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Intended Stalemate?
Via the Federation of American Scientists’ Secrecy News we get pointed to a report (PDF) by Gen. (Ret.) Barry R. McCaffrey about his recent visit to Guantanamo.
McCaffrey lauds today’s Guantanamo as the "most professional, firm, humane and carefully supervised confinement operation", not recognizing the absurdity of stuff like this:
Detainees receive 4200 calories a day with 53 individually prepared special diet meals. Four different menus and three meals a day are offered. Halal and cultural dietary requirements are supported. Refreshments are served in the recreation areas. All Detainees gain weight (average 18 ½ lbs) during custody. (Detainees on hunger strikes have gained an average of 20 lbs since going on strike.)
To feed 4,200 calories to POW’s not doing really, really hard work, but sitting in a prison is definitely not healthy. And don´t get me going on the humanity of overfeeding hungerstrikers by force.
McCaffrey concedes that the situation has been much worse and he puts the blame away from those in uniform:
During the first 18 months of the war on terror there were widespread, systematic abuses of detainees under US control in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Guantanamo. Some were murdered and hundreds tortured or abused. […]
Most of these abuses were the product of Pentagon policy directives that were a clear departure from our former commitment to the rule of law [..]
Some of the US military abuses of detainees were a result of grossly inadequate DOD deployed combat and support forces to control the combat situation. In other cases, reserve military forces were called up by DOD too late to receive the training and equipment required for the missions they were assigned. Finally, there was widespread US political and military horror at the unexpected (by DOD) level of casualties from a rapidly growing and violent insurrection in Iraq [..] Although some low level officers, NCOs’, and soldiers have been administratively punished or prosecuted—the public denial of wrong-doing by DOD has created a widespread belief in the world community that the U.S. has unilaterally walked away from Federal and international treaty restrictions on torture.
Nice try General. But the problem was/is not only DOD’s policy. In Abu Graibh there were orders given by officers, in Haditha and elsewhere there were the cover ups that are part of the crimes. Even professionals suspect a recent one in Hamandiya. These cover ups were certainly done by officers, not by some civilian DOD policy wonks.
The General thinks the legal situation in Guantanamo is a heap of dirty cloth laundry. (It was such a nice place to do illegal stuff before 2001.) He has a solution but doubts its implementation:
The only good solution would be to convince an international body to accept legal jurisdiction of the whole Guantanamo operation. We would provide and pay for the detention vehicle—the international legal system would accept jurisdiction. Not likely.
So he opts for the pragmatic detergent:
We need to rapidly weed out as many detainees as possible and return them to their host nation with an evidence package as complete as we can produce. We can probably dump 2/3 of the detainees in the next 24 months. Many we will encounter again armed with an AK47 on the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan. They will join the 120,000 + fighters we now contend with in those places of combat. It may be cheaper and cleaner to kill them in combat then sit on them for the next 15 years.
But why wait 24 month? Any further detention will increase the likelihood that the innocent people will be more hostile when freed. Why not free them today?
Aside from Guantanamo, the number McCaffrey is giving here is really interesting.
If there are 120,000+ defending against U.S. occupation in Iraq and Afghanistan, more than double the last estimate I noticed, the military 3:1 rule of thumb requires some 360,000+ to successfully attack these forces. Neither in Iraq nor in Afghanistan the U.S. is even planing for such a troop level.
Given that, is there any chance for the current stalemate to change into something else?
Is an indefinite stalemate intended?
The 1994 Riegle Report
U.S. Chemical and Biological Warfare-Related Dual Use Exports to Iraq and their Possible Impact on the Health Consequences of the Gulf War
A Report of Chairman Donald W. Riegle, Jr. and Ranking Member Alfonse M. D’Amato of the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs with Respect to Export Administration
United States Senate, 103d Congress, 2d Session
May 25, 1994
I wish that every American could be informed of the specific contents of this 1994 report to Congress about the role our government played in providing WMD to Saddam’s Iraq during the 1980’s, following Saddam’s massacre of the Kurds. Knowing of this atrocity did not stop the Reagan administration from following through with this program.
