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OT 07-38
Open threat: "If you don’t comment, the terrorists will win …"
Iraq agriculture, resp. to a previous disc.
The current main FAO statistics skip Iraq, it is not listed.
link
Most numbers from anywhere stop 2000 – 03. Iraq Fisheries at the FAO goes to 03-04. Sideline, heh?
Earth trends – Iraq (stops 2000) gives a quick easy summary with 3 little graphs (nos. co the FAO) PDF
In 2007 Iraq has become one of 33 countries (world) requiring outside food assistance, along with Ethiopia, Congo, Burundi, etc. according to UN criteria / report. (google) (food aid vs. food import are very tricky categories.)
If we are interested in ppl eating and trading, we need the large categories such as “Cereals” (maize, wheat, rice, barley, etc.) – world stats and definition: Gramene org. Unfortunately, The USDA does not use this category, but sub-categories (wheat, etc.) – there are other difficulties as well. Several reports on Iraq don’t load (which is why this took me so long, i was hoping to read them.)
Here is FAO Iraq cereal production hect. cult. 90 – 00 — sanctions decade. The variations are due to rainfall (Iraq agr. about half irrigated half not), other factors I can’t judge and import/export of same. Iraq had some bad drought years. The variance is very high, as compared to other countries.
FAO
FAO
Oil for food – 1996 – impoverished everyone and certainly affected agri. and food dependence. Tractor parts were probably dual use!
What about post 2003?
— the first sentences of US agricultural programs in Iraq (USDA) ::
USDA efforts in Iraq have helped establish a growing market for U.S. agricultural exports of wheat, rice and poultry. Iraq currently imports almost $3 billion in food annually. Of that amount, U.S. agricultural exports in 2005 totaled $325.6 million. During the period January-October 2006, U.S. agricultural exports to Iraq increased to $339 million compared to $244 million for the same period in 2005—a nearly 39-percent increase in one year. Iraq was the No. 2 buyer of U.S. hard red winter wheat in marketing year 2005-2006. In addition, Iraq was the No. 1 buyer of U.S. long grain milled rice in 2005. In the late 1980s, it was our top market for rice and one of our top 10 wheat export markets.
USDA
The US produces 9.5% of world wheat. It exports 50% of that. (2006, calculated from USDA tables.) — a 23% share of world exports. It also imports wheat and wheat products (eg flour, pasta, bulgur..between 8-10% of quantity exported).
US wheat exports to Iraq: 01-02; none or value missing
subsequent seasons (02-03 to 05-06) :
57, 135, 393, 2,278 “thousand metric tons.” (USDA)
This is not really very meaningful. Iraq grows rice, etc. Barley (tougher, less water needed) yields have gone up in 2006 (yield, not tons!), possibly simply because it rained more. Iraq is also starting to grow maize, a good idea perhaps. It grows a lot of tubers. One can dig up similar numbers for poultry etc. but such nos. don’t give an overall picture. Note 1.
Skimming, I find that pre 2003 agri was not as good as I thought, the main material problems (US articles always blame ‘collective farming’ – in fact Saddam was an over-determined land distributor – and ‘mismanagement’ – read struggling farmers) in the past 20 years: water, and again water; deforestation and salinization – the story of the region, the story of a ‘poor’ or ‘economically squeezed’ (sanctions) country, a large part of which is desert. After all, the words oil for FOOD are pretty telling.
The USDA with or no USAID has financed agri projects – the money is distributed to American Universities, contractors, etc. Often there are no follow up ‘evaluative’ or ‘progress’ reports. The FAO does more on-the-ground work, such as distributing fertilizer. But without info. from the ground (bloggers don’t know where their munchies comes from!) or overall stats…I also looked up the relevant Iraqi sites (ministry, agri. research / college, etc.) and came up empty (404s..), though the Uni in Kurdland has a snappy web site in English. I found no one to e-mail.
Impression 2 was that sanctions did more to break agri. than the invasion.
The CPA had no plans for the food basket that kept Iraqis alive beyond poster pictures, blurb about economic renewal, the free market, etc. Food was ‘monetized’, inflation became rampant, etc, see one article, from MERIP, link
Impression 3 was that the Ministry has done nothing much except handle the food basket, squeezing money from where it could and buying what was available. Typically, many articles about US help in the agri sector don’t even mention any Iraqi body at all.
The hard data is missing. Iraq has become a black hole. It is no longer in any way part of the Int’l community as reflected in UN Agencies or other intl. bodies, Afgh. is better documented, more comprehensible. No conclusion can be made.
Posted by: Noirette | May 31 2007 16:33 utc | 11
Noirette,
Note 1. … The correlation (Nation Master) between Energy-Oil exports per capita and wheat imports ditto (the per capita is necessary for sense-making) is astonishingly high, as the nos. are for the world, and countries are very different (includes Norway, for ex.) – .8 (point 8). It is the fifth significant correlation listed by NM, the four preceding it no brainers (eg. oil exports correlates wonderfully with oil production.)
This precisely demonstrates the point I made the last time we discussed Iraqi agriculture. The main decline came about with the advent of oil revenues. After the 1991 war, with imports no longer easy, people took to farming again. But at the same time government control on a local level declined, possibly because of sanctions, so the statistics may no longer be accurate.
Since 2003, no statistics have been kept. How can you do it in the situation in Iraq? I have a CD of Iraqi statistics, dated 2005, and you are right, the agricultural statistics go up to 2003, and then stop.
I have the impression that people have almost gone back to subsistence farming. I exaggerate but it is not far from that. It is very clear that there is no central control, and local government is probably not exerting decision-making power in more than urgent cases.
