It is not because we make fun of the “War on Terra” and criticise the catastrophic war in Iraq that the fight against terrorism is not real and does not need to be pursued. Quite to the contrary. Of course, and despite all the public pronouncements that “everything has changed”, and criticisms of “September 10” mindset, this is mostly a matter of law enforcement and intelligence gathering. And in that business, despite the occasional noise from the usual suspects, guess who the US can count on more than any other country?

France.

As many people tend to forget (or, like the US State Dept, to stay silent about), France is probably (with the obvious exception of Israel) the country with the longest and bloodiest experience of Islamist terrorism, going back more than 20 years.

See here and here lists of the major attacks in France. As you can see, there were (among others) 3 big waves of bombings, two in 1986 and one 1995. In each case, you had bombs in metros, restaurants, large stores, with each time a few people killed and several dozen injured. When it happens several times a week, or once a week for a couple of months, and most of it in Paris, it creates a real climate of fear – a lot of people take the metro or go shopping, and when it starts happening several times, you cannot wonder (even if the odds are actually really low) if it’s going to strike you (remember the sniper 2 years ago).

The first time, the interior minister famously claimed that “we would terrorize the terrorists” (that was after the second bombing in the first series in 1986). This did not work…as was shown a few days later. Blame games were played, accusations were thrown around, the usual suspects were blamed (Iran, Lybia, PLO), and a lot of noise was made while the bombings went on.
The investigations were started under the old existing rules of procedure. After the whole series of bombings, it appeared necessary to strengthen the ability of police to conduct wide-ranging enquiries into the terrorist networks, their financing channels, their logistics. Special anti-terrorist laws were put in place, along with a specialised group of investigating magistrates, and police corps. Basically, they created the concept that any action which can be, directly or indirectly, tied to terrorism could be prosecuted under the new laws, which also allowed for extended preventive detention (i.e. detention without being charged), increased periods before a lawyer could be called in, and much stiffer sentences for criminal activities associated with terrorism. These reforms also put in place coordination structures (around that team of investigative magistrates), with the associated specialised police forces, and an emphasis on international data gathering and exchange (especially within Europe).
At the same time, the Renseignements Généraux (RG), the French political police (yes, we have that) was told to refocus from communist/trotskyst groups to islamic groups, along with the DST, the domestic counter-espionage body. Mosques were infiltrated (often created with foreign funds and led by foreign imams, they were places of proselyting for all imported Islamic tendencies, including wahabism or the Algerian GIA), as well as all other Muslim organisations or associations. The RG and DST recruited a lot of French Arab-speakers (of the Muslim population in France, about half is French – whether French-born or naturalised – and the other half are foreigners) – contrary to the information now become “common wisom”, many of them are well integrated in France, feel fully French, and are quite happy to serve in the police force or other such bodies – and many do -it’s normal.

The terrorists who did the 1986 attacks were eventually linked to Iran (because we were helping Iraq back then…) arrested and sentenced to jail in 1987 and are still in jail today (except for one, Wahid Gordji, an employee of the Iranian embassy, who was expelled after France and Iran broke their diplomatic relations and blockaded each other’s embassies. Some of the French hostages in Lebanon were also released). Those that did the 1995 bombings were identified after a few weeks; one of their leaders was killed by the police when trying to escape and the others were arrested, except for their financier, based in London, whom the Brits refused to extradite because they considered that his rights would not be protected while in France…

The lesson has been, in any case, that the combination of painstaking police work, network infliltration, along with diplomacy (usually quiet, but not always) to kill off support from other countries, when combined with an extended and very tough package of police intimidation rights (especially the long preventive detentions) works. No need to invade Algeria, to bomb Lybia or whatever else could have been “satisfying” for the French leadership back then.

Some of these measures clearly make civil rights defenders very unhappy, but there are some limitations, and there is due process in the end, which so far has allowed to limit abuses. (Some abuse happened when the goal was more to generate headlines at convenient moments rather than actually fighting terrorism – people would be arrested, the politicians would make the statements they wanted/needed, and many of the people arrested would be quietly, and in a few cases not so quietly, liberated soon afterwards. The appellate courts have been pretty vigilant there. Maybe we’ve been also been lucky to have quite professional magistrates doing that job. As quoted in a November 2004 article from the Washington Post: “At the same time, Tubiana and other defense attorneys acknowledged that French counterterrorism investigators generally make efficient use of the tools at their disposal.”

The most famous of these, Juge Jean-Louis Bruguière, has become a hero in anti-terrorist circles, for his tough rhetoric against terrorism, his obvious knowledge of the various Islamist groups, and his willingness to make his case for tougher laws publicly.

To get an idea of how popular he has become in US conservative circles, see how his declarations made headlines in the conservative press, even when it was going against the wisdom of the moment, as this January 2003 article in Newsmax, , the rabidly right wing publication, shows:

Which means, simply, that US law enforcement was really impressed with Bruguière and his aggressive methods. The article from the Washington Post last November is a portrait of Bruguiere and explains the French anti-terrorist framework. The article is moslty descriptive, but you can understand the French policy as follows (all quotes from the WaPo article):

– extremely strong anti-terrorist legislation, with special rights for the police/investigative forces

France has embraced a law enforcement strategy that relies heavily on preemptive arrests, ethnic profiling and an efficient domestic intelligence-gathering network. French anti-terrorism prosecutors and investigators are among the most powerful in Europe, backed by laws that allow them to interrogate suspects for days without interference from defense attorneys.

(…)

At times, French authorities have pursued terrorism cases outside their borders, taking over investigations from countries unwilling or unable to arrest suspects on their own.

