|
Open Thread 05-02
Having said I wouldn’t dare enter this discussion without proper high-altitude equipment, I will not contradict myself and join it anyway. I am 50 and still have no ideological leaning whatsoever (somebody once said I was an “utopian anarchist”, but that, I believe, was intended as a joke). Before choosing which way to lean I’d have to reach a firm conclusion about the selfish/solidary nature of man and that was never clear to me either. In the absence of a theoretical foundation, I had to go on gut feeling and experience. Which eventually led me to my thesis no. 187 (thesis no. 186, incidentally, has to do with the inexplicable disappearance of ballpoint pens before they are ever finished, but I’ll leave that for another occasion): selfishness increases with distance. Eventually it becomes “compassion”, which is a socially accepted way of faking love for people who are too distant – geographically, ethnically, culturally – for you to really care.
Of course I’m making this all up as I go. Anyway, I think most of us are unselfish and certainly not lazy or cowardly with those who are chose to us (parenthood, by the way, is the closest you can get). At medium range you begin to engage in cost-benefit estimates. At long range you fake it because that’s what’s expected of you; you donate to the tsunami victims although the whole issue bores you a bit (in spite of the morbidly fascinating pictures), but you ignore the beggar at the street corner because nobody is paying attention. Distance is where civilization makes a difference. The rest is pure animal-territorial stuff. So how do you implement a fairly efficient economic & political superstructure on top of these fluid allegiances and concerns? By making it small & networked. You make it capitalist in design and socialist in the details.
I apologize if that annoys you, but I tend to speak by examples. A few years ago I was one of the owners of a medium-sized company (10 cities, 60 employees) dealing with technology – and therefore, since we were opening new paths and lacked standards of performance of efficiency to measure things by, one that required both creativity and trust. I took care of the tecnical side and gladly left all administration tasks to my partner because I don’t like power games (I equally hate obeying and being obeyed). He was a great manager, but his tendency to have everything under control made him more and more inefficient until he burned out, which forced me to step in and try to run things. My embarassment at being a boss led me to do exactly the opposite of what he was doing: I started socializing the profits, paying clubs, courses, vacations & meals to the employees and essentially letting them tell me what they wanted to do.
After an initial period of shock and suspicion, the happiness level grew enormously, but so did laziness and selfishness. It’s a long story, but in the end, by trial & error, we came to a workable solution. We, the capitalists, would tell them exactly what we wanted done and they would decide among themselves, without any interference whatsoever, who did what. Furthermore, the company was split in small cells (in our case, by city) which competed among themselves for monetary rewards. It worked quite well. Everybody was having fun (nobody was ever fired, although most of our former employees quit after we sold the company), creativity was high and I could spend most of my time downloading pirated music from the web instead of giving orders, because I knew the required work would be done.
Most decisions, except those related to hiring & firing people and establishing commercial agreements, were made collectively. One of the most interesting experiments was our “salary pool”, which was a percentage of each branch’s earnings to be spent in salaries. Out of a total of 100, each employee would allocate a specific quantity to each of his/her colleagues, excluding themselves. A totalling was made and each received a corresponding share from the pool. The system, with some adjustments (an assured minimum, etc.), worked pretty well and seemed to provide a fair distribution of income. Occasionally they would “cheat” – for example, to grant more money to someone who was in financial need – but that was alright.
Was it 100% efficient? Not by a long shot. I’d say it yielded at best 70% of what could be achieved under a tight capitalist administration with a conventional boss-employee rule. Salaries were above market average, people spent days at home sulking when they were dumped by their girl/boyfriends (that was allowed too, no questions asked), we spent too much with side benefits. But undoubtedly there was trust. And laziness was curbed by the employees themselves once they realized that work was being measured not by their individual performance but by tasks accomplished by the team as a whole.
Of course it can be argued that all this was just a clever capitalist twist to extract more revenue from the exploitation of labor. Moreover, our little experiment was only possible because the business had a high profit margin. Nevertheless, it led me to think that perhaps the capitalist model, which relies on enforced loyalty, steadiness, obedience and single-mindedness – in a word, alienation – is being superseded precisely by the new requirements of creativity and flexibility imposed by its technological breakthroughs. A sort of hybrid socialism may come top-down; what the French rebels wrote on the walls in 1968, “the imagination in power”, may yet become a business requirement.
The experience taught me that (a) people do tend to be solidary when they know (or are close to) the ones they are being solidary to; (b) socialization of work breeds dignity but may stifle creativity and efficiency; (c) competition does increase creativity. And, at least for me, the most optimistic realization was that people at first are quite scared of freedom & personal responsibility & tend to look for someone who will tell them what to do (or take the blame), but after a while they get the hang of it and won’t let go.
Incidentally, I also found out that women, as a rule, are better professionals and more reasonable human beings than men, but I guess most of you already know that. OK, I’ll stop now. Sorry for the long post, I got carried away.
Posted by: pedro | Jan 7 2005 8:19 utc | 30
From The New Republic:
01.07.05
“THE REPUBLIC OF FEAR LIVES ON”: The Iraqi Press Monitor of the Institute for War and Peace Reporting has closed its Baghdad office. As Matt Yglesias notes, their work in Iraq is invaluable to non-Arabic speakers, especially those outside the country trying to make sense of events there. In today’s edition of the IPM, the Institute includes a moving opinion piece by Ali Hasan, the IPM’s last remaining Baghdad translator. With the kind permission of the Institute, here it is in full:
The Republic of Fear Lives On
By Ali Hasan, IWPR
After a year of success in helping to rebuild the media in Iraq, we of the Institute for War & Peace Reporting have been left with only one option: to close down our Baghdad office.
