The Poison Pill Option – Moon of Alabama

April 4, 2006

The Poison Pill Option

(lifted and edited from a comment)

On what John Robb at Global Guerrillas would call 5th generation guerilla warfare, and what I would call "the poison pill option".

Either way, what is happening that differentiates the current situation in Iraq from the Maoist, and later Vietnam type of warfare, is that the insurgent forces have become so decentralized as a force that they have become incapacitated from asserting a coherent alternative governance.

I’m beginning to see this progression as a game of one-up manship where the occupier seeks a controlled divide and conquer strategy that is answered by the occupied, with a strategy of controlled divide and conquer of its own.

In Iraq, the occupier can reasonably be seen to have unwittingly played into and informed the hand of the occupied through its own overzellous implimentation, post invasion CPA policy.

In spite of these romantic notions of "creating chaos" as a means to divide and conquer it is important to remember that the "chaos" must be controled by the occupier in order to reap the benifits of the occupation. I’d be the first to admit that this has been the intent all along, from the CPA economic directives — to the current efforts to prevent a coherent government to emerge.

And by the same token, could it be possible that the Iraqis themselves, have also noticed that these policies have also prevented the US from achieving its own stated goals — of a privatized economy, of a fully functioning sectarian democratic government, or secure and legal production sharing agreements of the oil resources and its infrastructure.

What I’m saying here is that the Iraqis have developed a harmonic relationship to the occupation, which they cannot defeat militarily, but that they can prevent from becoming successful — in large part by observing the effects of the policies on their own culture — and then allowing them to become amplified to the extent that they defeat the original intention of occupation policy — by, in effect poisioning their own well with a higher level of chaos.

Consider these entries in recent news:

I’m not saying they are doing it on purpose, but saying that they are doing it by not doing what is expected, and it would appear to be working.

Posted by b on April 4, 2006 at 10:33 UTC | Permalink

Comments

Posted by: b | Apr 4 2006 12:28 utc | 1

Iraq’s interior ministry refusing to deploy US-trained police

Iraq’s interior ministry is refusing to deploy thousands of police recruits who have been trained by the US and the UK and is hiring its own men and putting them on the streets, according to western security advisers.
The move is frustrating US and British efforts to build up a non-sectarian Iraqi police force which would not be infiltrated by partisan militias.
The disclosure highlights growing US and British concern about the role of militias in sectarian killings, and their links to senior Iraqi politicians. “You can’t have in a democracy various groups with arms – you have to have the state with a monopoly on power,” Condoleeza Rice, the US secretary of state, said at the end of her two-day visit to Baghdad yesterday.

Rice is right, but the U.S. were the first to push special groups into the security services and who launched the Salvadorian option.
So anna missed is right, it’s biting back now.

Posted by: b | Apr 4 2006 12:32 utc | 2

In this case, the resistant forces are to weak to confront the occupation forces militarily, even in the traditional incrimental guerrilla progression, so opt instead to allow the host country to descend into a toxicity that renders goals of the occupier country moot.
This was the official plan B if Sweden would be invaded by the Soviet union. Phone books had pages on how to fight a guerilla war and most importantly stressed “every message that the resistance has surrendered is false”. The idea was the if such a strategy to deny every advantage of the occupation was planned and announced nobody was going to be foolish enough to attack.
For me it is really hard to see what is going on right now in Iraq. Resistance, civil war, kidnappings, burglaries on computer stores, what is black-ops and what is not? Even when I squint my eyes no clear picture shows itself.

Posted by: a swedish kind of death | Apr 4 2006 12:52 utc | 3

More poison needed – buy here!
Blackwater USA says it can supply forces for conflicts

Cofer Black, vice chairman of the Moyock, N.C.-based private military company, told an international conference in Amman, Jordan, this week that Blackwater stands ready to help keep or restore the peace anywhere it is needed.
…
“We’re low-cost and fast,” Black was quoted as saying. “The issue is, who’s going to let us play on their team?”
Unlike national and multinational armies, which tend to get bogged down by political and logistical limitations, Black said, Blackwater could have a small, nimble, brigade-size force ready to move into a troubled region on short notice.
…
The reconstruction of Iraq has been hampered by insurgent activity, Taylor said, and Blackwater has the expertise to quell insurgent attacks if invited by the Iraqi government.
“We clearly couldn’t go into the whole country of Iraq,” Taylor said. “But we might be able to go into a region or a city.”