The French anti-terrorism judge (…) is Bruguiere, an investigating magistrate who under French law is granted great prosecutorial powers, including the ability to sign search warrants, order wiretaps and interrogate suspects. Over the past decade, Bruguiere has ordered the arrests of more than 500 people on suspicion of “conspiracy in relation to terrorism,” a broad charge that gives him leeway to lock up suspects while he carries out investigations.

“There is no equivalent anywhere else in Europe. This provision is very, very efficient for judicial rule in tackling terrorist support networks,” Bruguiere said in an interview. “Fighting terrorism is like the weather. You have high pressure zones and low pressure zones. Countries that have low pressure zones” attract terrorism.

– police rights are extensive, but they are not limitless – ultimately, all work conducted by the investigative judges will come in front of a court of law, and it has to follow criminal procedure;

– police work has nothing to do with military action, and these are considered useless;

Terrorism is “a very new and unprecedented belligerence, a new form of war and we should be flexible in how we fight it,” said Jean-Louis Bruguiere, a senior French anti-terrorism judge. “When you have your enemy in your own territory, whether in Europe or in North America, you can’t use military forces because it would be inappropriate and contrary to the law. So you have to use new forces, new weapons.”

– intelligence gathering is a key feature of the fight against terorrists (see this article about the general lack of knowledge of al-Qiada by Western law enforcement agencies)

The Directorate of Surveillance of the Territory, the domestic intelligence agency, employs a large number of Arabic speakers and Muslims to infiltrate radical groups, according to anti-terrorism experts here. Police are also quick to use the threat of preemptive arrest to persuade suspects to work as street informants.

The French government has also stepped up efforts to crack down on radical Islamic clerics. While authorities have long had the right to expel foreigners if they are judged a threat to public safety, lawmakers passed a bill this year that makes it possible to deport noncitizens for inciting “discrimination, hatred or violence” against any group.

(…)

Bruno Le Maire, a senior adviser to the interior minister, said authorities have placed about 40 mosques under close surveillance and move quickly whenever they find a cleric preaching radicalism.

(…)

Other countries, including the United States, have long-standing policies that restrict law enforcement agents from infiltrating places of worship. So far, however, France’s aggressive approach has not led to widespread criticism.

Dalil Boubakeur, rector of the Grand Mosque of Paris, said many Muslims support the expulsions and are just as concerned about preventing terrorist attacks as other French citizens. “We find the public arrogance of these extremists completely intolerable,” he said. “Fundamentalism is on the rise. . . . This is a real danger. The state should take measures against these types of people that disrupt society, not only when there is a terrorist attack, but before.”

– police work and diplomacy are two things that can – and should – be completely separated:

Thomas M. Sanderson, a terrorism expert with the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, said France has combined its tough law enforcement strategy with a softer diplomatic campaign in the Middle East designed to bolster ties with Islamic countries.

“You do see France making an effort to cast itself as the friendly Western power,” as distinct from the United States, he said. “When it comes to counterterrorism operations, France is hard-core. . . . But they are also very cognizant of what public diplomacy is all about.”

(Of course, this is not to say that France has never been hypocritical in its diplomacy or dealings with States sponsoring terrorism, or that deals have not been made, but there is a general separation of police work and political relations).

The interesting thing to note is that while France’s diplomacy is strongly (and, as most of you around here probably agree, rightly) critical of US policies, its ruthlessly efficient police and intelligence operations against the Islamic “nebula” make it a valuable partner, and law enforcement officials on both sides seem to have made a better job of cooperating than governments. Maybe law enforcement people are more reality-based, maybe they were forced to acknowledge the very real input from their French colleagues because they did not have much else to work on, who knows – but the cooperation works (Same thing, by the way, between the military in Afghanistan, for instance).

Still, the lessons are stark

– the fight against terrorism is not a “war”, other than in the sense that it requires a lot of resources, a lot of time, and there are casualties. Blunt military force is useless and worse, breeds resentment and destruction, which nurture terrorism

– it is possible to fight terrorism while maintaining the rule of law. Exactly where the line is set between defense of civil rights and rights of the prosecution/the investigators can and should be debated. Not every country would want to be as aggressive as the French, but they all should make sure that courts acting under publicly known laws are the ultimate arbiters (as in France). There is no need to compromise our most sacred values to be successful in that fight

– human intelligence is vital. Language skills, undercover agents with ultimate loyalty to their country and not to their religion are essential. This requires either a lot of training, or the availability of a pool of bilingual and motivated citizens. Treating Muslims are suspects is definitely not the best way to get there. It is strange that the USA, a country of immigrants (like France) should have so much trouble filling up such positions

– explicit support from the population, and especially from the groups most threatened by these policies (i.e. Muslims) is required. Community leaders, religious leaders should be engaged, encouraged to speak up, and associated, in public and private ways, with anti-terrorist policies. Muslims know that they are often the first victims of terrorism, if indirectly – shunning, suspicion, discrimination, etc… and can be brought around if they can expect not to be blamed as a group.

– public diplomacy does not need to follow police work. The two can – and should – be kept separate; but public diplomacy must be accompanied by private diplomacy that follows more closely with the police work and focuses on intelligence gathering and surveillance of identified dangerous groups. However, such private diplomacy is hard if the public diplomacy consists in insulting or threatening your partners.

Without any specialist knowledge on my part, it looks like the USA is not doing good at all on the first 4 items, and also arguably not on the last one either, which is not encouraging… and meanwhile, they have to rely on their newest enemy, France (and other similary “unreliable” allies), to make any progress.

I would add that any long term anti-terrorism policy should take a long, hard look at our fucked up approach to the Arab world. This will come in another installment soon…