We feel defeated and we are frustrated. Adding salt to our injuries, none of us Iraqis can talk about our work in our neighborhoods, and even to our close friends. We fear that we will be branded as the spies and collaborators of the occupation. There are many whom we fear: The Board of Muslim Clerics, the foreign Jihadis, Muqtada al-Sadr, Zarqawi’s people, and finally Saddam’s henchmen.
Before liberation we were only afraid of Saddam’s people. But today the list is long.
When I first picked up Kanan Makiya’s book “The Republic of Fear”, (after Saddam’s departure, of course), I could identify with every single word that was in it and hoped that the republic of fear had gone once and for all. But today, I feel it is business as usual: the business of fear, intimidation, indiscriminate killing, torture, and beheading.
In Iraq today, people have a myriad of violent movements to fear. Significantly, the violence and the so-called resistance are found, in the great majority of cases, in the Sunni triangle: Fallujah, Tikrit, Samara, and Mosul. These areas were favored by the former regime, and their reaction to the collapse of that regime is logical.
Almost a year and a half after the war, we are still afraid of talking against Saddam’s regime. But, the irony is that this is the case in what is supposed to be an era of freedom. And we are afraid not only of the former regime but also of new figures that have popped up and been added to our list of fear.
One such figure is Muqtada al-Sadr. We cannot openly express our opinions of him, particularly opinions of disapproval. While his supporters follow him blindly, the germ of his popularity is the stand that his father, Muhammed Sadiq al-Sadr, took under the former regime. He openly stood up in the regime’s face. His stand cost him his life when he was assassinated by the regime in February 1999.
As for Muqtada, he is young in terms of religious authority. He is extremely young to be a marjia or religious leader–another reason to recognize that people follow him due to his father’s reputation. Yet his father’s stand was powerful and brave in an age when no one dared to say anything at all except to praise the regime. Muqtada’s followers see his father not him.
Another source of fear that has emerged in the wake of the US-led invasion is the Muslim Clerics Board, claiming to represent the Sunni sect in Iraq. On September 17th, 2004, Al-Hurra satellite channel interviewed Board member Sheikh Abdul Ghaffar al-Samarai. The channel asked the Sheikh to issue an edict banning murder of civilian foreigners, but the Sheikh would not. Although the Sheikh did not openly approve kidnapping and killing civilians, he did not object to it either.
Many of my friends have assured me that the Board allows the killing of any foreigner, whether a civilian or not. Recently, two French journalists were kidnapped. Their kidnappers said they would release the Frenchmen if told to in an edict issued by the Board. But the Board did not issue one. The very same Board already called for releasing all the civilians kidnapped. But the clerics contradicted themselves by refusing to issue an opinion on the fate of the French journalists.
In fact, almost all the Board’s members were supporters and beneficiaries of the former regime. So, logically they are victims of the new system in Iraq…
While you are in Iraq beware of talking against the Board for you might get kidnapped and beheaded.
In the wake of the last war, I wanted to release the pressure of silence I had endured for 25 years [my age then]. But after a while, I realized we were still suffering from the fear to speak out. I do not deny that I am still afraid while writing this story. But there is always a first time, and someone must do something.
Once, my friend asked me why I thought now was better than under the former regime. I said to him, “I know that I might get killed in any of the car bombs or simply by a quarrel, or by one of the celebratory bullets Iraqis fire everyday. But this is much better than being in one of Saddam’s prisons or under his reign. I never felt safe under Saddam.”
I’ve also met a number of foreign journalists. One of them, in the midst of a conversation, said to me, “Now that you are a free man…”
I interrupted him, saying, “I am not yet free.”
Officially and in reality, power used to be in the hands of Saddam and his henchmen. Today, the real power is still in Saddam’s henchmen’s hands. Officially, it is in the government’s hands, but the current interim government is simply not powerful. Nobody fears its authority. You can openly criticize it and swear about it fearlessly. On the local radio station Dijla, guests and announcers criticize the government’s performance.
The problem with the country is that it is paralyzed, and paralysis regarding security is only one side of the problem. Besides, we are just sitting and watching as if we are not involved. We were passive observers and are still so. We need everyone’s support to help us stop our fears. Terrorist groups make it to the headlines simply because they stir up trouble.
The majority of us are still marginalized. Anyone can cause a disturbance and make it to the headlines, including me. But I do not want to do so. I want my country to be rebuilt. It is easier to destroy than to rebuild. And terrorists take the easy way of publicity. This indicates they are bankrupt and desperate.
I do not want my children to lead the same sort of life I had in my childhood and youth. I want them to live fearlessly. I want to put an end to “The Republic of Fear.” But I cannot do that all by myself. My countrymen have to support me, even if they are afraid.
I have had long arguments with my friends about the occupation and the opponents of the occupation. I told them that I was not in favor of the occupation. On the contrary, I am totally against it. But dismissing it should not be done now, because if we do so now the country will descend into sheer chaos. I also told them that the country had been occupied for a long time. It was occupied by Saddam. And those who now claim to be resisting the occupation should have resisted Saddam.
Moreover, the Security Council resolution of power transfer gave the Iraqi government the right to dismiss the multi-national forces. But it is the government that keeps the foreign troops for security concerns. For the time being, I do agree with the government’s decision, for we need these foreign troops.
I know the former regime is not coming back. But evil powers cling to this hope and even bet on it. We gave them the chance once to be in power, and we are not ready to give it twice. We should not make the same mistake twice. I am convinced that Iraq’s rehabilitation is just a matter of time, and it is our turn to decide how long that will take.
