The "American Psyche" After Iraq
It will take at least another three to five years before the U.S. will retreat from Iraq. The four big bases are mostly finished and staffed and the U.S. elite will not be willing to give up that strategic gain.
But on a longer term, I do not believe that the U.S. will sustain that project because the public will be further alienated by it and because the financial consequences will start to show up in everyday life.
After a retreat from Iraq the financial problems will mostly be solved by the U.S. strongarming the G7 or G8 into a new Plaza Accord, i.e. a massive devaluation of the U.S. Dollar.
But what is going to happen to the "American psyche", its "victory culture", after a retreat from Iraq.
Ira Chernus, a Professor of Religious Studies at the University of Colorado at Boulder, has published his thoughts on this in Asia Times Online and at Tom Dispatch and comes to a quite frightening perspective: After Iraq, the U.S. will turn more nationalistic, militaristic and imperialistic.
Being only a U.S. observer, I have too little real recent experience with the "American mind" - most readers here have more. So let us know your opinion on the chance of this to happen.
Some excerpts from Cernus' piece:
Remember the "Vietnam syndrome", which made its appearance soon after the actual war ended in defeat. It did restrain the US appetite for military interventions overseas - but only briefly. By the late 1970s, it had already begun to boomerang. Conservatives denounced the syndrome as evidence of a paralyzing, Vietnam-induced surrender to national weakness. Their cries of alarm stimulated broad public support for an endless military buildup and, of course, yet more imperial interventions.
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Ronald Reagan played all these notes skillfully enough to become president of the US. The desire to "cure" the Vietnam syndrome became a springboard to unabashed, militant nationalism and a broad rightward turn in the life of the United States.
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Iraq - both the war and the "syndrome" to come - could easily evoke a similar set of urges: to evade a painful reality and ignore the lessons it should teach the US.
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The ambivalence lurking in the polls suggests that many Americans want it both ways. The war should end quickly, but somehow with victory culture if not still burning brightly, at least flickering, as the birthright Americans demand.
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the US public will be told that Iraq, too, was just an aberration, a well-intentioned war handled with a staggering level of incompetence that simply got out of control. Those who don't want to repeat the experience, who prefer to try other paths to global security, will be told they are infected with the Iraq syndrome. And the prescription for a cure will inevitably be military buildup, imperial war and, of course, the possibility of both "kicking" the Iraq syndrome and welcoming US troops home in the sort of triumph they so richly deserve.
Posted by b on March 3, 2007 at 20:38 UTC | Permalink | Comments (36)
Have Fun ...
Out for some clubbing - have a good weekend - have fun.
Posted by b on March 2, 2007 at 21:34 UTC | Permalink | Comments (18)
Politicized Reports
Government reports are not neutral, but express the general tendencies of the administrations politics. See the just released International Narcotics Control Strategy Report. It even confuses the person responsible for it. In her release briefing Mrs. Patterson manages to contradict her own report several times.
The report:
The Islamic Republic of Iran is a major transit route for opiates smuggled from Afghanistan and through Pakistan to the Persian Gulf, Turkey, Russia, and Europe. The largest single share of opiates leaving Afghanistan (perhaps 60 percent) passes through Iran to consumers in Iran itself, Russia and Europe.
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report-2007
Released by the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs March 2007
The briefing:
QUESTION: I have one more follow up. You are listing (inaudible) list that Pakistan is a major drug trafficking and money laundering center. How can you explain this? Where are the drugs coming and going through Pakistan?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY PATTERSON: There's a legal definition of what a major trafficking -- and it's in the front part of that report -- and yeah, sure, Pakistan because they take at least somewhere between half and two-thirds of the Afghan product moves through Pakistan.
Release of the 2007 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report
Anne W. Patterson, Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs - On-The-Record Briefing - Washington, DC - March 1, 2007
The report:
Afghanistan remained the world's largest producer of opium in 2006, cultivating 172,600 hectares of opium poppy according to USG estimates. This equates to 5,644 metric tons of opium, up from 4,475 metric tons in 2005.
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report-2007
Released by the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs March 2007
The briefing:
Afghanistan's opium poppy cultivation increased by an alarming 59 percent, making last year's crop the largest on record.
Release of the 2007 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report
Anne W. Patterson, Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs - On-The-Record Briefing - Washington, DC - March 1, 2007
Bonus issue - Venezuela:
Prepared remarks:
Venezuela's permissive and corrupt environment led to more trafficking, fewer seizures, and an increase in suspected drug flights over the past 12 months. From 2005 to 2006 there was a 167 percent increase in cocaine trafficked via air to Hispaniola.
