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ISG Report – Flowers And Sweets
Some random thoughts while reading through the Iraq Study Group Report (pdf) (all following page numbers refer to the PDF pagecount). I’ll probably try to come up with some less random thoughts later, but don’t want to miss to communicate the first impressions.
The situations is a terrible mess in all dimensions. At this blog we have in the past picked together pieces of the picture from various press accounts and blogs. But the public has had no overview of the situation and a comprehensive listing like available in the report will help to open some eyes.
As an example of how underreported the situation really is the report notes on page 13:
The standard for recording attacks acts as a filter to keep events out of reports and databases. A murder of an Iraqi is not necessarily counted as an attack. If we cannot determine the source of a sectarian attack, that assault does not make it into the database. A roadside bomb or a rocket or mortar attack that doesn’t hurt U.S. personnel doesn’t count. For example, on one day in July 2006 there were 93 attacks or significant acts of violence reported. Yet a careful review of the reports for that single day brought to light 1,100 acts of violence.
The report does call for more unity in the government and blames a lot on Maliki and sectarian forces within the government (p19).
Iraqi people have a democratically elected government that is broadly representative of Iraq’s population, yet the government is not adequately advancing national reconciliation, providing basic security, or delivering essential services.
There is this note that obviously is in conflict with recent press reports (p25):
There are roughly 5,000 civilian contractors in the country.
The Washington Post reported yesterday: Census Counts 100,000 Contractors in Iraq. So what is it???
How not to spend money effectivly (p26):
Congress has been generous in funding requests for U.S. troops, but it has resisted fully funding Iraqi forces. The entire appropriation for Iraqi defense forces for FY 2006 ($3 billion) is less than the United States currently spends in Iraq every two weeks.
As for outsite medling in Iraq, the Iranian influence, according to the report clearly runs through al-Hakim’s Badr corps, while the Sadr-movement is described as nationalistic. Also noteable (p47):
Funding for the Sunni insurgency comes from private individuals within Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, even as those governments help facilitate U.S. military operations in Iraq by providing basing and overflight rights and by cooperating on intelligence issues.
While the report notes the total number of Iraqis that have fled the country (1.8 million plus 1.6 internally displaced) and talks about the burdon this has put on Jordan (700,000 refugees), when talking about Syria, neither the numbers of refugees there nor any burden is mentioned.
Sovereign Iraq shall only have command over its own forces if it behaves as the U.S. tells it behave (p78).
The transfer of command and control over Iraqi security forces units from the United States to Iraq should be influenced by Iraq’s performance on milestones.
The report calls for much more embedded U.S. troops within Iraqi forces (p89)
Such a mission could involve 10,000 to 20,000 American troops instead of the 3,000 to 4,000 now in this role.
At the same time it notes the problem that I have pointed out a few days ago. (p110)
All of our efforts in Iraq, military and civilian, are handicapped by Americans’ lack of language and cultural understanding. Our embassy of 1,000 has 33 Arabic speakers, just six of whom are at the level of fluency. In a conflict that demands effective and efficient communication with Iraqis, we are often at a disadvantage. There are still far too few Arab language– proficient military and civilian officers in Iraq, to the detriment of the U.S. mission.
There simply are not enough translators to embed so many U.S. troops into Iraqi forces. How can you expect them to teach each other and/or fight together if they simply can not talk to each other?
One also wonders what 1,000 embassy personal are doing all day when they only have six reliable interfaces with Iraqis. But maybe the number is wrong here (see "missing" contractors above).
The report names some conditions that would have to be met for including Iran and Syria into talks. The attitude is roughly the same than Bush/Cheney have shown all along (p70).
Our limited contacts with Iran’s government lead us to believe that its leaders are likely to say they will not participate in diplomatic efforts to support stability in Iraq. They attribute this reluctance to their belief that the United States seeks regime change in Iran.
Nevertheless, as one of Iraq’s neighbors Iran should be asked to assume its responsibility to participate in the Support Group. An Iranian refusal to do so would demonstrate to Iraq and the rest of the world Iran’s rejectionist attitude and approach, which could lead to its isolation. Further, Iran’s refusal to cooperate on this matter would diminish its prospects of engaging with the United States in the broader dialogue it seeks.
There is no word of taking back "regime change", but the Iranians are "rejectionists"?