“It is only the Iraqi government that you can freely speak against,” says Jihad al-Mandilawi, a guard.
Posted by: Pat | Jan 7 2005 17:15 utc | 38
Hello all. Back from a week in Nanaimo BC (Canada), travelling there and back by train and various other conveyances. Once again struck by the pathos of (what is left of) the US rail system — who was it said that it would “embarrass a Bulgarian”? — several fellow-passengers commented, during a true “Amtrak from Hell” experience northbound, that they were personally ashamed that their “great country” has one of the worst rail systems on Earth.
Being in Canada for a few days was like a brief vacation from the loony bin. People were sane, well-behaved, courteous; cities were fairly clean, transit systems ran on time and were well maintained. While there is far too much Americanisation of BC, particularly the ludicrous/tragic Giant Strip Mall that sprawls N and S of Nanaimo, the general tenor of life is calmer, less volatile, more civil. Even the road signage exhorting drivers to obey speed limits, turn lights on and off, etc. prefaces its directives with “Please” and often ends them with “Thanks”. By contrast, US signage barks out orders with the telegraphic rudeness of paramilitary discourse.
Of course most people were talking about the tsunami (I was staying among maritime folks). One old codger in a chandlery remarked that it was nice living in western Canada — “we don’t have earthquakes and tsunamis, and we don’t have Bush.” Interesting juxtaposition. His equally venerable chum responded that they should knock on wood, the Yanks might invade any day on a whim — “we’ve got natural gas eh?”. So there’s my tiny sample of “How America’s Image is Doing Among Ordinary Folks”.
Haven’t had time to catch up on the mass of posting since I left, but skimmed the open threads. I do tend to agree that Jerome’s LCS thesis is seriously flawed — both historically and anthropologically underinformed — and would like to engage w/it in more detail; but for the nonce will merely snipe at one fundamental assumption: “the peasants are better off under capitalism than they were before [under feudalism?].” This is a core justification for capitalism-the-ideology. Actually all social systems from theocracy to the Divine Right of Kings justify themselves in this way — even if their ostensible purpose is to curry Divine approval, the end result is that happy Gods are kinder to the people, the crops will be good, etc. Because it is a fundamental tenet of the Capitalist Faith, I think it bears much closer examination.
The first question we could ask is “which peasants?” After all, what we know as capitalism was jump-started in C16 by a massive looting of specie and other goods from colonised nations, in other words an unparalleled global act of armed theft. A massive liquidation of fauna and flora throughout the N hemi, massacres and imprisonment of indigenous peoples (some of the most severe taking place in S America where the maximum extraction of precious metals also occurred), and a thriving slave trade are the foundation stones of modern capitalism. If we count all the hundreds of millions of peasants who over the course of capitalism’s ascendancy were deprived of land, livelihood, autonomy, culture, language, children, and life itself in order to build this “great” new system of capitalism, we would have to conclude that only white peasants of European descent eventually, after many generations, became “better off” as, after great struggle, they were finally allowed a share of the loot.
Initially, of course, Euro peasants were driven by force into the maw of factory labour, by the Enclosures (UK version) and similar processes: land holdings were consolidated and privatised, collective agricultural practises were outlawed by both force and fraud. The desperate and starving ex-peasantry that resulted from this deliberate displacement were easy recruits for 14-hour-a-day, starvation-wage factory work — and this mechanism persisted for two or three centuries before there was any substantial reform effort. Even if we limit our consideration to Anglo peasantry, were the generations who slaved from dark to dark in the “Satanic mills,” from the age of five on, “better off” than they had been working on the land? They did not think so — the folk culture of their day laments with heartbreaking poignancy the cruelty of their forcible conversion into mass, expendable industrial labour. They had to be herded off their land and into the mills and mines at gunpoint, much as indigenes worldwide had to be forced to labour for the new Anglo overlords under the lash, hanged and burned by the hundreds and thousands pour encourager les autres and so on.
So, when we proclaim proudly that capitalism made peasants “better off,” what we are talking about is the apparent contemporary affluence of the great-grandchildren of the survivors of what at the time was a disaster even for peasantry in N Europe, and is still an on-going disaster for peasantry and indigenes worldwide. Capitalism continues to destroy the lives of peasants today, by the destruction and contamination of biotic systems — which devastates their agricultural security; by the consolidation of wealth (by means of usury and loan sharking as well as by the more widely accepted mechanisms of interest accumulation and speculation) which leads inexorably to consolidation of land ownership, expropriation, foreclosure etc.; and by the continuing, systematic process of undermining regional autonomy and food security in favour of perilous dependence on fixed, rigged global commodity markets and upon the exploitation of “cheap acreage” to produce cash crops for wealthy Western markets at the expense of local nutritional sufficiency.
Even yeoman peasants such as American family farmers are seeing their land and livelihood destroyed, inexorably, decade by decade. I think the claim that “peasants” are better off is one of the weakest that can be made for the system. Suggested reading for Jerome: Guns Germs and Steel (I’ll think of some more later).
There is also the question of how enduring the increased well-being of the petit-bourgeois, tradesman, and servant class (the people who really benefited most from their masters’ adoption of capitalism as the new ideology of wealth) really is… but that’s a whole other can of worms. The liquidation model of resource use is more “industrial” than it is either capitalistic or communistic, that is, we can point to Lake Baikal or to Rocky Flats as examples of the same feckless, suicidal attitude to resource, toxicity, and biotic viability. At heart both systems partake of the fantasy that humans “create wealth,” and the rigorous denial that real wealth (biotic viability, the ability of landscape to sustain life) is often destroyed, sometimes irrevocably, by the practises that create wholly symbolic, artificial “wealth” in terms of cowrie shells or numbers in bank accounts. Capitalism has so far distinguished itself by its extraordinary efficiency in looting and wrecking real resources (soil, water, biotic diversity, predictable climate) in order to create surplus short-term “wealth”. Since peasants live closest to these resources, their lot is likely to become less and less happy as the “externalised cost” liquidation model rushes headlong towards its inevitable brick wall.
