voice. He was part of the Iraq Study Group recommending a phased withdrawal of US combat forces from Iraq and direct US dialogue with Syria and Iran over Iraq and the Middle East. According to a report in late November, the Iraq Study Group had “strongly urged” a large pull back of American troops in Iraq. What did we get with him? As Rick pointed out above, the surge, more deaths and no date for withdrawal in sight. Not that I believe that the decisions to spit in the Iraqi wind were his, but it shows how little say he has in what is done. Bush snubbed the Baker commission with his decision to send more troops without withdrawal date, and he’ll snub Gates, SecDef or not. I agree with you, if Rumsfeld would still be in the job, planning for war against Iran would be much easier, but I wouldn’t want to overestimate Gate’s degree of influence on major decisions.
According to this Guardian story, not that long ago, his stance on how to deal with Iran has somewhat changed, with him falling into step with neo-cons like Cheney and Hadley:
…The defence secretary, Robert Gates, told reporters that the decision to deploy a Patriot missile battalion and a second aircraft carrier to the Gulf in conjunction with a “surge” of troops in Iraq was designed to show Iran that the US was not “overcommitted” in Iraq.
…His remarks followed tough comments on Iran at the weekend from other senior US officials. The vice-president, Dick Cheney, accused Iran of “fishing in troubled waters inside Iraq”, while the national security adviser, Stephen Hadley, said the US was “going to need to deal with what Iran is doing inside Iraq”.
Such remarks, following the prospect of “hot pursuit” raids into Iran as raised by George Bush in his televised address last week, have fuelled speculation that the US is softening up the American public for possible action against Tehran.
The increasingly confrontational pose struck by the US is a repudiation of one of the key recommendations of the Iraq Study Group, which called for the start of a dialogue with Iran and Syria in an effort to extricate the US from Iraq.
Mr Gates, who as recently as 2004 publicly called for diplomatic engagement with Iran, said the situation was now different. In 2004, Iran was concerned by the presence of US forces on its eastern and western borders, in Iraq and Afghanistan, but its behaviour had changed….
To sum up this comment, if I had to put a bet on, I’d put my money on ‘no attack’, based on probability. The moment I get better odds than say 3 to 1 though, I’d be inclined to change to my mind.
Posted by: juan moment | Jul 11 2007 15:16 utc | 39
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