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Still True
[T]o the Bush administration hawks who are guiding American foreign policy, this isn’t the nightmare scenario. It’s everything going as anticipated.
In their view, invasion of Iraq was not merely, or even primarily, about getting rid of Saddam Hussein. Nor was it really about weapons of mass destruction, though their elimination was an important benefit. Rather, the administration sees the invasion as only the first move in a wider effort to reorder the power structure of the entire Middle East. Prior to the war, the president himself never quite said this openly. But hawkish neoconservatives within his administration gave strong hints. In February, Undersecretary of State John Bolton told Israeli officials that after defeating Iraq, the United States would "deal with" Iran, Syria, and North Korea. Meanwhile, neoconservative journalists have been channeling the administration’s thinking. Late last month, The Weekly Standard’s Jeffrey Bell reported that the administration has in mind a "world war between the United States and a political wing of Islamic fundamentalism … a war of such reach and magnitude [that] the invasion of Iraq, or the capture of top al Qaeda commanders, should be seen as tactical events in a series of moves and countermoves stretching well into the future." Practice to Deceive, Joshua Micah Marshall, April 2003
I’ve re-read this Marshal outline again, and I cant see anywhere where he is saying that the current chaos in Iraq is (from the neo-con point of view) a desirable or planned outcome. He summarizes their plan as such:
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The hawks’ grand plan differs depending on whom you speak to, but the basic outline runs like this: The United States establishes a reasonably democratic, pro-Western government in Iraq–assume it falls somewhere between Turkey and Jordan on the spectrum of democracy and the rule of law. Not perfect, representative democracy, certainly, but a system infinitely preferable to Saddam’s. The example of a democratic Iraq will radically change the political dynamics of the Middle East. When Palestinians see average Iraqis beginning to enjoy real freedom and economic opportunity, they’ll want the same themselves. With that happy prospect on one hand and implacable United States will on the other, they’ll demand that the Palestinian Authority reform politically and negotiate with Israel. That in turn will lead to a real peace deal between the Israelis and Palestinians. A democratic Iraq will also hasten the fall of the fundamentalist Shi’a mullahs in Iran, whose citizens are gradually adopting anti-fanatic, pro-Western sympathies. A democratized Iran would create a string of democratic, pro-Western governments (Turkey, Iraq, and Iran) stretching across the historical heartland of Islam. Without a hostile Iraq towering over it, Jordan’s pro-Western Hashemite monarchy would likely come into full bloom. Syria would be no more than a pale reminder of the bad old days. (If they made trouble, a U.S. invasion would take care of them, too.) And to the tiny Gulf emirates making hesitant steps toward democratization, the corrupt regimes of Saudi Arabia and Egypt would no longer look like examples of stability and strength in a benighted region, but holdouts against the democratic tide. Once the dust settles, we could decide whether to ignore them as harmless throwbacks to the bad old days or deal with them, too. We’d be in a much stronger position to do so since we’d no longer require their friendship to help us manage ugly regimes in Iraq, Iran, and Syria.
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So if this grand plan for reforming the ME begins with the reformation, top to bottom, of Iraq — its a little hard to see whats gone down henseforth, as anything remotely capable of elliciting envy, let alone an active empitus for liberal revolution. It seems to me that everything the US has done in Iraq so far, has been done according to the neo-con template. Its just that everything they’ve done has failed, and the resultant chaos, is simply the consequence of that failure. Although Marshall does quote a few of the crazier neo-con versions, like Max Boot, most of the efforts undertaken in Iraq do not reflect these perspectives in policy, although they might be assumed in a last ditch hail Mary effort, having all else failed. This would entail either a major escalation in military profile or some coup-detad scenario. (on the other thread anyonomus Debs is Dead proposes another possibility, although it is not very neo-con in inception).
I find it doubly ironic, first, that the neo-con policy(s) in Iraq of privitization, de-Baathification, cultural cluelessness, and both the ham-fistedness of US military action, and the intentional efforts of keeping the Iraqi security forces impotent and under-armed — have not only allowed the insurgency to develop, but have actually encouraged it to do so. Secondly, and perhaps an even greater irony, is that the war, framed as a neo-liberal task of bringing freedom, democracy, and the american way of life to the oppressed and tortured people of Iraq has become the mission, the mission itself then has carried the seeds of its own discontent, and even failure. The overt appeal to the exceptionalist american mentality has had its benifits, including the continued support defient at the lack of WMD and the missing al-Qaeda connection but, with this support framed so intrinsically in americana comes also a whole host of heightened hopes and expectations for an idealistic outcome. It has also placed restrictions in the formation of (Iraqi) political structure so as to maintain some conformity to the “purple finger” image of democratization in progress, inadvertanly giving Iraqi politicians themselves the currency of proof that the system is working. Essentially, this is a propaganda scheme constructed out of intrinsic american beliefs, that in order to function, must be reflected in the (political) facts, and so therefore have had an effect (on the Iraqi government itself) to produce these facts (as policy) — which have had the effect of actually undermining the neo-con position itself (by having to conform to its own ideals). And because these facts are in relation to the (heightened) expectations, when the facts deny the expectations, there is a reletive, subsequent, and precipitous drop in support. It took 10 years in Vietnam to reach the levels of support that Iraq has found in only 3. And with (W) at 33% approval and almost 70% regarding the whole affair as a “mistake”, and at a cost of 7 billion a month, clearly, this could’nt be the desired result.
Posted by: anna missed | Mar 19 2006 8:37 utc | 18
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