There are many theories (most recently this Kos diary) bringing up a tidbit of information about Iraqi oil that purports to explain that the war was all about oil.
Of course, it was about oil, but maybe not in the way you think about it. The issue (which has domestic relevance as well) is – do you have an administration that does not tolerate opposition and is willing to use all means to crush it?
Oil is the most important item on which decisions must be taken in Iraq, but how these decisions are taken are more important than the actual decisions.
Let’s play a game: what’s the common point between these 2 groups of countries?
1)
+ Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Egypt, Kuwait, Emirates, Sudan, Yemen, Kazakhstan
+ Italy, Georgia, Ukraine, Poland, Japan, UK, Norway, Israel, Nigeria
2)
+ Burma, Cuba, Zimbabwe, North Korea, Angola
+ Venezuela, Russia, Iran, France, Spain, Canada.
Now look again (same countries, different groups):
A)
+ Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Sudan, Angola, Kazakhstan, Emirates
+ Russia, Venezuela, Iran, UK, Norway, Nigeria, Canada.
B)
+ Burma, Cuba, Zimbabwe, North Korea, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Egypt, Yemen
+ Italy, Georgia, Ukraine, Poland, Japan, France, Spain, Israel.
Can you tell how I put these together? And what it has to do with Iraqi oil?
Group 1 countries are currently seen as allies by the US administration in the fight against terrorism;
Group 2 countries are enemies or at least unhelpful partners (Not all countries have been put into that list, only those relevant to the point I’m coming to)
Group A are oil exporters
Group B are not
Now, you have noticed that in each group, the first line includes dictatorial regimes while the second line includes democracies (some flawed, obviously, but nevertheless democracies). So, as you can see, democracy has little to do with either (i) being a friend of the US or (ii) having oil or not.
Now here’s a trickier one:
a) Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Russia, Emirates
b) UK, Norway, Venezuela, Iran, Angola, Nigeria, Sudan, Canada, Kazakhstan.
vs
i) Norway, UK, Kuwait, Angola, Sudan, Canada, Emirates, Nigeria
ii) Russia, Iran, Venezuela, Saudi Arabia.
These are all oil-producing countries and significant exporters
a) are those that do NOT, for the most part, give access to their oil reserves to foreign oil majors
b) are those that DO
i) are those that do not use their oil exports as a political weapon
ii) are those that DO.
And another one:
aa) France, Germany, Canada, Mexico,
bb) Cuba, Iran, Russia, Venezuela
vs
11) Canada, Mexico, Spain, Russia, Germany
22) Cuba, Iran, France, Venezuela
aa) and bb) list opponents to the war in Iraq, separated in "allies" and others
11) list those that are treated as friends by the US despite this opposition, and 22) those that are not. These last four tend to be those that are the most outspoken (or frank) and explicit in their opposition to US policies.
The point that I am trying to make is that US policy is not about oil, it’s not about democracy, it’s about a general intolerance to dissent and opposition. It’s about "we know better, and if you don’t agree we’ll make you pay for your insolence".
It’s all about hubris, and oil has little to do about it.
Saddam Hussein was hated by Americans, because, like Castro and Chavez, he was (at least after 1990 and his "betrayal") an outspoken opponent of the US, unwilling to bow to US demands, always trying to use his oil as a political weapon (by limiting his production to jack up prices or by threatening to price it in euros) and, unlike Chavez and Castro, he had provided a not entirely unarguable case under international law that he should be removed, so he was (note – I am not saying that I agree with the war, but I am saying that it was at least legitimate to put pressure on him like the first UN resolution did – he was stubborn enough that even France and others could have come to agree that war was the only way to make him comply).
Castro and Chavez have been the target of various attempts to destabilise them, which, as can be expected, only strenghten their internal legitimacy, despite their otherwise quite flawed policies.
Iran is the same – outspoken against the US, willing to use its oil in its international posture, and thus especially targeted by the administration.
France, not an oil producer, not a dictature (yet), quite outspoken in its opposition to the US (both for good and bad reasons), has also been subject of a campaign of hate of unusual intensity in right wing circles and media in the past two years. France has the "luck" of (i) being part of the EU which is quite able to fight the US where it matters (money and trade) (ii) having the same high opinion of itself as the US and thus not really caring about its opinion in the US beyond pragmatic interests.
Russia and Saudi Arabia are special cases, because they are not very friendly to the US, and they can do pretty much what they want in many respects – including in their oil diplomacy – because they are pretty careful not to be in outspoken opposition to the US. The play real-politik games which sometimes put them in opposition to the US, but these are understood as a defense of their national interest and are not part of a pattern of explicit opposition to the US, so they can be understood and tolerated in the general scheme of things (they are fought in such instances by the US, of course, but not seen as enemies, only temporary opponents).
Today’s Iraq is a big unknown for the time being. Still being fully controlled by the US, it has no independnet policy of its own. It’s clear that what Bushco want is an "independent" but friendly country, not an independent and independent-minded country with policies that go against US interests.
Oil, of course, is an important issue, and the way Iraq will open up its reserves is an important decision, but the important thing is more about who decides than the actual decision. Opening up your oil reserves is not a bad thing per se – it can be profitable to you if you negotiate good terms with the oil companies (such as PSAs – see this post I wrote in the diary I mentioned above).
The US has shown that it will deal with countries who export oil to the US or don’t, who open their oil sector to them or not, and who are democracies or not, so I really thing this is not the issue. (The US of course has a preference for democratic, friendly countries that give them access, but it can live with the other options. What they do NOT like is public opposition, especially when it is backed by oil and thus is heard).
The question is – will the opening up of Iraq oil reserves be a sovereign decision, and will the US tolerate decisions by Iraqis that do not follow their preferences.
Oil in Iraq will not be developed as long as there is unsecurity and instability, and the big oil companies will NOT invest as long as they do not have adequate long term contracts with a legitimate, sovereign, government. The US can give juicy short term contracts to oil contractors in Irak, but this a budgetary issue (who gets to spend Iraq’s money), a sovereignty issue and how US money for Iraq is spent (a domestic US budgetary oversight issue) and has little to do with Iraq’s massive reserves.
So that question has domestic repercussions in the US – do you have an administration that tolerates no dissent, no opposition, and seems willing to act forcefully against those that oppose or criticise it – or try to "check and balance it"?