In Baghdad, you can imagine in the statistics office, if they make it into the office at all (but they have to in order to get paid), they sit drinking tea and discuss the latest of their relatives to be killed. Not much substantial information for FAO.
There’s been a good biweekly report on the British Library web site about office life at the National Archives in Baghdad, by the Director Saad Iskander. Sorry don’t have the link to hand, nor time to look it up. It tells you exactly what life in a Baghdad govt. office is like. This account is devastating.
Thursday, 8 Feb., I sent after Ismail, He told me that he still had
no new information concerning the whereabout of Mr. M., who had been
missing since Al-Sadriya car-bomb attack. Soon after, I contacted my
cousin, asking him to search the two lists of the names of the dead
and the injured people in Al-Sadriya attack. After ten minutes he
rang me back, informing me that he did not find his name in the two
lists.
In the meantime, two of our librarians came to my office, asking for
my permission to search for Mr. M. I emphatically rejected their
idea, I warning them that it was too dangerous to go to al-Sadriya
area, as armed men were seen in the area. I also told them that I was
doing my best to find Mr. M. Unfortunately, the two librarians (a
Sunni and a Shi’i) did not listen to my advice. They left the
building without telling anybody about their intention. About one
hour later, I saw Miss. B, weeping in front of my office. I asked her
why she was weeping? She replied that al-Mujahdeen told her by phone
that they kidnapped the Sunni librarian in al-Sadriya area. They
asked her if the librarian was Sunni or Shi’i. She told them that she
did not know his religious background, and she begged them to release
him. Initially, I thought that the kidnappers were Shi’I, and
therefore, I contacted a number of trusted people, such as my own
cousin, to contact some Shi’I armed group that was active in
al-Sadriya area. I also sent one of my Shi’I librarians to the area
to see if he could secure the release of the kidnapped librarian. I
know Al-Sadriya very well. I was born and finished my primary school
in that area, and therefore I know a lot of local people. I thought
it would be relatively easy for me to release the kidnapped
librarian. I was totally wrong, as I discovered soon after. The local
leader of the Shi’I group told me by phone that his men did not
kidnap the Sunni librarian, and that his men were doing their best to
find him. He told me that it was very possible that another armed
Sunni group, which was also very active in the same area, kidnapped
the librarian. I felt immediately that something was wrong. I
immediately asked our security if they saw another librarian with the
kidnapped librarian? They said yes. The NLA was in state of total
chaos. Some female librarians were crying laudly. They thought that
both librarians were killed. I asked my staff to go back to their
work. Thirty minutes later, the kidnapped Sunni librarian returned to
our building. My staff gathered around him very quickly; some were
kissing him and other congratulating him about his release. I was not
happy at all; I knew that the kidnapped Shi’I librarians was in a
real danger. I asked the Sunni librarian to come to my office, and
not to talk to anybody else. In my office, he disclose the story of
their kidnapping. He said that he and his Shi’I colleague left the
building without telling anybody about their destination, and that
they were kidnapped a moment later by a group of Sunni armed men in
al-Maidan (just 200 meters away from the NLA). He said that he was
beaten up and hit several times on his head. He claimed that he was
released, after the kidnappers found out that he was Sunni. Then I
asked him about the fate of his Shi’I colleague. He said that he was
separated from him, immediately after the kidnapping, and that they
were both taken to al-Fadhal area (Just across road). I felt
instantaneously that I had no enough time to save the life of my
Shi’I librarian. I immediately contacted several people who had some
influence in al-Fadhal area. I sent two female administrators to
al-Fadhal, where they live, to see if they could persuade the
kidnapers to release the Shi’I librarian. I sent another person to a
a well-know Sunni figure in the hope that he could intervene. One of
librarians had the phone number of one our former drivers, who
resigned from his job last year. He and his family and relatives live
in al-Fadhal, where they had considerable influence among the locals.
I told him please act very quickly to safe the kidnapped librarian.
He told me that, as far as he knew, no one was kidnapped that
morning. I replied that I was sure that my kidnapped librarian was in
al-Fadhal, and that he should act very quickly before it was too
late. He promised to do his best to secure the release of the
kidnapped librarian or at least safe his life. The line went dead
before we could finish our conservation. Deep in my heart I knew it
was too late to safe the life of the kidnapped librarians. One hour
later I learnt from several sources that my librarian was executed
and that his body was dumped in an abandoned alley. We were all
devastated. I thought the news might not be true. But I received a
call from my assistant, which confirmed the fact that the librarian
was executed soon after the kidnapping. The killers rang the family
of the victim, telling them in cold blood that they murdered their
son and that they should take his body. I rang some people in the
hope they could provide me with more information on the kidnapping
incident.
There was no more news on Friday morning. In the afternoon, I offered
my condolence to the family of a Youngman, who was murdered for
sectarian reasons two days ago. In fact, my friends and I spent most
of our spare time visiting the families of the victims of the
on-going sectarian violence.
I do not know why I felt in that morning that our kidnapped librarian
was not murdered on Thursday. At 19.20 in the evening, I received a
call, and I was given more information. According to one of our
guards, who accompanied the family of the kidnapped librarian, the
victim “has been shot today morning”, and that “his family have found
his body”. The killers informed the family of victim about the place
where they threw his body.
–Saad Eskander
Posted by: Alex | May 31 2007 19:53 utc | 16
USA arming Iraqi insurgents?
The report forwarded by American intelligence officers is brief and to the point: “Hostiles” in Iraq are toting Berettas. Insurgents have a large number of Italian-made side arms, all recent-model weapons, and what is even more disturbing, with illegible or non-existent serial numbers.
…
However, the weapons found by the Americans are state-of-the-art 92 models, which are standard U.S. Armed Forces issue, among others.