On Syria there are mostly threats but also the recommendation of negotiation over the the Golan heights and of negotiations between the Palestinians and Israel. But each time the Palestinians are named as negotiating partner the wording includes a caveat (p72):
This commitment must include direct talks with, by, and between Israel, Lebanon, Palestinians (those who accept Israel’s right to exist), and particularly Syria
This caveat obviously exludes the elected Palestinian government and will be used to sabotage any negotiation attempt even before it starts.
The most important recommendation is on page 104:
RECOMMENDATION 63:
• The United States should encourage investment in Iraq’s oil sector by the international community and by international energy companies.
• The United States should assist Iraqi leaders to reorganize the national oil industry as a commercial enterprise, in order to enhance efficiency, transparency, and accountability.
• To combat corruption, the U.S. government should urge the Iraqi government to post all oil contracts, volumes, and prices on the Web so that Iraqis and outside observers can track exports and export revenues.
• The United States should support the World Bank’s efforts to ensure that best practices are used in contracting. This support involves providing Iraqi officials with contracting templates and training them in contracting, auditing, and reviewing audits.
"The Study Group has been assured that the Iraqi government and population will great the help of Mr. Wolfowitz in managing their oil contracts with flowers and sweets."
What struck me first about this document was its arrogance. The authors still think that they are in charge in Iraq and that it is their mission to reorder that country to suit their needs.
59p77
The most important issues facing Iraq’s future are now the responsibility of Iraq’s elected leaders. Because of the security and assistance it provides, the United States has a significant role to play. Yet only the government and people of Iraq can make and sustain certain decisions critical to Iraq’s future.
The Iraqi government needs to show its own citizens — and the citizens of the United States and other countries — that it deserves continued support.
The majority of Iraqis do not want anymore of the US’ “continued support.” Perhaps the US puppet does. This document is a fraud from the start.
What is appropriate now is humility. All the problems in Iraq are the direct consequence of the greed of the oil patch and the political ambitions of the Israeli far-right as carried out by their agents here in the US. It is not for the US to claim that the Iraqi government musr show “that it deserves continued support”, unless you are admitting that the present Iraqi regime is the puppet of the US and are still doggedly pushing forward with your pursuit of Iraqi oil. I guess the “realist” part of the assessment is that this group is willing to jettison the likudnik element. The chips are down. They want the oil. The likudniks were helpful getting the horse out of the barn, now who needs ’em?
Baker, Bush XLI and Cheney are from the oil patch and first and foremost they want the oil
24p42
The politics of oil has the potential to further damage the country’s
already fragile efforts to create a unified central government.
The Iraqi Constitution leaves the door open for regions
to take the lead in developing new oil resources. Article 108
states that “oil and gas are the ownership of all the peoples of
Iraq in all the regions and governorates,” while Article 109
tasks the federal government with “the management of oil and
gas extracted from current fields.” This language has led to
contention over what constitutes a “new” or an “existing” resource,
a question that has profound ramifications for the ultimate
control of future oil revenue.
They wrote the “Iraqi” constitution and specifically that provision is their foot in the door to Iraq’s oil wealth. The undeveloped fields that Cheney discussed at the meeting with big oil that he still refuses to provide the minutes of.
39p57
While such devolution [partition of Iraq] is a possible consequence of continued instability in Iraq, we do not believe the United States should support this course as a policy goal or impose this outcome on the Iraqi state. If events were to move irreversibly in this direction, the United States should manage the situation to ameliorate humanitarian consequences, contain the spread of violence, and minimize regional instability. The United States should support as much as possible central control by governmental authorities in Baghdad, particularly on the question of oil revenues.
They want one stop shopping. Cut the deal with their puppets and lock it up.
45p63
RECOMMENDATION 2: The goals of the diplomatic offensive as it relates to regional players should be to:
i. Support the unity and territorial integrity of Iraq.
ii. Stop destabilizing interventions and actions by Iraq’s neighbors.
iii. Secure Iraq’s borders, including the use of joint patrols with neighboring countries.
iv. Prevent the expansion of the instability and conflict beyond Iraq’s borders.
v. Promote economic assistance, commerce, trade, political support, and, if possible, military assistance for the Iraqi government from non-neighboring Muslim nations.
vi. Energize countries to support national political reconciliation in Iraq.
vii. Validate Iraq’s legitimacy by resuming diplomatic relations, where appropriate, and reestablishing embassies in Baghdad.
viii. Assist Iraq in establishing active working embassies in key capitals in the region (for example, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia).
ix. Help Iraq reach a mutually acceptable agreement on Kirkuk.
x. Assist the Iraqi government in achieving certain security, political, and economic milestones, including better performance on issues such as national reconciliation, equitable distribution of oil revenues, and the dismantling of militias.