Posted by: DeAnander | Jan 7 2005 19:50 utc | 45
Sweden, the Model
How is the Swedish model faring?
by Joakim Palme, director of the Institute for Future Studies
Sweden moved into the 21st century after a decade of mass unemployment, financial crisis and cutbacks in the social welfare sector. Moreover, inequality has increased today, the population is ageing and large groups of immigrants are jobless. EU membership and globalisation of the economy, meanwhile, appear to be restricting Sweden’s room for manoeuvre on national policy issues. This prompts the question of how the Swedish model is faring.
Ever since the arrival of Marquis Childs’s book, Sweden: The Middle Way, in the 1930s, the idea of an alternative Swedish social model has been strong in people’s minds, both internationally and at home. At various times, this model has been associated with the way decisions are made, the shape of social welfare policy and other public institutions, and the nature of differences in people’s lives and circumstances. Despite the fact that society has changed radically since the 1930s, the concept of a Swedish model lives on. In recent years, however, the perception that Sweden is special has been increasingly questioned in Sweden itself. And beyond the country’s borders, the crisis of the 1990s and the cutbacks and reforms introduced as a consequence, have been seen as the beginning of the end for this model.
In the field of social welfare, Sweden has come to represent the archetype of a universal model. All Swedish residents are included and the vast majority are insured primarily via the various public welfare systems. In the case of welfare transfers, employees receive a combination of general benefits and universal means-tested benefits. Entitlement is individual and is not related to the family provider. Public healthcare insurance is available to all. A distinguishing feature of the Swedish social model is its comprehensive range of publicly subsidised welfare services for everything from childcare to care of the elderly. Local authorities have been the main providers of these services. Social policy programmes targeting disadvantaged groups have been variously integrated into the country’s public social welfare institutions. Policy in the disability field is one such example. In addition, the Swedish social welfare model has been based on a policy of full unemployment with a strong element of both active and selective labour market initiatives. The welfare services sector itself is a major employer.
In discussing social welfare models, people tend to confuse the instruments of social policy with the consequences they are thought to entail. This causes problems when the time comes to analyse the actual impact of different social policy models on such things as poverty levels and inequality in society. The Swedish model is generally associated with low poverty levels, a low level of inequality, a high employment rate, a high level of employment among women, and a situation in which disadvantaged groups such as single mothers and people with disabilities are more likely than in other countries to live on terms that are not very different from those enjoyed by the majority of the population. There is plenty of evidence to suggest that the institutions comprising the Swedish model have contributed to such an outcome, but there are also other reasons why equality in living standards has become a feature of this model.
Relations between the social partners, labour and management, tend to be discussed in terms of the mutual understanding and negotiated solutions that are usually achieved in Sweden, often with a strong emphasis on equality. Such agreements, too, are seen as a feature of the Swedish model. They do not mean, however, that the underlying conflicts in society have been eliminated, but rather that compromise has been viewed as a means of reducing open conflict and thereby promoting growth. The fierce political battle that took place over the introduction of a compulsory profit-sharing scheme, the so called wage-earner funds, and the employers’ decision to move away from central wage negotiations in the early 1980s could both be viewed as departures from the consensus model. After the country’s economic crisis peaked in the mid-1990s, however, the introduction of a new, more decentralised model for wage formation, along with the emergence of a more independent Bank of Sweden (Riksbanken), contributed to real wage increases and employment growth coupled with a low rate of inflation. Pay differentials, however, have increased. It remains to be seen how persistent and sustainable this trend will be and how well the new institutions will be able to cope with future conflicts.
While the features described above characterised social welfare institutions in Sweden going into the 1990s, some sectors were clearly having problems introducing the welfare principles involved and others were finding it hard to uphold them. The earnings-related principle in both traditional social insurance and unemployment insurance was eroded as a result of a growing number of people moving up into income brackets that brought them above the ceiling for benefit entitlement. In addition, there were obvious failings in the provision of decent basic benefits for parental leave, for instance. Regular unemployment insurance was not universal but based on a voluntary state subsidised model. Childcare services had been expanding during the 1980s but access was uneven around the country and between different groups in society. At the same time, austerity measures had been introduced in the old-age care sector. The healthcare service was struggling with queues for operations and recruitment problems as unemployment in Sweden soared to record heights towards the end of the decade. It is wrong, therefore, to imagine that the Swedish social welfare model has ever worked perfectly.
The 1990s began with what was described as the tax reform of the century. It involved reducing marginal rates while at the same broadening the tax base; it separated tax on labour and capital, it redistributed income by means of household transfers rather than progressive taxation, and so forth. While the tax reform was under-financed, a larger problem for government finances was the time of its introduction. The problem was that the financial and credit markets had already been deregulated while wage increases were now inflationary and marginal tax rates high. This led to a rush of speculation in the property market. When the social partners agreed on a wage freeze, inflation vanished and the speculation bubble burst, triggering a banking crisis. Moreover, the tax reform made it expensive for Swedes to borrow but profitable to save. Household demand fell dramatically while at the same time the country’s export industry entered a recession. Unemployment hit the manufacturing sector first but then spread to the publicly financed welfare services sector. In the space of only two years, the employment rate plunged 13 per cent. Unemployment in the open labour market rose from 1.7 to 8.2 per cent, and the proportion of people in government relief jobs and training programmes, etc, rose from 2.2 to 6.2 per cent. Sweden’s GNP declined for three successive years. The crisis in public finances became acute when the budget deficit reached 13 per cent of GNP. Meanwhile, the biggest wave of refugees Sweden had seen since the Second World War was arriving. No part of the Swedish model was in good shape.