…
In fact, the United States has become a major market in side arms, because regulations governing the sale of handguns allow wholesalers to purchase very large quantities of weapons. The only difference is the price. The U.S. Marines pay $263 for a Beretta 92, but in Falluja, the going rate is $850 dollars.
…
The crucial detail is the erasure of the serial numbers. The numbers do not appear to have been physically removed. Instead, the guns seem to have come off the production line without any serial numbers, or they could have been erased with high-tech industrial technology. The lack of serial numbers suggests that the weapons were intended for intelligence operations or terrorist cells with substantial government backing.
The investigating magistrates in Brescia are reminded of an old inquiry by the Anti-mafia authority into a stock of Beretta pistols with no serial numbers, or with the serial numbers erased. The mystery involved preliminary investigations by Judge Carlo Palermo, but failed to reach any conclusions. Now the Americans face a similar quandary, but on a much larger scale. The total number of weapons found when Saddam fell, and recovered during anti-insurgency operations, runs into the many thousands. The final figure will certainly exceed 10,000, and the Brescia public prosecutor’s office will have to try to shed light on their origin.
This sort of thing is common in Italy, land of
Gladio, Compass Rose and P2.
So:
There were also media reports that British arms and equipment exported to Iraq, specifically some of a consignment of 20,000 used Beretta Italian police pistols, were being diverted to terrorists.
But the latest and most interesting development on the small-arms front in Iraq was the news in May that the Pentagon has secretly shipped tens of thousands of small arms to Iraq from Bosnia-Herzegovina in the past two years, using a web of private companies. At least one supplier is a noted arms smuggler, Viktor Bout, blacklisted by Washington and the United Nations.
The US government arranged for delivery of at least 200,000 Kalashnikov machine-guns, together with tens of millions of rounds of ammunition, from Bosnia to Iraq in 2004-05, according to a report by Amnesty International, which investigated the sales. But though the weaponry was said to be for arming the fledgling Iraqi military, there is no evidence the guns reached their intended recipient.
The US and local authorities in Iraq and Bosnia when questioned could not or would not account for the deliveries and denied all knowledge of any weapons purchases from Bosnia.
Hmm. Coincidence, I suppose. The Americans send 20,000 Berettas to Iraq, no-one ever sees them again and 10,000 suddenly end up in the hands of “terrorists”. I wonder if carabinieri weapons have serial numbers. I like this:
The British Broadcasting Corp’s File on Four program said it was shown paperwork about a consignment of 20,000 AK-47-type assault rifles that shows they were imported by a company in the north of England called York Guns Ltd, which sells shotguns and sporting rifles. Its managing director Gary Hyde denied having imported the AK-47s and claimed that a third-party dealer had legally brought them into the United Kingdom.
Interesting. The open question is whether this is by design or blowback or to paraphrase Jeff Wells, “What can “state-sponsored” mean, when much of the United State’s security apparatus has been contracted out to private cartels, private intel corporations?
Posted by: Uncle $cam | Jun 1 2007 6:22 utc | 28
More on PSI’s (private security industry) or PMC’S (private military contractors)?
On its website, GlobalOptions, a Washington-based corporate security and investigations firm, describes itself as a “private CIA, Defense Department, Justice Department, and FBI, all rolled into one,” and says it offers
attorneys, crisis communications specialists, investigators, former senior policymakers and even commandos who can be mobilized on a moment’s notice to protect you, your employees, corporate reputation, bottom line, and share holder value.
I’ve been watching this trend since before March of 03, when CNN did a posting of a Fortune magazine article by Nelson D. Schwartz entitled: THE WAR BUSINESS, and post it here in full only because it is no longer on line.
THE WAR BUSINESS
The Pentagon’s Private Army
They run the mess halls. They program the weapons. They even recruit soldiers. And if America goes to war against Iraq, private military companies will play a bigger role than ever before.
FORTUNE
Monday, March 3, 2003
By Nelson D. Schwartz
American tanks move down a narrow street as explosions rattle the ramshackle town. Behind them, infantrymen outfitted in the latest high-tech gear creep forward, looking out for snipers, as well as for refugees and other civilians who could end up in the middle of a firefight. The brass has told the commanders in the field to keep collateral damage to a minimum, and headquarters is monitoring every step the grunts take via real-time voice and data links. Suddenly shouts are heard over the roar of the tanks, and a figure rushes onto the road. The soldiers tense and prepare to fire, only to see that it’s a man from the town, hollering at them in a language they don’t understand. A specially trained member of the unit quickly approaches him, says a few words in the man’s native tongue, and gets him out of harm’s way.
This scenario could come to pass in a few weeks in Baghdad if America does go to war, but for now it’s an exercise soldiers are taking part in at the U.S. Army’s Joint Readiness Training Center in Fort Polk, La. The drill reveals more than just the Pentagon’s concern for civilian casualties. It also demonstrates the large–and growing–role that private companies play in war. For while the men and machines are from the Army, just about everything else–from the explosive charges and electronics to the refugees and even the war game itself–has been supplied by a publicly traded company called Cubic.
If and when the shooting starts in Iraq, American companies will be more critical than in any previous conflict, including the last Gulf war. That’s because the Army has changed dramatically in the past decade, shedding almost one-third of its soldiers even as it has taken on missions from Kosovo to Kabul. At the same time, a government-wide push to privatize, as well as the increasing complexity of military hardware, makes the military more and more dependent on contractors. The upshot is that the Pentagon is outsourcing as many tasks as possible to enable the military, if you’ll forgive the MBA-speak, to focus on its core competency: fighting.