A smart reporter during the Q&A:
QUESTION: Anyway, on the second question, which is more -- you say that -- on Venezuela that there was a 167 percent increase in cocaine traffic (inaudible) to -- I presume this is Haiti and the DR. How do you know this? Are there seizures that --
ASSISTANT SECRETARY PATTERSON: Because we track -- we have very good information on air tracks. And what's essentially happened is what the -- what used to come through Colombia by air has now been virtually eliminated through a very successful program called air bridge denial and pushed eastward into Venezuela.
QUESTION: Okay.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY PATTERSON: And a lot of product is also moving from Colombia by land into Venezuela where it's put on small planes and goes into Haiti and the Dominican Republic.
QUESTION: And your information is on the weight of this amount or just on the number of planes?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY PATTERSON: No, on the -- on the number of tracks we've seen. And there's a complicated formula that derives that. It's about 9 percent of U.S. supply.
QUESTION: Yeah, but I'm just not sure I understand how you get 170 --
ASSISTANT SECRETARY PATTERSON: Okay, we'll give you that.
QUESTION: -- 167 percent increase in cocaine when you haven't actually weighed it. I mean, you're talking about an increase in the number of flights, right?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY PATTERSON: We're talking about an increase in the number of flights.
QUESTION: Of which you do -- which may or may not have illicit drugs on them?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY PATTERSON: Well, that's true. But we have many years of statistical history on this --
Release of the 2007 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report
Anne W. Patterson, Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs - On-The-Record Briefing - Washington, DC - March 1, 2007
Unfortunately, such bogus reports have consequences. When newspapers write "Report slams Venezuela for drug trafficking," people immediately assign guilt. Of course that is why the effort is made ...
Posted by b on March 2, 2007 at 17:24 UTC | Permalink | Comments (8)
NoKo Intelligence Blunder
If these reports in the Washington Post and the New York Times are true, which looks likely, the U.S. administration has committed the biggest foreign policy blunder possible.
North Korea did not intend to build nukes, but the administration, blinded by its own light, made them do so.
The Bush administration is backing away from its long-held assertions that North Korea has an active clandestine program to enrich uranium, leading some experts to believe that the original U.S. intelligence that started the crisis over Pyongyang's nuclear ambitions may have been flawed.
Back in 2002, an agreement was in place that guaranteed North Korea some oil supplies if it stayed away from nukes and kept its nuclear programs under IAEA supervision.
The U.S. then found that North Korea had received some 20 centrifuges from Pakistan and had bought lots of aluminium tubes, though the quality of those tubes was in doubt and likely unsuitable for uranium enrichment.
But the administration, based on intelligence analysis, assumed that North Korea had started a uranium enrichment program to build a nuclear Uranium weapon. It immediately went to hostility mode, did stop the agreed to deal and refused any further serious negotiations. Tit led to tat and North Korea threw out the IAEA inspectors and built nuclear weapons using plutonium that had been under IAEA supervision.
This of course did make much more sense than to start an enrichment program. Uranium weapons are bulky and heavy and to deliver them large bombers, which North Korea does not have, are necessary. Plutonium weapons are much lighter and can be fitted on missiles which North Korea has available. This fact alone should have softened the intelligence estimate. (For the same rational reason I seriously doubt that Iran's Uranium enrichment program is for weapon purposes. Why build a bomb one cannot deliver?)
So why was the early assessment wrong? The intelligence people would not say. Unlike with the Iraq intelligence there was no need to intentionally manipulate the assessment on North Korea. There is no oil to win there and there is no other motive for exaggeration I can think of.
But the psychological background may be one of projection. Ultra-hawks like John Bolton tend to believe that their enemies would do exactly as they would do. They project their own amorality, fear and irrationality on others. The various instantiations of the Committee on the Present Danger are evidence of this tendency. Adding to that was an acute "anything but Clinton" psychosis.
Now, five years after a neurotic exaggerated intelligence assessment and the breakdown of relations, North Korea does have several nukes and the U.S. is in the same or even a worse position than back in 2002. North Korea now will get oil for putting some of its programs under IAEA supervision but in between gained the deterrence to avert any military pressure.
While the Iraq intelligence was intentionally wrong, and therefore not a showcase of a lack of ability of clandestine services, the case of North Korea really proves their incompetence.
If they were unintentionally wrong on North Korea, where can one trust their abilities at all?
Posted by b on March 1, 2007 at 15:44 UTC | Permalink | Comments (12)