From the report:
U.S. Exports of Biological Materials to Iraq
The Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs has oversight responsibility for the Export Administration Act. Pursuant to the Act, Committee staff contacted the U.S. Department of Commerce and requested information on the export of biological materials during the years prior to the Gulf War. After receiving this information, we contacted a principal supplier of these materials to determine what, if any, materials were exported to Iraq which might have contributed to an offensive or defensive biological warfare program. Records available from the supplier for the period from 1985 until the present show that during this time, pathogenic (meaning “disease producing”), toxigenic (meaning “poisonous”), and other biological research materials were exported to Iraq pursuant to application and licensing by the U.S. Department of Commerce. Records prior to 1985 were not available, according to the supplier. These exported biological materials were not attenuated or weakened and were capable of reproduction. According to the Department of Defense’s own Report to Congress on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, released in April 1992: “By the time of the invasion of Kuwait, Iraq had developed biological weapons. It’s advanced and aggressive biological warfare program was the most advanced in the Arab world… The program probably began late in the 1970’s and concentrated on the development of two agents, botulinum toxin and anthrax bacteria… Large scale production of these agents began in 1989 at four facilities in Baghdad. Delivery means for biological agents ranged from simple aerial bombs and artillery rockets to surface-to-surface missiles.”
Included in the approved sales are the following biological materials (which have been considered by various nations for use in war), with their associated disease symptoms:
Bacillus Anthracis: anthrax is a disease producing bacteria identified by the Department of Defense in The Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Contress, as being a major component in the Iraqi biological warfare program.
Anthrax is an often fatal infectious disease due to ingestion of spores. It begins abruptly with high fever, difficulty in breathing, and chest pain. The disease eventually results in septicemia (blood poisoning), and the mortality is high. Once septicemia is advanced, antibiotic therapy may prove useless, probably because the exotoxins remain, despite the death of the bacteria.
Clostridium Botulinum: A bacterial source of botulinum toxin, which causes vomiting, constipation, thirst, general weakness, headache, fever, dizziness, double vision, dilation of the pupils and paralysis of the muscles involving swallowing. It is often fatal.
Histoplasma Capsulatum: causes a disease superfically resembling tuberculosis that may cause pneumonia, enlargement of the liver and spleen, anemia, an influenza like illness and an acute inflammatory skin disease marked by tender red nodules, usually on the shins. Reactivated infection usually involves the lungs, the brain, spinal membranes, heart, peritoneum, and the adrenals.
Brucella Melitensis: a bacteria which can cause chronic fatique, loss of appetite, profuse sweating when at rest, pain in joints and muscles, insomnia, nausea, and damage to major organs.
Clostridium Perfringens: a highly toxic bateria which causes gas gangrene. The bacteria produce toxins that move along muscle bundles in the body killing cells and producing necrotic tissue that is then favorable for further growth of the bacteria itself. Eventually, these toxins and bacteria enter the bloodstream and cause a systemic illness.
In addition, several shipments of Escherichia Coli (E. Coli) and genetic materials, as well as human and bacterial DNA, were shipped directly to the Iraq Atomic Energy Commission.
The following is a detailed listing of biological materials, provided by the American Type Culture Collection, which were exported to agencies of the government of Iraq pursuant to the issueance of an export licensed by the U.S. Commerce Department:
Date : February 8, 1985
Sent To : Iraq Atomic Energy Agency
Materials Shipped:
Ustilago nuda (Jensen) Rostrup
Date : February 22, 1985
Sent To : Ministry of Higher Education
Materials Shipped:
Histoplasma capsulatum var. farciminosum (ATCC 32136)
Class III pathogen
Date : July 11, 1985
Sent To : Middle and Near East Regional A
Material Shipped:
Histoplasma capsulatum var. farciminosum (ATCC 32136)
Class III pathogen
Date : May 2, 1986
Sent To : Ministry of Higher Education
Materials Shipped:
1. Bacillus Anthracis Cohn (ATCC 10)
Batch # 08-20-82 (2 each)
Class III pathogen
2. Bacillus Subtilis (Ehrenberg) Cohn (ATCC 82)
Batch # 06-20-84 (2 each)
3. Clostridium botulinum Type A (ATCC 3502)
Batch # 07-07-81 (3 each)
Class III pathogen
4. Clostridium perfringens (Weillon and Zuber) Hauduroy, et al (ATCC 3624)
Batch # 10-85SV (2 each)
5. Bacillus subtilis (ATCC 6051)
Batch # 12-06-84 (2 each)
6. Francisella tularensis var. tularensis Olsufiev (ATCC 6223)
Batch # 05-14-79 (2 each)
Avirulent, suitable for preparations of diagnotic antigens
7. Clostridium tetani (ATCC 9441)
Batch # 03-84 (3 each)
Highly toxigenic
8. Clostridium botulinum Type E (ATCC 9564)
Batch # 03-02-79 (2 each)
Class III pathogen
9. Clostridium tetani (ATCC 10779)
Batch # 04-24-84S (3 each)
10. Clostridium perfringens (ATCC 12916)
Batch #08-14-80 (2 each)
Agglutinating type 2
11. Clostridium perfringens (ATCC 13124)
Batch #07-84SV (3 each)
Type A, alpha-toxigenic, produces lecithinase C.J. Appl.