Mundane chores like KP duty and laundry detail have been outsourced at bases as far away as Afghanistan and Kuwait. Closer to home, even recruiting is being privatized. At stations in ten states, the medal-bedecked, ramrod-straight recruiter of yesteryear has been replaced by a casual-Friday-outfitted headhunter from one of two private firms. You probably have never heard of these corporations–Cubic, DynCorp, ITT, and MPRI aren’t exactly household names–but the Pentagon would clearly be lost without them. “You could fight without us, but it would be difficult,” says Paul Lombardi, CEO of DynCorp, which saw revenues rise 18% in 2002, to $2.3 billion. “Because we’re so involved, it’s difficult to extricate us from the process.”
The process, as Lombardi calls it, happens to be big business–very big business. Computer Sciences Corp., an IT-consulting giant, agreed late last year to buy DynCorp for nearly $1 billion, and L-3 Communications scooped up MPRI for $35 million in 2000. Cubic Corp.’s profits rose 41% in fiscal 2002, and its stock price has tripled over the past four years. By one estimate, the Pentagon this year will spend at least $30 billion–or 8% of its overall budget, on private military companies (PMCs), even if the U.S. doesn’t invade Iraq.
Like the peddlers who shadowed Napoleon’s armies, many of these companies are nestled close to the Pentagon, in bland northern Virginia office complexes. Staffed largely by ex-military types and former top Defense Department officials, they are the latest iteration of the military-industrial complex. Sometimes it’s difficult to tell the civilians from the warriors on today’s battlefield. While executives at DynCorp and other companies emphasize that most of their work consists of noncombat jobs like maintaining planes and choppers, installing software, mowing base lawns, and hauling garbage–“ash and trash” in industry parlance–certain missions blur the lines. For example, DynCorp won a State Department contract to protect Afghan leader Hamid Kharzai, who survived an assassination attempt last fall. Former members of Delta Force and other elite units, the DynCorp employees in Kabul carry guns and serve right alongside active-duty Special Forces soldiers. MPRI, for its part, has trained foreign militaries in places like Croatia and Bosnia.
Perhaps nowhere have private military companies played a more significant role than in the war against drugs in Colombia. At least a half-dozen companies, including Airscan, Northrop Grumman, and DynCorp, receive up to $1.2 billion a year from the Pentagon and the State Department to fly the planes that spray suspected coca fields and to monitor smugglers from remote radar sites, says Brookings Institution scholar P.W. Singer. Just last month a small plane carrying employees of Northrop Grumman crashed in rebel-held territory. One of the employees was killed, and three are being held prisoner by the rebels. U.S. and Colombian forces are still searching for them.
“That is exactly the kind of situation that I was concerned about,” says Democratic Representative Jan Schakowsky of Illinois, a critic of the private companies that help fight the drug war in Colombia. “There’s a great lack of transparency when you contract out, yet if something happens, we’re supposed to use our military to go in and rescue them and get involved in other conflicts.” Indeed, Northrop Grumman has refused to say what its employees were doing when the plane crashed, or even to answer questions about how many people it has in Colombia or what the company does there, citing the terms of its contract with the State Department.
As we’ll see, the question raised by the incident in Colombia is but one of many concerning the rising prominence of private military companies. “This is a huge and growing industry that is increasingly active in a number of conflict zones,” says Singer, who is completing a book on the subject. “The state is usually thought of as having a monopoly on the use of force. But it doesn’t anymore.”
Despite misgivings about PMCs in Congress and elsewhere, the Pentagon has had little choice but to embrace privatization as part of its ongoing effort to modernize and become more efficient. “Only those functions that must be performed by the Defense Department should be kept by the Defense Department,” an internal Defense Department study concluded shortly after Sept. 11, 2001. “Any function that can be provided by the private sector is not a core government function.” If that sounds like a broad mandate to privatize, well, it is. “There’s a recognition that we can’t be good at everything,” says Ken Krieg, a former International Paper executive and Pentagon veteran who is now a top advisor to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. “It’s an acceptance of what companies are already thinking in terms of core competencies. Do we need to have privates on KP duty slicing potatoes? Probably not. So I think this trend is just starting.”
While Big Business may play a more significant role in the next war than ever before, it’s hardly a stranger to the battlefield. Just as private companies aid high-tech communications today, contractors helped man telegraphs in the Civil War while other private firms hauled wagons and provided food. A century later DynCorp helped airlift troops to Korea and had some 3,000 employees stationed in Vietnam servicing Huey helicopters and other aircraft.
What’s different now is the scale and scope of the services the companies provide. In the late 1990s Halliburton’s KBR unit provided nearly all the food, water, laundry, mail, and heavy equipment to the roughly 20,000 U.S. troops stationed in the Balkans, according to a study by the General Accounting Office. It’s a massive job–since 1999, KBR has served 42 million meals and washed 3.6 million bags of laundry. Nor has it been cheap: The military has paid KBR $3 billion. (Halliburton’s CEO in the late 1990s was Vice President Dick Cheney, who had served as Defense Secretary in the first Bush administration.) When you figure that ten times as many U.S. troops are in the Middle East today as were in the Balkans in the late 1990s, you get a sense of how big a job KBR now has providing support at bases in Kuwait. “There are a lot of people to take care of,” says Butch Gatlin, a former Army engineer who is now KBR’s project manager in Kuwait. “As long as the Army needs us, we’ll be here.” Several hundred KBR employees are scattered over at least half a dozen bases in Kuwait.