One of the pillars of this model, an active employment policy, was designed to manage an unemployment rate of no more than 3 per cent. The shift from active to passive government measures, therefore, was a dramatic one and the quality of the active measures deteriorated. Despite this, a growing number of the jobless had no recourse to either active or passive unemployment benefit but flooded into the social benefit system instead. The direct costs of unemployment grew extremely high and virtually crowded-out other areas of government expenditure, while at the same time the tax base was eroded.
The centre-right coalition government that held power from 1991 to 1994 reacted by imposing widespread cutbacks in the country’s social security systems, although leaving some untouched. The Social Democratic government that followed continued in the same vein but combined cutbacks with tax increases of almost the same magnitude. The list of cutbacks in income maintenance systems was long. The hardest to bear for most people were the cutbacks in sickness benefit and unemployment benefit. Reductions in the nominal child allowance sum also belong in this category. Revising the indexing of various benefits is a frequently used method for reducing expenditure without this being too evident. The changes made in the indexing of pensions fell into this category, as did the changes in advance-maintenance support to single parents. These changes involved cutbacks without actually constituting a change in model in the sense of importing principles from other social welfare models. Lower benefit levels, however, increase the scope for collectively bargained schemes and other kinds of private insurance.
In one respect, some developments brought social insurance in Sweden closer to what is termed the basic security model. This was a result of ‘non-decisions’ whereby no changes were made in the ceilings for income on which benefit entitlement is based. As these ceilings or maximum benefit levels followed price trends, the fact that real wages increased meant that a growing number of people earned incomes in excess of the ceilings. This applied in the case of sickness and parental benefit, and to an even greater extent in the case of unemployment benefit.
Qualification rules have been enforced more strictly in most social insurance areas without this being directly influenced by regulatory changes. Similarly, one can see variations in the way the rules and regulations concerning social assistance have been applied, both across time and between local authorities.
In the welfare services sector, developments have been more heterogeneous. In some areas, the trend is towards greater universalism, in others greater selectivism. Most areas are having to conserve their resources, which have declined in relation to needs.
In the childcare sector, the pattern in the 1990s was one of both greater universalism and greater resource depletion. This was due on the one hand to an increasingly large proportion of each age cohort entering publicly subsidised childcare, which reinforced the universal character of the Swedish model. On the other hand, a marked decline occurred in the amount actually spent on each child in public childcare, which led to such developments as a lower staff-child ratio. Despite an improvement both in expenditure and staff density at the end of the decade, the levels achieved in 1990 were not restored.
In compulsory education, both costs per pupil and staff-pupil ratios have been reduced considerably. Upper secondary schools have suffered resource depletion on a similar scale, but in their case universalism has increased as a growing number in each age cohort have entered upper secondary programmes after compulsory school. Resource depletion in the educational field could be said to correspond to the reduction in social insurance benefit levels and in that sense could be described as another cutback that does not actually represent a change of model.
In the old-age care sector, a declining share of elderly people receive publicly financed home help services. A small group with very extensive needs are appropriating an increasingly large share of the available resources. At the same time, responsibility for the elderly is shifting from public institutions to the family and the market.
Disability policy is another sector that displays conflicting tendencies. On the one hand, this sector as a whole has been an object of ambitious reforms and special measures – in particular the personal assistant reform – that have considerably improved the resources and freedom of action of the most disadvantaged among the disabled. On the other hand, many of those with disabilities have been confronted by changes in home help services that have meant fewer and fewer people receiving increasingly expensive help.
Throughout the welfare services sector, employment policy included, a decentralisation trend is discernible, even if some movement in the opposite direction has been noted in recent years. In the welfare services field, ideology has played an increasingly important role. It is not clear how this should be interpreted in model terms, but the purchaser-provider approach has paved the way for the growth of private provision in a number of areas. Both the proportion and the actual numbers working in private companies have increased sharply in all welfare service areas, although starting levels have varied to a considerable extent. For the welfare services sector as a whole, the proportion of private employees increased from about 6 to 12 per cent during the decade. Models differ from area to area. Sometimes what are known as customer choice models are used, but often a bidding procedure is involved with public and private actors competing for the contract. It is also clear that private providers are largely a metropolitan phenomenon. Very little information is available concerning the consequences of privatisation, as regards both user experience and provider experience.
The notion of a ‘model shift’ denotes changes of such a far-reaching nature that they alter the fundamental principles of a country’s central social welfare system. This may, for instance, involve changes from earnings-related to flat-rate social insurance benefits, to means-tested benefits or to a state corporatist system of earnings-related social insurance. A few changes introduced in the 1990s were clearly designed to bring about a change of model but proved to be only minor disruptions in the overall trend. One of them concerned the introduction of a ‘home care allowance’ for parents with young children, which only lasted a few months in 1994. This allowance represented an attempt to give the family greater responsibility for children with the aid of public funding, and marked a departure from the ‘dual earner model’, according to which both spouses contribute to family upkeep by going out to work. The other reform coincided with the first and met the same fate. It concerned the introduction of a compulsory dimension into the unemployment insurance system. This reform marked a departure from the established Swedish model involving state subsidies to voluntary unemployment funds. However, it applied to an area where the existing system deviates from the compulsory universal approach that otherwise characterises the Swedish social insurance system. At the height of the economic crisis, there were far-reaching plans to make the social partners responsible for both sickness and unemployment benefit, i.e. to introduce a corporatist model. In the debate on this issue, there have been vociferous calls for the introduction of means-testing across the board. There have also been calls from time to time for the introduction of ‘citizen’s accounts’ or a ‘citizen’s wage’. The most striking outcome both of the debate and of the crisis years is the fundamental stability of the social welfare policy systems, in contrast to the fevered nature of the debate on their future.