12. Bacillus Anthracis (ATCC 14185)
Batch #01-14-80 (3 each)
G.G. Wright (Fort Detrick)
V770-NP1-R. Bovine Anthrax
Class III pathogen
13. Bacillus Anthracis (ATCC 14578)
Batch #01-06-78 (2 each)
Class III pathogen
14. Bacillus megaterium (ATCC 14581)
Batch #04-18-85 (2 each)
15. Bacillus megaterium (ATCC 14945)
Batch #06-21-81 (2 each)
16. Clostridium botulinum Type E (ATCC 17855)
Batch # 06-21-71
Class III pathogen
17. Bacillus megaterium (ATCC 19213)
Batch #3-84 (2 each)
18. Clostridium botulinum Type A (ATCC 19397)
Batch # 08-18-81 (2 each)
Class III pathogen
19. Brucella abortus Biotype 3 (ATCC 23450)
Batch # 08-02-84 (3 each)
Class III pathogen
20. Brucella abortus Biotype 9 (ATCC 23455)
Batch # 02-05-68 (3 each)
Class III pathogen
21. Brucella melitensis Biotype 1 (ATCC 23456)
Batch # 03-08-78 (2 each)
Class III pathogen
22. Brucella melitensis Biotype 3 (ATCC 23458)
Batch # 01-29-68 (2 each)
Class III pathogen
23. Clostribium botulinum Type A (ATCC 25763)
Batch # 8-83 (2 each)
Class III pathogen
24. Clostridium botulinum Type F (ATCC 35415)
Batch # 02-02-84 (2 each)
Class III pathogen
Date : August 31, 1987
Sent To : State Company for Drug Industries
Materials Shipped:
1. Saccharomyces cerevesiae (ATCC 2601)
Batch # 08-28-08 (1 each)
2. Salmonella choleraesuis subsp. choleraesuis Serotype typhi (ATCC 6539)
Batch # 06-86S (1 each)
3. Bacillus subtillus (ATCC 6633)
Batch # 10-85 (2 each)
4. Klebsiella pneumoniae subsp. pneumoniae (ATCC 10031)
Batch # 08-13-80 (1 each)
5. Escherichia coli (ATCC 10536)
Batch # 04-09-80 (1 each)
6. Bacillus cereus (11778)
Batch #05-85SV (2 each)
7. Staphylococcus epidermidis (ATCC 12228)
Batch # 11-86s (1 each)
8. Bacillus pumilus (ATCC 14884)
Batch # 09-08-80 (2 each)
Date : July 11, 1988
Sent To : Iraq Atomic Energy Commission
Materials Shipped
1. Escherichia coli (ATCC 11303)
Batch # 04-875
Phase host
2. Cauliflower Mosaic Caulimovirus (ATCC 45031)
Batch # 06-14-85
Plant Virus
3. Plasmid in Agrobacterium Tumefaciens (ATCC 37349)
(Ti plasmid for co-cultivation with plant integration vectors in E. Coli)
Batch # 05-28-85
Date : April 26, 1988
Sent To: : Iraq Atomic Energy Commission
Materials Shipped:
1. Hulambda4x-8, clone: human hypoxanthine phosphoribosyltransferase
(HPRT) Chromosome(s): X q26.1 (ATCC 57236) Phage vector
Suggest host: E coli
2. Hulambda14-8, clone: human hypoxanthine phosphoribosyltransferase
(HPRT) Chromosome(s): X q26.1 (ATCC 57240) Phage vector
Suggested host: E coli
3. Hulambda15, clone: human hypoxanthine phosphoribosyltransferase
(HPRT) Chromosome(s): X q26.1 (ATCC 57242) Phage vector
Suggested host: E. coli
Date : August 31, 1987
Sent To : Iraq Atomic Energy Commission
Materials Shipped:
1. Escherichia coli (ATCC 23846)
Batch # 07-29-83 (1 each)
2. Escherichia coli (ATCC 33694)
Batch # 05-87 (1 each)
Date : September 29, 1988
Sent To : Ministry of Trade
Materials Shipped:
1. Bacillus anthracis (ATCC 240)
Batch # 05-14-63 (3 each)
Class III pathogen
2. Bacillus anthracis (ATCC 938)
Batch # 1963 (3 each)
Class III pathogen
3. Clostridium perfringens (ATCC 3629)
Batch # 10-23-85 (3 each)
4. Clostridium perfringens (ATCC 8009)
Batch # 03-30-84 (3 each)
5. Bacillus anthracis (ATCC 8705)