As the military has downsized and privatized, the number of private contractors in the field has soared. Back in 1991, when American troops last faced down Saddam Hussein, the Army had 711,000 active-duty troops. Today it has 487,000–a 32% drop. Cuts in the number of Navy and Air Force personnel have been just as steep. (The Marine Corps has been more stable–semper fi–dropping only 10% in the past decade.) So no one should be surprised that private companies have picked up the slack. Singer of Brookings estimates that during the last Gulf war there was one contractor for every 50 to 100 soldiers. This time around the ratio is more like one for every ten. “Though we’ve relied on contractors forever, it’s unprecedented how much we depend on them right now,” says Paula Rebar, a senior Pentagon analyst who focuses on management issues. “Whether it’s good or bad, it’s the reality we have to deal with.” For the companies, it means having many more workers in what military people call “forward areas”–that is, close to the action. SAIC, a $6.1-billion-a-year employee-owned firm that specializes in engineering, software, and IT consulting, has 150 workers in the Middle East. At this stage of Desert Storm, it had just five in the region.
Unfortunately, military policy hasn’t caught up with the new reality. “It’s all unfolded so quickly that the Defense Department is playing catch-up,” says Rebar, ticking off some of the thorny questions that arise from having privately employed personnel on the battlefield: Can they carry arms? If employees of private companies run from their posts when attacked, are they considered deserters? If taken prisoner, are contractors considered POWs and covered by the Geneva Convention? The answers to those questions aren’t reassuring–because the Pentagon doesn’t yet have any. “Policy is still being drafted, and it’s still kind of mushy,” Rebar says. “It’s being studied.”
It’s probably too late to reverse the military’s need for private know-how. Although the Pentagon is reportedly considering new weapons that aren’t as dependent on contractors, many tech functions have already been outsourced. “We don’t have that organic capacity anymore, so we’re forced to go to war with contractors,” says Rebar. “It can put us at risk. And it places added burdens on the commander in the field. Not only does he have to worry about his soldiers, he has to provide protection for the contractors.”
The Reston, Va., headquarters of Dyncorp, the country’s premier private military company, is as bland as the corporate art on its walls. The only giveaway that there might be a martial connection is the black POW-MIA flag that stands alongside the Stars and Stripes in the reception area. While many of the company’s 23,000 employees are ex-soldiers, CEO Paul Lombardi is a soft-spoken veteran of the IT business and civilian positions in the Navy and Department of Energy. Because of DynCorp’s work in Colombia and Afghanistan, among other places, media accounts often portray it as the kind of shadowy company that might show up in an Oliver Stone film.
Yet unlike several of his counterparts at other firms, Lombardi seems eager to talk about DynCorp’s work. The bulk of the company’s $2.3 billion in sales last year came from much less sexy stuff than toting guns around Kabul or buzzing coca fields in the Andes–operating bombing ranges in California, maintaining military aircraft in Oklahoma, installing secure communications links for overseas troops. Although the federal government provides nearly all of DynCorp’s revenue, the company has a growing private-sector business as well. In 1994, for example, it installed a wireless network on the floor of the New York Stock Exchange. “But you’re not going to write about that,” Lombardi tells FORTUNE, sounding almost weary from the media’s focus on the Karzai and Colombia deals. Still, it’s hard not to notice his company’s PMC-type work, which is handled mostly by its international division. In the past five years DynCorp International’s revenues have gone from a few million dollars to $700 million, or about 25% of total revenues.
DynCorp’s roots are in aviation–the firm started as California Eastern Airways in 1946–and its aircraft-maintenance business has received a big boost in recent years from a wave of outsourcing by the Air Force. Two and a half years ago DynCorp won a $280 million contract from the Air Force to service the government’s executive air fleet, including the Vice President’s plane and the President’s choppers. (Air Force One is still maintained by the military.) At Fort Rucker in Alabama, where DynCorp’s headcount has doubled to 3,000 in the past five years, DynCorp’s mechanics service the planes and store aircraft parts.
DynCorp’s impressive growth (total revenues have tripled since 1994) and rock-solid relationship with the Pentagon explain why Computer Sciences Corp. decided late last year to buy DynCorp for $950 million. The deal should close this month, and Lombardi says he plans to stay until the transition is complete, which could take up to a year. Looking ahead, Singer of Brookings predicts that CSC might spin off DynCorp’s more dangerous operations–like flying planes in Colombia and guarding imperiled world leaders–and focus on safe, predictable businesses like IT and aircraft maintenance. “You might not want your stock price to go down every time a plane crashes in Colombia or there’s an assassination attempt in Kabul,” he says. In 2000, DynCorp was embarrassed by a sex scandal in Bosnia, where seven of its employees allegedly owned prostitutes, including one as young as 12. The episode raised questions about the company’s management of its overseas operations. Lombardi responds that all the employees linked to the prostitution ring were immediately fired and that the company did nothing wrong.
Meanwhile, back in the U.S., PMCs are broadening their portfolio. Companies like DynCorp and MPRI are offering services ranging from teaching leadership to formulating military doctrine. Guess who helped write the manual on dealing with contractors? A contractor–MPRI. That company, as well as RCI, a private firm in Vienna, Va., is also moving aggressively into the recruiting market, sharing a new $171 million contract to operate 60 stations in ten states. Lt. Col. Diane Potts of the Army’s recruiting command says the goal of this pilot program isn’t to save money–it’s to free up troops for more vital needs. So far, 360 soldiers have been returned to the field.
With a ready pool of young retirees (soldiers can retire with full benefits while still in their 40s) and a military desperate to keep officers in the field, combat simulations, classes, and live-action war games are also being run by corporations like DynCorp, MPRI, and Cubic. The Pentagon is paying private companies as much as $4 billion a year for training, according to Singer, and the companies provide more than laser-signal-equipped guns and smoke bombs. Along with preparing after-action reports and adjudicating “kills,” Cubic brings in Bosnian refugees from around the U.S. to recreate their experiences at the Army war games at Fort Polk. It’s a big production–in January more than 600 Cubic employees were needed to create an exercise for 6,500 troops.
