France votes tomorrow on the EU Constitution. As the latest polls show, the "non" seems likely to win:
The last 3 polls available actually give 51%, 52% and 56% for the "non", so it’s hard to know if it will be close or not. Several commenters, including Valery Giscard d’Estaing, the former French President and the main writer of the new Constitution, have made a reference to Liverpool, who came back from a 3-0 score at half time to win the Champion’s League last Wednesday.
We’ll know tomorrow. Below are a few musings on the last days of the campaign:
– a campaign with international voices
– two radically different "non"
– what will happen next on the left and on the right
I will use this thread for live blogging of the results tomorrow, along with a parallel diary over at dKos.
A campaign with international voices
What has been striking in this campaign is the massive involvement of non-French politicians and personalities in the campaign in France. They have joined the political meetings organized by the big parties, they have written many op-eds in the papers, they have spoken on TV and radio. In a previous diary, I wrote that these foreign politicians only supported the "oui" vote, but I was wrong about that: conservative British politicians have supported the sovereigntist "non" campaign on the right, and senior figures of the European left (like Oscar Lafontaine, the maverick leftist politician who is currently musing a run as an independent, left-of-Schoeder’s SPD in the coming German elections) have also participated in the "non" from the left, asking France to reject the treaty as too market-oriented.
Still, the majority of these foreign voices have been favorable to the "oui" and have called the French, sometimes with passion, to support the Constitution.
Europe’s leaders in frantic Yes push on EU poll
After his country became the ninth EU country to ratify the treaty, Gerhard Schröder, Germany’s chancellor, travelled to the French city of Toulouse on Friday night to take part in frantic last-minute campaigning. José Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, Spain’s prime minister, joined French socialist leaders at a Yes rally in the northern French town of Lille. "Europe cannot advance without France," he said.
I have not heard or read a single complaint about these foreign interventions in this campaign. The French probably relish the attention – once again, they are at the center of everybody’s attentions, which certainly provides a nice feeling of being relevant in the world, a feeling which appears to be rare these days in my country (not everybody has tried a new career as a dKos regular diarist 😉 ).
But in a way (in my ever-optimistic world view), it also shows that this vote matters to all Europeans and that it is legitimate that they be involved, and it underlines the fact that our destinies are pretty much irreversibly intertwined, whatever institutional form that takes.
It also underlines, of course, that a lot is at stake in the short term, and that the course of Europe is likely to take pretty different paths depending on tomorrow’s result. My take:
– a French "oui" would in all likelihood be followed by a Dutch one, as they would probably hesitate to be the first ones to go against Europe. The onus would then move on to Poland, the Czech Republic and the UK, the countries where a "no" as the most chances of winning. In the meantime, the business of the EU will start again, with the big discussions on the 2007-2013 budget – likely to be acrimonious – to start. The scare of the narrow French win would certainly influence discussions towards a more social agenda, in my view.
– a French "non" (and/or a Dutch one) would certainly be followed pretty quickly be calls by European leaders for the ratification process to continue, to give other countries a chance to give their own opinion (if 80% or more of countries, but not all, ratify, they have agreed to discuss how to move forward again). It would in all likelihood also be followed by a Dutch no, and the British government (which takes the rotating presidency of Europe for the second half of this year and thus has the administrative responsibility to organize discussions between countries in the European council) would have a big mess on its hands. France will push for more "social" stuff, but will have limited support; in all likelihood, with the German election campaign under way (it’s expected in the autumn), the mood will become pretty acrimonious, with fighting about the budget (the French want to protect their (extravagant) agricultural subsidies, the Brits want to protect their (equally extravagant) rebate, the Spanish want to protect their (increasingly undeserved) structural subsidies, the Poles want more, and the Germans and Dutch want to pay less), and about any European directive that has any whiff of being market friendly. There will not be any sensible stuff happening for at least a year, I’d say.
two radically different "non"
What will make France’s position especially difficult is that the "non" vote will be equally split between two radically opposed strands:
– the "non" of the right, which is about sovereignty. People on that side don’t like the current big Europe with its many poor new members (this is delayed vote against enlargement), with France’s loss of influence, and with Turkey potentially joining in. A good chunk of that vote comes from supporters of Le Pen’s National Front, with its anti-immigrant, protectionist and populist ideology; another part comes from the more mainstream right (people like De Villier’s MPF), which resent Europe’s increasing federalist bent and the "far away Brussels bureaucracy" – these are fairly similar to the British conservatives, although they are probably a lot more protectionist and extra on the economic front (but then a lot of the French right is like that, i.e. basically paternalist and anti-market). Overall, with the government being from the right, a lot of people from the right will vote "oui" out of party loyalty.
– the "non" of the left is more complex. I have been highly critical of it, as I think it is very misguided, and thus am probably not the best person to describe it but I’ll have a try anyway (but I hope that the several French kossacks that have stated in previous diaries that they will vote "non" will join in the comments to provide a better description if they feel that I have unfairly described their position). The argument is that the current Constitution is too "libérale" (i.e. market-oriented in the French meaning of that word). It focuses too much on economic policies and free trade and not much on social rights and issues, and, as it is a solemn document, it will freeze Europe into that unfavorable framework for the left. Many arguments also go on to say that it is not a proper Constitution, being absurdly long, too detailed on many topics (again, especially on economic policies) and inaccessible to the population. It fails to say what Europe stands for and what Europeans really want to do together, and to really stand for the right values.