A number of dramatic changes have, however, taken place. The major pensions reform introduced in Sweden in the 1990s presents a formidable challenge to anyone seeking to describe social policy reforms in modern, mature welfare states. For a start, this was no straightforward retrenchment package. On the contrary, it entailed increased government spending in both the short and medium terms. In the long term, the outcome is genuinely uncertain. If economic growth in Sweden is good, expenditure will be higher than it would have been had the rules not been changed. What complicates matters is that as a result of the system’s contribution-defined character, pension levels have become dependent not only on employment and growth but also on life expectancy in the population. If life expectancy increases, this would mean lower expenditure than if the reform had not been introduced. This demographic factor is likely to exert a general and downward pressure on the level of pensions. Otherwise, the revised entitlement rules mean that some people will be drawing smaller pensions and some larger. The reform also means an increase in the degree of pre-funding, with a strong element of privatisation and freedom of choice for the individual to invest a portion of his pension contributions as he wishes. The size of the return on the part of the pension that is invested in a pension fund will depend on the individual’s choice of fund manager. This introduces an individual form of risk diversification that was previously foreign to the social insurance system. The social policy objectives of providing both basic security and security of income within the framework of a publicly financed compulsory system remain unchanged. The means, however, have altered, which in itself may have far-reaching consequences for various interests in society.
Membership of the European Union has had little direct impact on Swedish social policy. Swedish policy on alcohol is perhaps the most notable exception. Historically, it has been incorporated into the country’s general social and healthcare policy. The aim has been not only to get to grips with widespread abuse and a drink culture that is peculiar to the Nordic area, as well as the consequences of this culture in the form of suicides and crimes of violence, but also to reduce the harmful effects of alcohol on public health. In practice, policy has been based on what is called the total consumption model. A central observation in this respect is that the harmful effects of alcohol are closely related to average levels of consumption in society. Accordingly, policymakers seek by various means to reduce overall consumption via high prices (selective purchase tax) and to restrict access both in retail stores and in the number of distribution points. In addition, efforts have been made to influence drinking patterns by taxing wine less heavily than spirits. The lower prices found in Europe and the substantially higher import quotas now permitted have not only boosted border trade but also increased the pressure on Sweden’s alcohol policy as a whole. In the case of drugs policy, it is worth noting here that different countries in the European Union apply different approaches.
Although it is difficult to find evidence of any substantial change of model in Sweden in the 1990s, either in the welfare services sector or in the transfer sphere, some changes marking a departure from the Swedish model may be noted. In some cases, they could be labelled partial changes of model that in the course of time may cause social welfare to move in a direction other than the established one. Even moderate cutbacks in public benefit levels, for instance, increase the scope for individual coverage and collectively bargained alternatives, which may force benefit levels down still further. Similarly, any deterioration in quality or accessibility in the welfare services sector may cause privileged groups to choose alternatives that lie wholly or partially outside the public system. Such a development might in turn lead to a loss of interest in preserving the quality of the universal systems. On the other hand, greater freedom of choice in the publicly financed security systems may make people more willing to pay taxes and fees to compulsory systems. Local authorities’ greater freedom of decision enables them to introduce local changes of model of a more dramatic kind in the welfare services sector. Also, a lack of political decision-making may have far-reaching consequences for how the country’s social security systems are perceived.
The crisis that the Swedish model has undergone has presented different aspects. The financial crisis was deep but could be overcome relatively quickly. The political and ideological crisis that this model underwent for much of the 1980s and early 1990s appears to have been superseded by greater backing for major public undertakings in the various areas of social policy. Furthermore, the number of people who feel that the various systems are being over-exploited declined in the early 1990s. Public faith in the model now appears to be strong on the whole, but an element of distrust remains. It is expressed in dissatisfaction with healthcare services and with the returns on taxes. Faith in private alternatives, however, does not appear to have increased.
The beginning of the 21st century brought a recovery for several of the country’s social security systems – the Swedish model is now in slightly better shape. At the same time, new problems and challenges have emerged. The increase in long-term sick leave means that working life must be re-examined and that more resources must be allocated to healthcare, education and social care programmes in particular, but also to rehabilitation programmes. A certain amount of debt build-up was a feature of the 1990s, with the national debt being just one example. The crisis imposed a strain on families’ financial margins, on the working environment in the form of greater stress, on people’s mental health and on the situation of disadvantaged groups in society. The declining birth rate increases the pressure on family welfare policy to provide the kind of resources that would enable women and men to start the families they wish for.
The various developments in the evolution of the Swedish model over the years could be viewed as reactions to structural changes and political mobilisation. If the politicians fail to respond to the new challenges facing them, there is a danger that important social policy gains will be lost, such as low poverty levels and improved gender equality. The Swedish model is now facing some important choices as to the future course of welfare policies. The choices made will shape the character of the Swedish model in the years to come. The only thing we can be sure of is that whatever decisions are reached, the model will remain Swedish.
– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
Joakim Palme is the newly appointed director of the Institute for Future Studies in Stockholm. He has worked for many years at the Swedish Institute for Social Research, Stockholm University.
Posted by: Cloned Poster | Jan 7 2005 23:24 utc | 59
I forgot to say how much I liked Pedro’s post.