Posted by: b | Apr 4 2006 15:24 utc | 4

I’ve been wondering if one of the reasons for the Condi/Jack show in Baghdad last weekend is the increasing desperation to get a “status of forces” agreement (SOFA) in place to legitimize the occupation. The U.S. is required to have SOFA’s in place with host governments when it bases military forces abroad, and these agreeements provide the specifics of what they can do, where they can do it, etc. plus usually lucrative remuneration for the host government. Without a SOFA in place the illegitimacy of the occupation becomes more apparent each day.

Posted by: maxcrat | Apr 4 2006 16:46 utc | 5

Sorry, if thats all a little incoherent. Part of the problem is in describing the chaos in Iraq, the chaos created either by the occupation or the resistance — as intentional. Obviously, the chaos created by the occupation as a result of policy, could be described as intentional — or simply the result of failed policy. The disbanding of the Iraqi army was a policy that resulted in a certain level of uncontroled result (chaos). Its stupid to think the US intentionally wanted to create the results the policy eventually produced (the manpower for the insurgency). More likely through incompetency, like someone burning the house down trying to barbque hot dogs on a grill, the policy inadvertantly produced unexpected results. Another way to see this is that the US created policy that was entirely clueless with regards to Iraqi culture — so clueless that most of the decisions produced results that were 180 degrees contrary to their intent. All in all, the Iraqis themselves never seemed to respond to policy in the expected cooperative manner. Which is instructive, I think, in how they (the Iraqis) perhaps developed this harmonic relationship to the occupation, in creating their own, very effective mode of chaos. Or at least it was their cultural resonse to the culturally alien policy that was being imposed upon them. They simply oppted for their own cultural structure, tribe, clan, local religious authority, or criminal gang instead of conforming to the dictates of the occupation — to deliver the essentials of life, services, security, income, etc. To the clueless occupation, this kept them one step beyond the controls of the occupation — and prevented the occupation from achieving its goals of replacing the old authority structure with a new one. Basically this was(is) a progression of decentralization of authority in the face of imposed authority that fills the dual purpose of both providing the essentials of living and frustrating the occupation at the same time. It can in a sense then be seen as a credable mode of guerrilla warfare — a radically decentralized mode of resistance that renders the host culture uncontrolable and toxic to the occupier i.e. poisened.

Posted by: anna missed | Apr 4 2006 20:17 utc | 6

i don’t think it’s incoherent at all anna missed. i think ts a very clear post, with alot of originality.
allow the host country to descend into a toxicity that renders goals of the occupier country moot.
very clear.
although the US is not in control of the chaos, i think that was not somethng that was a priority these last few years. the time factor, enogh time that is, to build those permanent bases, was the priority. the timing of ‘turning the country over to the iraqis’ was that 6/04? then the months of constitutional negotiations were preplanned. now is a different story. clearly there was an attempt to rile up the natives w/the death squad and negroponte. i’m sure they were pushing for a civil war, just not the way it has played out. all the money for ‘reconstruction’ was actually for ‘construction’, ours. interesting to see if the ‘they aren’t appreciating us’ meme, groucho linked to in another thread is a warm up for the new talking point. this coupled w/rice’s visit, there is probably a new tactic in the making to allow for our established presence. i think the US has consistently underestimated the will of the iraqi people. once those bases are ready and waiting, the real war will start. we aren’t really in ‘battle ‘ so to speak w/the iraqi people. but when they join forces against us, which there are rumblings of, thats when the shit will hit the fan. cause no way are we leaving just yet. or ever.

