Billmon:
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Bernhard:
The US military has opened a new war on Al Sadr and his Mahdi militia. It is the Iraq part of the Oceania moment – declaring a new war on the Shiite militia instead of the old war on Sunni dead enders.
In this war the US is taking out the leaders of Sadr’s militia one by one and prepares, by rushing more soldiers to Baghdad, for the expected reprisal and a third all out fight against Al Sadr in a second phase.
Based on interviews with Khalizad and other officials David Ignatius reports on, and is sceptical of, this importent shift in the US strategy in Iraq. Let’s try to pick this apart.
Ignatius on phase 1:
Maliki has endorsed an aggressive strategy to retake Baghdad from the Shiite death squads roaming the streets. That means taking on militia gangs tied to radical cleric Moqtada al-Sadr and his Mahdi Army. The strategy is premised on a view that unless Maliki’s Shiite-dominated government can stop the death squads from his own sect, he will have no chance of co-opting Sunni insurgent groups.
Khalizad did put up a long fight to get Maliki installed instead of Jaafari. The selected man has now endorsed, we are to believe, a plan to kill his friends and only his friends. Attacks on Sunni death squads seem not to be part of the new plan.
The military calls the new battle for Baghdad "Operation Together Forward." It began about two weeks ago, with raids by U.S. and British special operations forces to capture or kill death squad leaders. So far, about 10 have been "taken out," most of them members of the Mahdi Army, according to administration officials.
Looks like Sadr Inc. may lose a bit of its middle management. But with this, the US forces are just another death squad within the hodgepod of death squads in the Iraqi civil war.
One wonders who will decide who is the "death squad leader" that needs be be "taken out" next. On what and who’s intelligence are and will these actions be based?
This third war against assumed Iran supporter Sadr did start two weeks ago, i.e. July 14.
As it is the Middles East, one might assumes this to be a pure coincidence that another war of attrition against another assumed Iran supporter organisation started on July 13.
(Incidently: I currently have several bombed bridges in Beirut and Baghdad on sale. Is anybody interested?)
Although U.S. military planners were worried that Sadr might respond by bringing his fighters out in the streets en masse, Khalilzad said that, so far, "Moqtada’s reaction has been muted. He understands that the death squads are out of control. They include former Saddamists who joined the Mahdi Army and are not under his control." Administration officials say that they don’t want a pitched battle with Sadr, but that, in the words of one official: "If confrontation comes, it’s best that it come now."
Khalilzad’s explanation of former Saddamists (secular Baath Sunni)
having joined the Mahdi Army (radical religious Shia) to fight a
religion and tribe based civil war is, of course, pure male bovine
dropping.
But why would a confrontation comming later be worse? Are there circumstances envisioned where such a confrontation would intervene with other endeavors?
This stealthy war against the death squads is at the center of the new strategy for securing Baghdad. [..]
In addition to targeting death squad leaders, the United States plans to retake Baghdad neighborhoods by starting with the city’s 117 police stations. The plan is to install stronger Iraqi police leadership and embed U.S. forces with them. Administration officials speak of an "ink spot" strategy for Baghdad, establishing these pockets of security and then expanding them outward.
As the fight against Sadr forces by "taking out" his leadership ranks
is the "center idea", the military will have to prepare for the
inevitable backslash. Al Sadr has not taken the bait yet, but at one point he may
have to respond.
(Sidenote: Putting small contingents of US forces into 117 police station makes for 117 distributed and easy to pick targets who depend on reenforcement coming through narrow, easy to blockade city streets. This plan will really motivate the GI’s involved in the mess.)
In preparation for this second phase (and maybe other eventualities), the U.S. is increasing its official troop strenght in Iraq from currentlly 128,000 to 135,000 men.
The AP reports 16 brigades are in Iraq now compared to 14 brigades a few weeks ago. (A brigade has about 3,500 men and women.) The LA Times writes that the 172nd Brigade, which was scheduled to go home these days, will now have to stay in Iraq for another three month. The 3rd Brigade of the 2nd Infantry Division is moving to Iraq and a another brigade stationed in Germany did get orders to prepare to move to Iraq. The major in-theatre reserve force that was stationed in Kuwait is now committed to battle in Baghdad.
Unlike the last big fight against the Mahdi army in the Najaf cementary, this fight will take place in Baghdad. There, the Sadr folks are an indigenous force. They will fight in the streets they grew up in. Even with the additional forces committed now, I do doubt that the US has any chance to make more than a decent dent into their capabilities.
But then that may not even be the intent. The idea might to be to increase pressure on Iran by pushing against its assumed allies. Degrading their capacities now, could lessen the negative effects of a later attack on the center of the axis of evil.