They want the Sunnis to have a good piece of the action. The Sunnis know how to behave. Look at Saudi Arabia.
60p78
RECOMMENDATION 23: The President should restate that the United States does not seek to control Iraq’s oil.
Lie about your intentions. It’s essential.
65p83
RECOMMENDATION 28: Oil revenue sharing. Oil revenues should accrue to the central government and be shared on the basis of population. No formula that gives control over revenues from future fields to the regions or gives control of oil fields to the regions is compatible with national reconciliation.
Sunni control of oil revenues, on the Saudi model.
82p100
Since the success of the oil sector is critical to the success of the Iraqi economy, the United States must do what it can to help Iraq maximize its capability. Iraq, a country with promising oil potential, could restore oil production from existing fields to 3.0 to 3.5 million barrels a day over a three- to five-year period, depending on evolving conditions in key reservoirs. Even if Iraq were at peace tomorrow, oil production would decline unless current problems in the oil sector were addressed.
The Iraqis have had all the “help” they can stand at the hands of these bastards already. This is “help yourself” help to the oil patch.
84p102
RECOMMENDATION 62:
As soon as possible, the U.S. government should provide technical assistance to the Iraqi government to prepare a draft oil law that defines the rights of regional and local governments and creates a fiscal and legal framework for investment. Legal clarity is essential to attract investment.
The U.S. government should encourage the Iraqi government to accelerate contracting for the comprehensive well workovers in the southern fields needed to increase production, but the United States should no longer fund such infrastructure projects.
The U.S. military should work with the Iraqi military and with private security forces to protect oil infrastructure and contractors. Protective measures could include a program to improve pipeline security by paying local tribes solely on the basis of throughput (rather than fixed amounts).
Metering should be implemented at both ends of the supply line. This step would immediately improve accountability in the oil sector.
In conjunction with the International Monetary Fund, the U.S. government should press Iraq to continue reducing subsidies in the energy sector, instead of providing grant assistance. Until Iraqis pay market prices for oil products, drastic fuel shortages will remain.
85p103
RECOMMENDATION 63:
The United States should encourage investment in Iraq’s oil sector by the international community and by international energy companies.
The United States should assist Iraqi leaders to reorganize the national oil industry as a commercial enterprise, in order to enhance efficiency, transparency, and accountability.
To combat corruption, the U.S. government should urge the Iraqi government to post all oil contracts, volumes, and prices on the Web so that Iraqis and outside observers can track exports and export revenues.
The United States should support the World Bank’s efforts to ensure that best practices are used in contracting. This support involves providing Iraqi officials with contracting templates and training them in contracting, auditing, and reviewing audits.
The United States should provide technical assistance to the Ministry of Oil for enhancing maintenance, improving the payments process, managing cash flows, contracting and auditing, and updating professional training programs for management and technical personnel.
All pretense of a “sovereign Iraq” is dropped when they talk about taking over Iraqi production and contracting oil field services.
The US military is now plainly seen as a force to protect the wells, refineries, and pipelines. “War is a racket”. We need a statue to Smedley Butler on The Mall!
Recommendation 63 is nothing other than a mob takeover. They’re offering a deal the Iraqis can’t refuse. So they think. They have no chips. These are the “realists”?
There are other wild recommendations. Making the State Department a branch of Defense. Making soldiers of the employees of practically all other government departments and shipping them for tours overseas. Wild flights of fancy on what they’re going to make other nations in the region do via Diplomatic Offensives.
This whole report is offensive. And it is anything but reality based.
We’re going to be in Iraq until the US Treasury can no longer sell the bonds to finance the occupation.
bbo && JJ:
I don’t discount the Sunnis at all. It’s just that this regime is trying to parlay Sunni fears into its entree to the Iraqi oil fields and that will prolong the civli war and not deliver the oil fields in any case.
Times have changed. The wind is filling the Shia’s sails now. They are going to come out the winners in Iraq and Iran and Lebanon… and Saudi Arabia?
And the US is living on its reputation and is THE superpower in its own imagination only. It’s over.
Of course this “analysis” is worth just what you’ve paid for it.
Posted by: John Francis Lee | Dec 7 2006 13:13 utc | 48
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