Posted by: annie | Apr 5 2006 2:00 utc | 7

…the Iraqis have developed a harmonic relationship to the occupation, which they cannot defeat militarily, but that they can prevent from becoming successful…
Good point, and really, by preventing the occupying forces from having success, the Iraqi resistance defeats them slowly, time is on their side.
…They simply oppted for their own cultural structure, tribe, clan, local religious authority, or criminal gang instead of conforming to the dictates of the occupation — to deliver the essentials of life, services, security, income, etc….
This going back to their own cultural structure was on the cards long before the first shot was fired. SH had to use force to keep the country’s different ethnic groups ‘unified’, and the moment he and his henchmen were gone, the cookie fell apart into its various crumbles, a development which was forecast by many before the invasion started. The US regime has to deal now not with three parties to the chaos, Shia, Sunnies and Kurds, but with dozens of them, smaller units that are decentralized and for US forces hard to define, reach and/or engage in the political process. And this is what happens when you occupy a country, play the different ethnic groups against each other and spend your money and efforts mostly on building military bases (Euronews via Today in Iraq):

American troops have clashed with insurgents in Iraq. They began exchanging fire after a US military base was attacked in Ramadi, west of Baghdad. Meanwhile a woman and her two sons were killed when a bomb exploded outside their home in the Iraqi capital.
And there was more bloody evidence of the sectarian violence which is gripping the country last night. A truck bomb went off outside a Shi’ite mosque in north-eastern Baghdad, killing at least 10 people and wounding 38 others. It happened as worshippers were leaving after evening prayers. Funerals in which emotions spilled over have already been held. Over a thousand Iraqi civilians died last month in attacks and bombings that have fuelled fears the country’s slipping towards civil war.

How many people have to die before the mayhem can be called ‘civil war’?

Posted by: Feelgood | Apr 5 2006 3:27 utc | 8

annie,
I really think the administration thought there would be a much greater complicity with their plans from the Iraqis. Otherwise they would have taken more seriously the calls for more troops for the post invasion period. None of this civil war, creative choas stuff makes any sense if you want to impliment a long term (and projecting) military presence that also involves a strong hand in the economy and resource production. The biggest mistake IMHO was this outrageous notion that they could predicate economic (and hence) social reforms on a broad based and sudden privitization of the economy. All of which led to the collapse of the Iraqi economy and civil security, leaving in its wake a spiral of mistrust in US (alterior) motives. This along with the endless series of infamous fuck-ups would seem to confirm the worst of suspicions of anything connected to the americans. And comming off years of similar dictatorship has bred a climate of pervasive mistrust and lack of credibility in any “official” authority, hence the rise of decentralized “resistance”, which has served to deny effective control to either the US or the new Iraqi government.
As far as the bases go, I suppose they represent the last illusion of having gained something, but I cant see what practical use they can serve, givin the present climate of not actually controling anything. I would imagine that the vanity of having secured these will evaporate on closer examination of the cost effectivness ledger.

Posted by: anna missed | Apr 5 2006 4:27 utc | 9

you are probably right, and i do hold a prossibly too sceptical view, but..the state department did a number of studies, all predicting what was needed, all ignored. i think i saved the pdf file, but don’t know where, i think uncle linked just in the last few weeks. the reports also predicted the resistance if the infrastructure wasn’t attended to immediately. i think there were many w/good intentions, but i believe there was a very sinister intention by the neocons to implement failure. otherwise, why send a bunch of kids to handle the cpa? why not send our best foriegn service?
chompsky talks about US consistently pitting the different factions in the ME against themselves. it is a very effective form of destruction, we come in at the end and pick up the pieces. but i fully agree there was an anticipation of a less qualified resistance.
also, if our intentions were true, why fake news. why the anticipation of needing to be deceptive? Why the constant lies for so long about who the resistance was, calling them al Q? they knew the assassination would begin right after the handover. it really seems that instead of doing everything they could to assure success the focus was on the pretense of success thru the media. as if we wouldn’t find out.and the salvadoran option? how could that possibly lead to stability. i think they fueled the flames but couldn’t control the fire.
but i’m winging it. i don’t have the kind of well roundedness and knowledge you do about war. it just my instinct.