These two strands weigh about the same, i.e. about 25%+ of the population each, but the leftist one has been more volatile, with the socialist voters torn between the two options.
what will happen next on the left and on the right
I’ve written briefly above about the European consequences of the vote, but the biggest impact is likely to be domestic, as the campaign has pitted against each other politicians that are formally part of the same camp (the sovereigntist right against Chirac, and the idealist left against the realist left, with the fracture right in the middle of the Socialist Party). There has been a lot of acrimony and it is hard to see how some groups are going to manage to even pretend to any reconciliation.
One thing is certain: whatever the vote, the current Prime Minister, Jean-Pierre Raffarin’s days are numbered. He will probably leave even faster in the case of a "oui" (he can at least say that he got that through, and leave honorably; ) than in the case of a "non" (to avoid the acknowledgment by Chirac that the vote was about any domestic issues). In any case, he will be replaced by a guy supposed to represent a more "socially minded" policy. The front runners for the job are Dominique de Villepin, the infamous foreign minister during the Iraq war and currently interior minister, Philippe Douste-Blazy, currently the health minister, or Michèle Alliot-Marie, the (female) Defense minister. De Villepin, fully loyal to Chirac, is said to be the front runner, but is hated by Sarkozy, Chirac’s main rival on the right and the leader of the UMP, the main party of the right. Sarkozy would be another option for Prime Minister, but Chirac really hates him and does not seem to want to go through a new "cold" cohabitation with him; also, he would not really fit the desire for a more "social" policy. On the other hand, he is extremely popular for his perceived straight talking and could be seen as a change from "politics as usual" which is what people really don’t like about Chirac. The Chirac-Sarkozy duel will last until the presidential election in 2007 and will dominate the politics of the right in any case, so the result of the referendum will not change much. Chirac is unpopular, a "non" will be (rightly) blamed on him, but he will not really profit from a "oui" which will be decided on the left. Sarkozy has campaigned for the "oui", as fits the leader of the main governmental party, but neither result will have much an impact for him.
On the left, things are a lot harder to fathom, because the campaign has shown a deep chasm between two strands of the left, which I will label, for lack of better terms, the hard left and the centrist left. The communists, trotskysts and other assorted leftists have traditionally been anti-EU, and their position in this campaign is coherent with their previous policies. They state they are pro-European, but they have always been against Europe as it is (with its focus on economic and commercial issues). This has not usually prevented them from joining the socialists to win elections together and even to govern together (like in 1997-2002 when there were communist ministers), but this time, they have campaigned hard against the socialists and relations have turned a lot more acrimonious than is usual between them. This is linked, of course, to the fact that the Socialist Party, which is the main party of the left, has been literally split in two over the issue. Despite an internal referendum last December, where the "oui" was supported by 59% of card-carrying members of the party, the partisans of the "non" have decided to campaign actively, ignoring party discipline, and joining the other partisans of the left "non" in political meetings. That "non" camp is itself fragmented (too many egos, which I won’t bore you with), but has been made very credible by the presence of Laurent Fabius, the former Prime Minister of Mitterrand in 1984-86 (when he signed the European Single Act which created the single market) and finance minister of Jospin in 2001-2002, formerly identified with the rightist wing of the party. He is widely suspected to have chosen the "non" as a tactical move in the perspective of the 2007 presidential elections, to shed his "centrist" reputation and differentiate himself from the other likely socialist candidates, several of which are also centrists like Dominique Strauss-Kahn.
The official campaign of the socialist party, lead by François Hollande, in favor of the "oui" has been much less visible and dynamic than the campaign of the "non", and they have been fighting each other a lot more than anyone else, as it is the vote of the socialists which will essentially decide the final result. As a result of this campaign, it is not clear how the two halves will be able to be reconciled, even though they know that they have to in the perspective of the following elections (presidential and for parliament, in that order in 2007). The camp that wins the referendum will obviously have an advantage in the aggiornamento that will follow, but it is not clear how any side can actually translate that into real political gains.
In the case of a "oui" victory, the current leadership of the party will be comforted, and it is likely that they will exclude the most aggressive supporters of the "non". The others will be asked to pledge loyalty or to leave, and it can be expected that a number will come back to the fold, although the political differences will remain and can be expected to burst out at any time.
in the case of a "non" victory, the socialist leadership has announced that there will be a party congress in the autumn, to decide the political line and the leadership of the party; will Fabius succeed in his take over of the party and a possible unification of the left on a hard line, or will the party split hopelessly, with unpredictable consequences, into factions that do not talk to each other and start organizing separately?
In any case, Chirac will have succeeded in his attempt to weaken the socialists, although he probably did not expect that he would be so weakened himself in the process. France will have to live for 2 years without any new elections to set a policy and will thus have a weak government, a majority right beset by personal rivalries, and a very divided left. In the case of a "non", the country will further have to live with the aftermath of that vote on the European scene, where that self-absorbed vote will certainly not be appreciated and where France’s voice is likely to become much less audible.
My bet: 50.5% for the "oui".