Batch # 06-27-62 (3 each)
Class III pathogen
6. Brucella abortus (ATCC 9014)
Batch # 05-11-66 (3 each)
Class III pathogen
7. Clostridium perfringens (ATCC 10388)
Batch # 06-01-73 (3 each)
8. Bacillus anthracis (ATCC 11966)
Batch #05-05-70 (3 each)
Class III pathogen
9. Clostridium botulinum Type A
Batch # 07-86 (3 each)
Class III pathogen
10. Bacillus cereus (ATCC 33018)
Batch # 04-83 (3 each)
11. Bacillus ceres (ATCC 33019)
Batch # 03-88 (3 each)
Date : January 31, 1989
Sent To : Iraq Atomic Energy Commission
Materials Shipped:
1. PHPT31, clone: human hypoxanthine phosphoribosyltransferase (HPRT)
Chromosome(s): X q26.1 (ATCC 57057)
2. Plambda500, clone: human hypoxanthine phosphoribosyltransferase
pseudogene (HPRT) Chromosome(s): 5 p14-p13 (ATCC 57212)
Date : January 17, 1989
Sent To : Iraq Atomic Energy Commission
Materials Shipped:
1. Hulambda4x-8, clone: human hypoxanthine phosphoribosyltransferase
(HPRT) Chromosomes(s): X q26.1 (ATCC 57237) Phage vector;
Suggested host: E. coli
2. Hulambda14, clone: human hypoxanthine phosphoribosyltransferase
(HPRT) Chromosome(s): X q26.1 (ATCC 57540), Cloned from human lymphoblast, Phase vector
Suggested host: E. coli
3. Hulambda15, clone: human hypoxanthine phosphoribosyltransferase
(HPRT) Chromosome(s): X q26.1 (ATCC 57241) Phage vector;
Suggested host: E. coli
Additionally, the Centers for Disease Control has compiled a listing of biological materials shipped to Iraq prior to the Gulf War. The listing covers the period from October 1, 1984 (when the CDC began keeping records) through October 13, 1993. The following materials with biological warfare significance were shipped to Iraq during this period.
Date : November 28, 1989
Sent To : University of Basrah, College of
Science, Department of Biology
Materials Shipped:
1. Enterococcus faecalis
2. Enterococcus faecium
3. Enterococcus avium
4. Enterococcus raffinosus
5. Enteroccus gallinarium
6. Enterococcus durans
7. Enteroccus hirae
8. Streptococcus bovis
(etiologic)
Date : April 21, 1986
Sent To : Officers City Al-Muthanna,
Quartret 710, Street 13, Close 69, House 28/I,
Baghdad, Iraq
Materials Shipped:
1. 1 vial botulinum toxoid
(non-infectious)
Date : March 10, 1986
Sent To : Officers City Al-Muthanna,
Quartret 710, Street 13, Close 69 House 28/I,
Baghdad, Iraq
Materials Shipped:
1. 1 vial botulinum toxoid #A2
(non-infectious)
Date : June 25, 1985
Sent To : University of Baghdad, College of
Medicine, Department of Microbiology
Materials Shipped:
1. 3 years cultures
(etiologic)
Candida sp.
Date : May 21, 1985
Sent To : Basrah, Iraq
Materials Shipped:
1. Lyophilized arbovirus seed
(etiologic)
2. West Nile Fever Virus
Date : April 26, 1985
Sent To : Minister of Health, Ministry of
Health, Baghdad, Iraq
Materials Shipped:
1. 8 vials antigen and antisera (r. rickettsii and r. typhi) to diagnose rickettsial infections (non-infectious)
Also see, United States exports of biological materials to Iraq
Compromising the credibility of international law
And would it be obtuse of me to ask where is all this stuff? Was it destroyed? If so is there documentation of it, if not…
Posted by: Uncle $cam | Jul 10 2006 4:50 utc | 19
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