I think it’s indeed true that a “statist economy” is stifling, tends towards totalitarianism, suppresses the democratic impulse. But here’s the interesting part: there are imho at least two ways to have a “statist economy”.
One is where the State tries to run all businesses — the other is where big business tries to run the State.
Capitalist corporatocracy of the kind we have in the US today is the latter flavour, and it is as corrupt, wasteful, and criminal as any third world dictatorship or decadent late-communist bureaucracy imho. Right now, private profiteering is setting the agenda for government — legislation, policy, warmaking.
I also think that blanket dismissals of the achievements of various socialist revolutions worldwide are vulnerable to the same kind of argument made in favour of the capitalist system. Real benefits were realised by real people. Millions — tens of millions — of peasants and low-ranking workers were far, far better off under communism than they had been under previous — monarchical/feudal — systems. The communist revolution in Russia freed millions upon millions from hereditary serfdom — introduced universal education and literacy to villages whose peasants had been illiterate for generations — brought a rushed, often crude, but functional industrialism to huge areas still living technologically in mediaeval times.
So it is imho simply not true that the Russians, for example, had “nothing to show for it” (their liquidation of resources, their authoritarian system). Almost overnight they were transformed from a third world nation, a monarchical/feudal backwater, into a world power (and the proud producer of chess champions, first-rate mathematicians, arguably the world’s best corps de ballet, and so on). This “great leap forward” (if I may mix my revolutions a bit) came at an enormous price (some of it not realised until later) in both human misery and biotic vandalism — but so, as I have noted above, has capitalism.
Afghani women were, by and large, way better off under Soviet Communist occupation than previously under patriarchal traditionalism or latterly under naked warlordism. China pre-Maoism was unbelievably cruel and corrupt (I highly recommend Han Suyin’s massive tetralogy covering the decades before and immediately after the Chinese Revolution, for a perspective on the abuse and suffering that stoked the fires of revolution in that country). While we commonly bemoan the violent excesses of the French Revolution, I think it was Mark Twain who indignantly asked who remembers the millions killed and humiliated with impunity by the aristocratic classes for centuries leading up to it… My point is that the benefits of various communist revolutions were just as real as their victims — just as the victims of capitalism are just as real as its benefits. We cannot make an honest assessment of any social theory without facing up to both aspects (victims and benefits).
Also we, those of us who came of age during the later parts of C20, witnessed the decay and fall of the Soviet and Chinese revolutionary systems. We were not present during the arc of their hopefulness and success, when their achievements were shiny and new. We are imho also past the arc of hope and success for capitalism and well into the commencement of decay; if predictions of the collapse of the US dollar (etc) come true, we may live to see its squalid, disorderly and humiliating end-state, when the exorbitant cost of its achievements can no longer be ignored. Our assessment of the success or failure of any system largely depends on where along its historical arc we take our snapshot.
Now, I have no doubt that capitalism can, with sufficient political will and an informed and passionately engaged electorate, be domesticated — much as hereditary monarchy was domesticated from its virulent feral form into constitutional monarchy and thence into the harmless, if expensive, ritual of State which it is today in Euroland. Of course, capitalism in its current, feral, barbarous form tends to stifle the very social institutions needed to moderate it.
Bottom-feeding, corporate media and Scroogeian social policy both tend to produce an ignorant, functionally-illiterate and terminally distracted electorate; and the erosion of social capital caused by rabid privatisation (privateering) and by doctrinal monadism, tends to produce anomie and political apathy.
Communism can also be domesticated and democratised — as has been happening in Cuban agriculture for example, where more and more local and individual control has been granted to producers and the model of centralised, total State micromanagement has slowly been atrophying as it proves unworkable. Micromanagement and rigid control by “professional planners” is almost inevitably disastrous whether those planners call themselves capitalists or communists; and this is I think illustrated vividly by Pedro’s delightful post.
Pedro’s management model could be applied equally by a capitalist boss or a communist government — the important feature is that individuals are given autonomy and creative decision-making power over their own work, within the larger structure of the collective endeavour. The other (imho very important) lesson from Pedro’s story is that maximum “efficiency” is incompatible with maximum human happiness, i.e. squeezing the maximum profit-making or productive efficiency out of a system per unit labour inevitably results in treating the labourers as less than adult or as less than human.
Posted by: DeAnander | Jan 8 2005 4:48 utc | 72
July 5, 2003
US-EU: The Constitutional Divide
by Marian Tupy and Patrick Basham
Marian Tupy is assistant director of the Project on Global Economic Liberty and Patrick Basham is senior fellow in the Center for Representative Government at the Cato Institute.
All written constitutions are products of their time. They reflect a specific political culture, the strength of different political interests, and the particular historical concerns of the authors themselves. As President Bush, sworn to defend a constitution written over 200 years ago, meets in Washington with EU leaders finalizing a constitution of their own, the respective documents reflect the differences between American and European political cultures.
The American Constitution is a product of the 18th century Enlightenment. Its overriding concern is the relationship between individual freedom and coercive government power. Hence, the government’s powers are delegated, enumerated, and thus limited. The authority that government enjoys is derived from the people, who can, in theory, reclaim that authority.
In contrast, the recently drafted EU constitution is a product of 20th century welfare-state socialism. The official goal was to design a simpler, more efficient, more democratic Europe that is “closer to its citizens.” However, the goal was never seriously pursued and, consequently, never achieved. As a result, the new constitution will have serious negative implications for liberal parliamentary democracy and the principles of self-government.