And now the military training industry is expanding overseas. MPRI advised the Croatian army shortly before it launched a pivotal attack against Serb forces in Bosnia in 1995 and more recently advised the Colombian Defense Ministry. Cubic has won contracts from the Pentagon and the State Department to train the armies of new NATO members like Romania, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in NATO doctrine. That work has given the San Diego company entree to winning direct business from these governments in the future. “We may not be a household name in America,” says Gerald Dinkel, who runs Cubic’s defense unit, “but we’re getting to be pretty well known in Eastern Europe.” DynCorp helped train the Haitian police and is now advising members of the new Afghan police.
All of which brings us to Iraq. We wouldn’t be so crass as to describe that crisis as a business opportunity–too many lives are on the line. But the fact is that if America goes to war, private companies are going to be deeply involved both in supporting the troops during the fighting and in whatever peacekeeping and reconstruction efforts follow. Just getting water into the heart of the Iraqi desert, let alone food and other supplies, is a monumental challenge. And it’s clear from Halliburton’s experience with much smaller forces in Kosovo and Bosnia that taking care of several hundred thousand soldiers in Iraq for a year or more won’t be cheap either. Even after the bulk of U.S. forces leave, it’s likely that companies like MPRI and DynCorp will be busy training whatever military and police forces arise in a post-Saddam Iraq. But we’re getting ahead of ourselves. If war breaks out, employees of private military companies will be tested right next to the soldiers they serve. And unlike the war games at Louisiana’s Fort Polk, this time the bullets and bombs will be real.
Mercenaries have a long, bloody history of annihilating humans for cold hard cash. Huge, hairy Gauls stocked the Roman phalanxes; Hessians were hired by the British to perform their filthy colonial chores; 1960s vipers like “Mad” Mike Hoare and Bob Denard pillaged the Congo and Indian Ocean archipelagos. Mercs’ well-earned reputation as sadistic slaughterers-for-hire has been shattered in the last eight years, though, by three organizations that coolly operate with impeccable behavior.
For example:
Executive Outcomes (EO) of South Africa, though it has now closed shop, serves as today’s prototype for civilized mercenary activity. This Pretoria-based outfit boasted a multiracial force (70 percent black) of between 500 and 2,000 soldiers, primarily battle-toughened veterans from apartheid-era special forces. The commando-killers were paid the equivalent of between U.S. $2,700 per month for basic infantry mayhem and $13,000 per month for bomber pilots. Life insurance was duly included.
EO’s first spectacular assignment arrived in March 1993, when it was commissioned by the government of Angola to recapture a oil refinery that UNITA guerrillas had seized. With Ramboesque efficiency, 50 EO officers trained and led 600 Angolan troops in a victorious assault in which only three soldiers were wounded. The impressed Angolans next hired EO to protect its diamond mines: Continued success eventually earned the mercs more than $100 million.
Sierra Leone was EO’s next destination — in 1995. With only 170 men and six aircraft, the foreign pros managed to miraculously quell a civil war. The subsequent calm enabled the population to hold the first democratic elections in 28 years. Only two mercs were killed, and EO picked up another check for $35 million — a small bill for national peace.
Executive Outcomes also supplied soldiers to Uganda, Mozambique, and Kenya, to aid regimes that were struggling against internal chaos. International admiration for its battle prowess ensued, with a grudging reappraisal of mercenary potential. “I think there’s a place for these companies,” suggested Canadian Brigadier General Ian Douglas to United Nations officials. “You have to stop violence before you can start negotiations. Executive Outcomes did that in nine days (in Sierra Leone). They literally stopped the war.”
On January 1, 1999, EO abruptly closed its Pretoria business, prompted perhaps by recent South African “no-merc” legislation that prohibits the bartering of armed conflict for personal profit. Today, EO’s staff and expertise has been transferred to its once-subsidiary operations: LifeGuard in Sierra Leone and Saracen in Angola.
There’s more if anyone is interested, but I don’t want to siphon b’s bandwidth.
Are we feeling safe yet?
Posted by: Uncle $cam | Jun 1 2007 7:32 utc | 30
meanwhile, in the niger delta
Nigeria: Day 3 Protest – Shell Shuts 150,000 BPD of Production
Following the Bomu protest that has gone on for three days, Shell has been ramping production, cutting down on 150,000 barrels per day of output.
Villagers from K-Dere have since Tuesday, forcefully occupied the pipeline hub at Bomu, which feeds the Bonny shipping terminal destroying the environment by opening some pressure indicator valves.
According to Teddy Penedibebari, who led the protesters, “the lines are still shut. They are not flowing. We locked up the place and slept here last night.”
He said the protesters have decided not to leave the premises till Shell obliges them their request, which is allocating them contract to supply the company with goods and services.
Report revealed that the same protesters, from the Ogoni area, attacked the same pipeline hub on May 10, and occupied it for six days, forcing a 170,000 bpd closure.
Penedibebari said they demanded contracts worth N50 million, but a local source said the protesters yesterday modified their demand, calling for N200 million in cash. Reacting to the incident, a Shell spokesman said it was “ramping up production” and confirmed that output was still down by 150,000 bpd yesterday.
The company, which hopes that the situation changes very soon, said it had suspended production in Ogoni 14 years ago, because of popular protests, but the area is still criss-crossed by pipelines and many residents are aggrieved about oil spills and what they see as a history of neglect.
Shell had only just resumed normal production levels at its 400,000 bpd Bonny terminal before the villagers attack on Tuesday. Exports remain under a force majeure.