Posted by: annie | Apr 5 2006 5:08 utc | 10

Otherwise they would have taken more seriously the calls for more troops for the post invasion period.
if the intention was peace they would have followed the advice of the pros. why bring in a huge army to possibly battle if you can manipulate the people to kill eachother?
i would imagine to eliminate the bravest, most threatening,largest portion of your opposition , at least those you don’t imprison and torture, asap without taking the blame or loosing treasure would be one way to weaken the threat. why assume what happened wasn’t part of the plan?
what practical use they can serve, givin the present climate of not actually controling anything

Posted by: annie | Apr 5 2006 5:28 utc | 11

a)The state dept was cut out of the decision making process, and their predictions were ignored — as were reports (during the invasion) to tommy franks about the strength of the fedayeen and its ability to cause trouble down the road.
I’m not sure how to reconcile the twin neo-con notions of creating endless war and chaos — as policy, and the notion of creating a functioning liberal democracy as an example, to discredit authoritarian regimes and open the ME to western investment. Sometimes it seems as if the failure of the latter legitimizes the former, or through the former will emerge the latter. In Iraq the failure of neo-liberal policies have created chaos, if this were the predictable outcome I doubt they would have pursued it like they did — and they did pursue all these free market and democratization schemes with a relentless vengence. Countless investment conventions, all kinds of contractors flooding in, lots and lots of publicity on business opportunities, and on the flip side countless do-gooders and ngo’s, and military attache’s running all over the country setting up local elections, big tent prounouncments about democracy commin to town. All with the net effect of creating a culturally “alien” profile of what was being hawked.
b) The divide and conquer routine only works if it can be controlled or manipulated toward an end. Like the contras, where one faction was split off, funded and put to work against his countrymen. The Shiites (and the kurds) in Iraq, being the likely winner demographically, were
supported and funded as most likely to exchange protection for complicity, and at the same time achieve a local handle on the Saddam leftovers likely to crystalize into an insurgency. Now that their power is on the brink of consolidation, the US has gotten cold feet in that their vision has increasingly little to do with the overall goals of privitization, PSA’s, secular law, or a geo-political stance becoming to the US. So yes the US appears to be shifting allegiances to the Sunni faction to curb this development, flirting with as a consequence, the greater potential of setting off a full-blown civil war — which would reach its greatest likelyhood if the Shiite alliance itself should disintegrate into factional infighting. A development like this would not only render the entire Iraq policy an abject, by any definition, failure — but would also, if Lebanon is any example (12 years), be likely to drag on for years and years, possibly engulfing the entire region. That would be a long time to wait around to pick up the pieces, on this one Isreal would even agree.

Posted by: anna missed | Apr 5 2006 8:13 utc | 12

thank you anna missed. i feel like i’m getting a private tutorial and appreciate the effort you’ve made to spell it out to me.
it is starting to sink in. i think i need to beef up on my understanding of exactly what the goals of the neoliberal policy are. if the failure of this policy has been the cause of the chaos, instead of an intention towards chaos.
“In Iraq the failure of neo-liberal policies have created chaos, if this were the predictable outcome I doubt they would have pursued it like they did”
ok, i am chomping on this thought. i do wonder if the failure of the policy is what has created the chaos, instead of more sinister acts. many iraqi’s seemed willing to trust americans intentions to be true. we now know legal preparations were in place to torure etc. could the outcome of the actions of the occupation not be more responsible for the chaos than the failure of the policy? we had our policy wanks, and we had rummy. were they co ordinated? were the policy wanks being sold a bill of goods and the chenyites weren’t completely forthcoming . sending negroponte, abu G, how can one implement a policy towards peace while henchmen run rife?
my brain is stuck here. something just doesn’t sit right.
but i agree, there was clearly mass efforts made w/building bridges and their ilk, the brokers of commerce. but what idiots to try to manipulate all trade thru american elite. who could ever imagine iraqis would be that stupid? thank you for your efforts to bring me up to speed. if they had just been willing to socialize the infrastructure like the iraqi’s wanted, as spelled out in their first draft constitution, at least as far as getting themselves on their feet, and let the iraqi’s take the helm in this regard… maybe too much greed, too soon.

Posted by: annie | Apr 5 2006 17:48 utc | 13

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