Within the U.S. foreign policy establishment there are two opposing strategic approaches towards the Persian Gulf area. Competing moves by and open collisions between the two groups representing the strategies often make it difficult to decipher what is really going on.
Additionally tactical action within each of the strategies sometimes seems to contradict that strategy’s general direction. It further obscures the big picture.
As a result of these factors there is utter confusion within the think tanks and the administration resulting in a policy paralyze. A Gordian knot that requires a bold move.
The Executive Editor of Roll Call, Mort Kondracke, argues for winning dirty in Iraq:
The 80 percent alternative involves accepting rule by Shiites and Kurds, allowing them to violently suppress Sunni resistance and making sure that Shiites friendly to the United States emerge victorious.
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Winning will be dirty because it will allow the Shiite-dominated Iraqi military and some Shiite militias to decimate the Sunni insurgency. There likely will be ethnic cleansing, atrocities against civilians and massive refugee flows.
This amoral option is not new. It was reported earlier as being discussed within the Cheney administration. But the timing of the Kondracke piece is interesting.
Kondracke is sourcing the idea he presents on "one member of Congress."
The central reasoning of the argumentation is in a tactical sense not plausible. But within a bigger context it is, while still conscienceless, a "liberating" bold move. It is also characteristic for a certain school of foreign policy.
Kondracke says the U.S. should side with the Shia and win the civil war in Iraq by extinguishing the Sunni opposition by any means including ethnic cleansing and, unsaid, genocide. The resulting Shia state will be U.S. friendly, manipulable and allow for basing rights and oil access.
Kondracke sees Maliki’s Dawa party and al-Hakim’s SCIRI as "Shiites friendly to the United States." He says they have lost the support of Iran and al-Sadr has emerged as the new Iranian puppet faction. The U.S. should therefore support Maliki and al-Hakim against the Sunnies and against al-Sadr.
But where are the facts supporting the assertion that Iran has changed sides within the Shia factions? Where is the proof that Iran has moved its support away from Dawa and SCIRI? Where is the proof that these are Shiites friendly to the U.S.?
I presume that in reality the opposite is happening. Badger seems to detect that the nationalistic-toned al-Sadr will (re-)unite with the Baathist and Sunni tribal resistance. Him doing so while having major Iranian support is very unlikely.
Kondracke and/or his source are either dumb, or they have something bigger in mind.
The only way to have U.S. friendly Shia in Iraq, as they premise, is by having U.S. friendly Shia in Tehran too. A U.S. supported fight against the Sunnis would certainly create serious backslashes in the relations with Saudi Arabia. A plan to enter this fight therefor must have a bigger component to prevent or circumvent such backslashes.
There have been hints towards such a plan.
That general strategic plan is to completely change the balance of power in the region. It is to a align the U.S. (and Israel) with the Shia crescent as a balance against Sunni powers (and the Arab peace initiative for Palestine.)
This sets up Iran against Saudi Arabia with the U.S. allied, if possible, with both simultaneously holding the power to tip the scale to either side anytime it feels the need to do so. "Divide et impera" – divide and rule – writ large. If this is not possible, the plan leans to an alliance with Tehran.
Prof. Cutler attributes such a plan to "Right-Zionists":
The folks who brought us this war–and intentionally brought Shiites to power in Iraq–have done what they wanted to do in Iraq. They have opened Pandora’s Box and are now prepared to watch as Iraqi Shiite power change the balance of power in the region.
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Right Zionists are now and have always been sweet on the Shiites and hostile toward Sunni Arab regional domination.Right Arabists are now and have always been sweet on Sunni Arab regional hegemony and totally hostile to Shiite power.
Within that framework the Right Zionists include the neo-cons and are personified in the administration by Cheney. The
Right Arabists opposing them are Baker, Zinni, Scowcroft and other ‘realists’, represented in the cabinet by, well, by whom? Maybe Rice leans a bit to their side, but more likely she is undecided.
The Right Zionists plan sees a need to prop up the Shia in general to diminish the role of the Sunni states. This in a general political, cultural and military power sense and in the case of Saudi Arabia also its role as swing oil-producer.
With Iraq’s and Iran’s oil-producing capacity submitted to U.S. counsel and advise, the Wahhabi Saudi Arabia would lose its role as leading OPEC power, its economic power and its ideological projection capacity (i.e. financing of wahhabi madrasses.)
The plan re-institutes a U.S., Israel and Iran coalition like it openly existed during the Shah’s regime. (The same coalition acted hidden during the Iran-Contra affair when Israel, on the behalf of the U.S., sold weapons to Iran. Note that very significant Iran-Contra players, Ledeen, Abrams etc., today are deeply involved in, if not the sources of, the Right Zionists plan.)
To fulfill this plan regime change in Iran is certainly preferable to these actors. But if an alliance with Iran can be achieved without regime change, such may not be an ultimate imperative.
Would a U.S. "gift" of a Shia Iraq cleansed of Sunnis be acceptable for Tehran? Could such a present be the start (or condition?) for a broader strategic cooperation agreement?