The latest disruption brings the total amount of output shut in in Nigeria to 845,000 bpd, or one-third of capacity.
Meanwhile, the protesters invaded the facility of Trans-Niger pipeline on that same day, which feeds the Bonny crude export terminal, prompting partial shutdown of the company three days ago.
Shell Halts Exports of 150,000 bpd Due to Nigerian Unrest
Anglo-Dutch oil giant Royal Dutch Shell PLC has suspended the export of 150,000 barrels per day of crude oil because of community unrest in southern Nigeria, a company spokesman said.
“We had to halt production from the Bomu manifold until we are able to resolve our problems with the community,” Precious Okolobo told AFP.
He said villagers from K-Dere in the restive Ogoniland had stormed the
facility that feeds the Bonny export terminal, disrupting supply of crude.
It was the second seizure in two weeks. Shell reported on May 15 that protesters occupied the same facility, causing a daily output loss of 170,000 barrels, out of which the company directly accounted for 137,000.
…
Shell, Nigeria’s largest oil operator, accounts for around half of the country’s daily output of 2.6 million barrels, but unrest in the oil-producing south has cut production by 25 percent.
Our conditions for peace in the Niger-Delta, by MEND leader
JOMO Gbomo is the name with which he is known in the world of militants in the Niger-Delta and he is one of the leaders of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger-Delta. But only very few persons have seen him face-to-face. He spits fire in the many statements he had issued on behalf of the MEND. It was typical Gbomo in this online interview, Wednesday night, with this paper.
Excerpts.
…
In all honesty, don’t you think that the region would be the loser in terms of investment by investors if the militants do not drop their arms?
Already, companies are moving away from the Niger-Delta region, the same companies that would provide the much sought-after employment for the youths…
The same companies moving out of the Delta have been there for nearly 50 years and what have we got from their presence? Pollution and menial jobs for the people of the Delta. They will not be missed. As long as there is oil, I assure you, they will return at our terms, whenever there is peace in the Delta, when we get justice. The temporary exit of these dubious oil companies is a very small price to pay for freedom.
What do you think the new government should do for the MEND to stop hostage taking and the bombings in the Niger-Delta?
Ultimately, the Nigerian state must do what is right. As we have maintained, the terms presented to us in the pre-independence constitution were the basis upon which we consented to being a part of Nigeria. These terms must be restored, otherwise we should be permitted to peacefully exit Nigeria. It is only if both of these options are refused, that we are left with no choice but to fight to enforce our rights within Nigeria or our exit.
Navy to Lead Gulf of Guinea Maritime Security Initiative
WASHINGTON, May 31, 2007 – This fall, a U.S. Navy ship will embark on a six-month deployment to the Gulf of Guinea region, part of a multinational maritime security and safety initiative that partners with several west- and central-African nations, a senior U.S. Navy officer said here today.
The yet-to-be designated amphibious ship will carry 200 to 300 sailors and U.S. Coast Guard members who will man training teams that will work with eleven Gulf of Guinea nations, helping them to build their maritime security capabilities, Navy Adm. Henry G. Ulrich III, commander of U.S. Naval Forces, Europe — based in Naples, Italy — told reporters today at a news conference held at Fort Lesley J. McNair here.
U.S. Naval Forces Europe Prepares For AFRICOM Stand Up
WASHINGTON, June 1, 2007 – U.S. Naval Forces Europe, an organization responsible for naval operations in much of Africa, is preparing to work with the new U.S. Africa Command, which is slated to stand up sometime in October, the naval forces’ commander said here yesterday.
…
A U.S. Navy ship will embark on a six-month deployment to the Gulf of Guinea region this fall, part of a multinational maritime security and safety training initiative that partners with several west- and central-African countries. Ulrich said his command did the planning for the Gulf of Guinea initiative. That mission, he said, falls within “the spirit of AFRICOM and the initial operating capacity of AFRICOM.”
…
The Gulf of Guinea mission dovetails with U.S. Africa Command’s mandate, Ulrich said.
“If you look at the direction that the Africa Command has been given and the purpose of standing up the AFRICOM, you’ll see that (the Gulf of Guinea initiative) is closely aligned,” the admiral said.
Posted by: b real | Jun 2 2007 4:32 utc | 54
about starting a war with china
literally, of course not. nor was that implied.
Beyond that, the dream was always for labor to be as fluid as capital, right?
And China and the US are in economic cahoots – the US sells its bonds or treasury notes or whatever and the Chinks produce irons, fans, tvs, radios, soon (..) cars; underwear, wedding dresses, toys, candy and favors, shoes, furniture, optical instruments, chemical products, plastics; toothpaste, make up, etc.: food: spicy chicken drum sticks, and much more –
‘slave’ labor, the stuff is sent right to the US, sold at Wallmart, etc. I mean by now, without the Chinese, Americans would be eating beets, turnips, cabbage, ground maize, -grits?- and scratching their calendars and love notes on scrap paper found in the litter bin of the corps who just toss everything.
Even out of work, producing nothing, they can buy machines, pickles, frothy party dresses, shaky BBQs, fake plants, garish aprons, plastic gnomes, lovely party dishes, chairs, lace, glass end tables, and semi-sexy repros of great works of art. (In Europe also.)
There is no way the US establishment will ever take action against China. The jockeying for energy resources is wink wink. The neo cons judge that China is not baad, as China is not anti-israel, its interests are purely commercial, the energy China uses to produce plastic shoes (etc.) is big benefit for the US, as US citizens can then pay ‘very little’ for shoes and need not really have ‘jobs’ and can go along grumbling about having no jobs.
I am, hah, a little economically naive.