The EU constitution makes European government more, not less, remote from the citizenry. The EU’s operations are expanded, not streamlined, and its bureaucracy is made more complex, not simpler. There are no cuts to the EU’s 97,000 pages of accumulated laws and regulations. The EU’s powers are supposedly limited in this document but there is an escape clause in case the Brussels-based bureaucracy ever feels boxed in by popular sentiment. The decisions in Brussels are final and EU laws supersede laws made by national parliaments.
The EU constitution ignores the delineation of government powers for both ideological and practical reasons. Ideologically, the federalist European Left views government as the initiator of action, which is why it favors a government uninhibited by individual freedom. By contrast, most Americans view government as a facilitator of actions initiated by private individuals. That is why individualism is incompatible with the welfare state and that is why it is rejected by European elites as alien to the European political system.
In practical terms, the drafters of the EU constitution made a conscious decision to leave the exact parameters of federal government power as ambiguous as possible. This is in order to provide for the expansion of EU power held centrally in Brussels. If the EU is ever to approximate the stature of the United States in international affairs and global economics, the Brussels-led reasoning goes, centralized decision-making must increase. Hence, the pessimism of those seeking to overturn the EU’s longstanding “democratic deficit.”
The EU constitution is also full of dangerously vague, politically correct phraseology, including references to “sustainable development,” “solidarity between generations,” and “the social market economy.” Moreover, the EU constitution is also preoccupied with the codification of welfare entitlements, i.e., redistributive claims that individuals and/or groups make against one another. For example, some of the provisions in the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, such as the right to a job, can only be guaranteed through the transfer of vast resources from some citizens to others.
When the original Charter was signed, it was considered a non-binding statement of intent. That is why the British, whose political system most closely resembles the American, were willing to consent to it. The EU constitution makes the Charter provisions compulsory in the manner of the American Bill of Rights. However, the two are fundamentally different. With the exception of the 7th Amendment, which provides Americans with the right to a trial by jury, the Bill of Rights stipulates only those rights individuals possess vis-à-vis the state. It says nothing about entitlements that some people may receive at others’ expense.
The formal adoption of the EU constitution will result in one of two possible outcomes. Either the constitutional welfare provisions will be discretely ignored, because of their prohibitive cost and negative effect on European economic growth, or their enforcement will lead to even greater central government regulation of European social and economic life.
In the former outcome, the entire EU constitution will be devalued by overtly broken promises. The latter outcome will relegate the European economy to permanent second-class socio-economic status and thus postpone, perhaps indefinitely, the European dream of eventually rivaling American financial wealth, cultural influence, and political power.
Alain Lamassoure, a French delegate to the EU Constitutional Convention, states, “Our work compares favorably with that of the Philadelphia Convention.” On the contrary, the EU’s technocratic social engineers confused their overly elaborate constitutional designs with the simple yet enlightened principles that anchor the American Constitution and underpin the very success that the EU exists to emulate.
Posted by: Pat | Jan 8 2005 12:33 utc | 82
In the former outcome, the entire EU constitution will be devalued by overtly broken promises. The latter outcome will relegate the European economy to permanent second-class socio-economic status and thus postpone, perhaps indefinitely, the European dream of eventually rivaling American financial wealth, cultural influence, and political power.
Had to laugh. Look at the Euro. Look at the dollar. Then tell me whose economy is heading for second-class status… The EU imho will not just rival US power and influence, it will eclipse it. And it will happen pretty soon — it is happening right now — unless we get a competent administration running the US instead of this happy band of fantasists, brigands and bible-thumpers.
BTW about taxes. I was buying some parts at a chandlery in BC and my host said, “You’d better be prepared, we have 14 percent tax here.” My jaw dropped a bit. He said, “Yep we have the national tax and the provincial tax, it adds up to 14.” I said, “Wow, we have about 8.5 percent sales tax in California and people complain about that.” He thought for a moment and said, “Well sometimes I feel like complaining, because it seems like you can buy stuff cheaper in the States. But on the other hand I know I can walk into a clinic or doctor’s office and get medical care whenever I need it, and I don’t have to worry that I’ll lose everything — my house, my business, my savings — if I get seriously ill. So I guess the 14 percent is pretty cheap insurance eh?”
I thought about this and ya know, moving to Canada is looking even better than usual to me at this moment. I think he’s right. In the US we have the worst of all possible worlds right now. We pay a fair amt in taxes — we middle class people who don’t have offshore bank accounts and front companies and clever lawyers and special credits for buying giant SUVs — and we get damn-all for it. Our money is handed over to corrupt corporate barons for no-bid contracts and secret deals whose details are never revealed until 30 years later. Our schools are failing, the roads in my town are potholed worse than in some third world burg, there’s no public transit, 45 million of us have no health insurance at all, and yet I’m paying 30 percent income tax to the feds. All I’m paying for, as far as I can tell, is BushCo’s private war and the bloated, Soviet-style HSA and TSA created to spy on me, treat me like a criminal, and humiliate me in airports.
I love the way this administration, which wants to “privatise” everything, wants my tax dollars to fund their dirty little smash-n-grab raid on Iraq. Sorry, I’m really ranting… But this conversation with my Canadian friend made me think rather clearly and hard for a few minutes about what he pays in taxes and what he gets for his money, and what I pay in taxes and what I get for my money. His government is imho clearly giving him a better deal. He has public transit that works, a relatively clean environment, a clean and functional city with decent pavement, and he doesn’t have to fear bankruptcy if he gets seriously ill. I’d say his social contract is working pretty well. If his government were a company, and the US government were a company, and I were deciding where to take my business, I’d definitely shop at his government. They treat their customers better and give better value for money.
Posted by: DeAnander | Jan 8 2005 20:03 utc | 96
|