There are several accounts this week on future U.S. planing in Iraq. These reports seem to contradict each other and they of course contradict the facts on the ground.
None of the strategies discussed involves a decrease of troop numbers and as the Democrats (predictively) have folded and conceded defeat to themselves, Bush certainly has no need to plan any decrease at all. With Congress giving more money than he asked for, troop strength will increase.
The "surge" did look fake to me when it was announced. Some 25,000 additional troops for some month was the official line. Now smart people at Hearst newspapers have analyzed the actual Pentagon activation orders and the numbers look much higher:
When additional support troops are included in this second troop "surge," the total number of U.S. troops in Iraq could increase from 162,000 now to more than 200,000 — a record high number — by the end of the year.
The second surge of troops to Iraq is being executed by deploying more combat brigades to the country, plus extending tours of duty for troops already there.
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Taken together, the steps could put elements of as many as 28 combat brigades in Iraq by Christmas, according to an analysis of deployment orders by Hearst Newspapers.The actions could boost the number of combat soldiers from 52,500 in early January to as many as 98,000 by the end of this year, if the Pentagon overlaps arriving and departing combat brigades.
For real boots on ground numbers one has to add the 100,000 contractor currently in Iraq. More soldiers there will need more services so these contractor numbers will surge too.
But what are these soldiers for?
The on-the record account of several people involved in current strategy planing in today’s Washington Post does not mention any increased troop numbers.
The strategy planing is explained as three pillars. First bringing U.S. troops into the streets to "protecting Iraq’s population", second building the government through a period of 18-21 month instead of a "rapid transition" and third to kick out officials and commanders with sectarian agendas (good luck with that.) The plan calls for keeping Maliki in his position.
The above plan was briefed by the military in Baghdad. Yesterday David Ignatius, also at the Washington Post, had a report titeled After the Surge. It was based on "senior administration officials". That report does not fit today’s account.
Ignatius wrote:
The new policy would focus on training and advising Iraqi troops rather than the broader goal of achieving a political reconciliation in Iraq, which senior officials recognize may be unachievable within the time available.
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The post-surge policy would, in many ways, track the recommendations of the Baker-Hamilton report, which senior administration officials say the president now supports.
Did the Baker-Hamilton report recommend to increase troop size by 60%? Certainly not.
Yet another contradicting account based on "a former senior administration official" is given in the Guardian today:
The Bush administration is developing plans to "internationalise" the Iraq crisis, including an expanded role for the United Nations, as a way of reducing overall US responsibility for Iraq’s future and limiting domestic political fallout from the war as the 2008 election season approaches.
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The former official, who is familiar with administration thinking, predicted Mr Bush would instead ask Congress to agree a six-month extension of the surge after Gen Petraeus presented his "progress report" in early September.
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Mr Bush will sweeten the pill by pursuing a series of steps intended to "hand off" many current US responsibilities to the international community, the former official said. The president would try simultaneously to placate congressional and public opinion by indicating willingness to talk about a future troop "drawdown".
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If all else failed, the US might seek an arrangement with Mr Sadr, if only to secure an orderly transition, the official claimed. "Cutting a deal with the Mahdi army is [vice-president] Dick Cheney’s deep fallback option."
Now what is this? Are these plans to be combined? Are the reports wrong? Are they leaked to confuse?
Meanwhile there is some strain on the lines of communication, i.e. some necessary convoys seem not to come through, salad bars get closed even on the big bases and the troops have to eat MREs. More troops in the country equals more convoys equals more targets. I therefore expect such logistic problems to increase.
But what are all these troops to do in Iraq anyway?