Posted by: Noirette | Jun 2 2007 17:52 utc | 62
my hunch in #51 was correct, wrt the u.s. attacks on puntland friday. when i flagged the article on the men in boats of whom the puntland info minister initially stated “were most likely on their way further north, possibly to Yemen, but rough seas forced them to come ashore.”
Conflicting reports about the U.S. air strikes in northern Somalia
BOSSASO, Somalia June 3 (Garowe Online) – There are conflicting reports emerging after the U.S. military bombed a coastal town in northern Somalia’s Puntland region on Friday.
Both American and Somali officials have claimed that the strikes targeted a group of armed men who arrived in Bargal town by speedboats last week, sparking a gunfight with lightly-armed local police.
According to the officials, the men included Somalis and foreign-born fighters from various countries, and number somewhere between 35 and 70 men.
…
Hassan Dahir Afqura, the vice president of Puntland, told local media on Saturday in the regional capital Garowe that 8 suspected militants were killed in the air strike. Five Puntland intelligence (PIS) agents were wounded during a gunfight with the militants, according to VP Afqura.
…
Afqura said Puntland security forces had recovered U.S., Swedish and British passports among others from the dead men. The vice president did not produce any evidence to that effect, however.
But Bargal locals have told Garowe Online that the U.S. air strikes missed their target, and instead wounded four PIS agents.
Describing the beginning of events, one local elder said 13 armed men led by a man from Puntland landed at the coast on Wednesday. The group’s leader apparently told the locals that his men, who clearly included foreigners, came to Bargal for fishing.
But local policemen attacked the 13 men, who defended themselves and fled into nearby mountains. “No one knows who they [really] were or where they went,” the elder said.
Local police then contacted PIS agents in the port city of Bossaso, Puntland’s commercial hub. Security forces were dispatched to the area and U.S. warships operating off Somali coast alerted, security sources said.
VP Afqura said 3 American intelligence agents were on location to help with the hunt for the militants.
nobody disputes that the boats were traveling north. if you look at the map in the article above, not too far north is the city of bossaso. a couple weeks back, there was an article on bossaso that may possibly offer some context.
Somalia: Bossaso teeming with would-be migrants
BOSSASO, Somalia May 21 (Garowe Online) – The port city of Bossaso in northern Somalia is teeming with young men and women seeking to take the dangerous journey across the Red Sea to the Mideast, residents and officials said.
Hundreds of young Somalis who fled conflict in southern Somalia and young Ethiopians seeking better opportunities aboard can be seen walking up and down major city streets in Bossaso.
Residents said some of these young people can be seen sleeping on the side of the streets, since they can’t afford to pay rent or live at a hotel.
Some of the would-be migrants said in interviews with local media that they plan to take the perilous trek across the Red Sea to Yemen, despite knowing the full consequences of the journey.
because of the desperate situation in somalia, intensified by the u.s.-backed ethiopian invasion which drove nearly 400,000 residents from the capital city of mogadishu alone (of which the UN said friday that maybe only 90,000 have returned), somali’s are risking the boat ride to yemen, often relying on boat operators & smugglers who exort large fees & have reportedly forced many passengers to attempt to swim to shore, no wanting to get their boats too close to land. so there have been reports all year of numerous deaths & drownings of those fleeing somalia, compounding the tragic state of life there.
could these foreigners have also been related to that journey, either smugglers themselves or involved in moving people up from the south toward bossoso? after all, as ‘terrorism experts’ claim, al qa’idah cells comprise at most 20-30 people, and accounts put the traveler’s group at 35 figures and up.
and i cannot even recommend mcclatchy newspapers — which has been one of the only hopeful signs of journalistic integrity wrt the iraq quagmire — as a good source of information on this coverage. in the article i’m looking at now, American among those killed by U.S. attack in Somalia
there’s this unchallenged stmt
The violence has increased since December, when a U.S.-backed invasion by Ethiopia toppled a fundamentalist Islamic regime that Bush administration officials said was run by al-Qaida.
they’re gonna leave it at that (the AQ connection), despite all evidence to the contrary.
On Sunday, Somalia’s interim prime minister escaped an assassination attempt when a car bomb detonated outside his heavily guarded residence. News reports said five Somali soldiers and two civilians were killed.
Somali officials immediately blamed al-Qaida-linked insurgents for the attack, the second in as many weeks on the prime minister, Ali Mohammed Gedi.
“We have been patient for so long,” Gedi later said on a radio broadcast. “We can no longer cohabit with these terrorists. … We have to eliminate them.”
the “somali officials” are the same people who were selling the cia on AQ operatives running around the country from the 1990s onward. the plain facts are that the imposed government is very unpopular, as it was crafted & comprised largely of one particular clan from the north, the “insurgents” do not recognize it’s authority, which only exists because of u.s. and ethiopian muscle & mayhem. it was not AQ that sets off bombs in mogadishu, it is indigenous resistance to an occupation. the “somali officials” use the AQ tag to get help eliminating their opposition.
next, getting back to the u.s. attacks this w/e, the mcclatchy article states
The clashes in Puntland were the first in the north of the country, which has largely escaped Somalia’s recent violence.
this is not so. for instance, there were a week or two of clashes in april. see Fighting in northern Somalia between Somaliland, Puntland forces.
finally, the article gives a somali official the last word
“Quite a number of international terrorist groups have been looking for Somalia as an alternative base,” said Somalia’s foreign minister, Ismail Mohammed Hurre.
ironically, the minister is, in part, correct, as one is unlikely to currently find a larger int’l terrorist group on the planet than the u.s. military/govt
Posted by: b real | Jun 4 2007 3:12 utc | 96
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