This time a U.S.-Israel-Iran coalition would be supplemented and strengthened by including a Shia Iraq.A really powerful entity geographically and economically squeezing the Arab nations in the Middle East.
The forming of this coalition does not necessarily require ethnic cleansing. If the Sunnis in Iraq knuckle down voluntarily, it would be fine with these partners. If not …
Opposed to this scheme are the Right Arabists.
They fear that a broad Shia coalition is uncontrollable. An empowered Shia crescent could jump across the Gulf and spread its influence to Shia Bahrain (now under Sunni minority rule) and the Shia (oil-)regions of Saudi Arabia. Instead of a balance of power a Shia monopoly of power could arise.
A U.S. alliance with the Shia could also push the Saudis to align themselves with Russia, still the Right Arabists ultimate enemy, or even China.
They want to stick to the intimate longterm and very profitable Sunni Saudi Arab-U.S. coalition and they want to keep Iran contained. They will fight tooth and nail to prevent the Right Zionists scheme. To this end they see an urgent need to keep the Sunnis in Iraq as a significant part of the national government.
Within the above strategical framework the timing of Kondricke’s despicable, amoral call for ethnic cleansing does make tactical sense.
Cheney is currently in Saudi Arabia. His task is to push the Saudis to press on the Sunni resistance in Iraq. They have to capitulate to the occupation and except their minority role. To this end carrots and sticks are presented. This would be the carrot for the Saudis: In Gulf, Cheney Pointedly Warns Iran
Aboard an aircraft carrier in the Persian Gulf 150 miles off Iran’s coast, Vice President Cheney warned Tehran yesterday that the United States and its allies will not allow Iran to acquire nuclear weapons, close off vital sea lanes for oil supplies, or control the Middle East.
Again – within the above strategic framework this is a tactical, ultimately not serious, threat towards Iran. Its purpose is to vociferous assure the Saudis of a U.S. commitment to them, the carrot, while silently amplifying the putative insecurity they would have without their U.S. alliance.
The timely publishing of the Kondracke "80 percent" piece is the ultimate stick to show the Saudis the alternative at the other end of the possible relation spectrum.
Laura Rozen suspects this to be true:
Cheney
may want to reinforce just such a ["80 percent"] message on his current trip to Saudi
Arabia and the region, that if the Saudis, Egyptians and Jordanians
can’t lean on their Sunni brethren in Iraq to make the Iraq gov’t of
national reconciliation a go, the alternative could be worse for them.
Is Kondracke part of the effort to deliver that message, as it were?
Isn’t Cheney as Vice-President also technically "one member of Congress?" Could he be Kondracke’s source?
On the strategic level the conflict between Right Zionists and Right Arabists leads to two incompatible directions in the current U.S foreign policy. As this fight continues a powerful unifying U.S. foreign policy does not exist or can not unfold. In Cutler’s words:
The US is in trouble in Iraq for a thousand reasons, but one of those reasons is that the US foreign policy establishment has been and continues to be working toward entirely different, mutually exclusive goals in Iraq.
It is not only Iraq, but the whole Middle East. There is a paralyze and utter confusion resulting from the two contradictory strategical positions.
The WaPo report on Cheney’s current trip points to the additional confusion on the tactical level. It notes that at the same time as Cheney is verbally blasting Iran, Rice is preparing for negotiations with Tehran. Robin Wright writes:
As Cheney spoke in the Gulf — after stops in Iraq and the United Arab Emirates — the State Department was working to set up a meeting in the next two weeks between senior U.S. and Iranian officials in Baghdad, U.S. officials said Friday.
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The divergent approaches toward Iran reflect the tensions within the administration, particularly between the State Department and the vice president’s office about whether to engage with Iran and, if so, how far to go.
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Some in the administration refer to the divergence as a good-cop, bad-cop strategy, while others say that it reflects a deep policy divide, with Cheney trying to stall or undermine diplomatic outreach efforts.
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Analysts say U.S. strategy is instead simply contradictory. "On the one hand, U.S. policy involves a series of coercive steps — U.N. resolutions, financial sanctions, arresting Iran’s operatives in Iraq, trying to mobilize the Gulf states against Iran, giving the kind of speeches with symbolism done today — that is quite comprehensive," said Ray Takeyh of the Council on Foreign Relations. "On the other side, it’s an offer to negotiate that is not well laid out. But the conciliatory effort is totally negated by the coercive steps, which is why it’s not working."
Confusion abound.
By invading Iraq the Right Zionists achieved a change in the balance of power around
the Persian Gulf. But without any influence in Teheran, they will have lost control over the powers they unleashed.
Now time is running out for the Right Zionists. If the U.S. is forced by its public opinion to give up on Iraq, they will lose the last leverage they have to achieve their overall goal of coercing Iran into an alliance. Regime change in Tehran may not be achievable within the remaining time-frame and/or the given resources. A grand deal though might be possible.
This grand deal is also the ultimate fear of the Right Arabists and their Saudi friends.
The split between the factions is very deep, and the confusion so persistent, that only some outer event or a bold move by one of the involved parties may cut the knot.
What move to what outcome is currently unpredictable.
A "gift" of a cleansed Iraq to Tehran is a possible bold move.